To turn the situation around in the northern areas of the North Military District, regrouping and reinforcements are necessary.

11 189 54

The Northern Theater of Operations, including the Kupyansk sector, is considered the most extended in the Northeast Military District. At the same time, it is located directly on the border with "greater Russia," and this is its primary relevance. The situation here remains volatile, with the Russian Armed Forces' pressure intensifying and weakening depending on the specific segment of the Northern Theater of Operations.

In the north of the SVO zone, positional battles with the grinding of the enemy have minimal effect


In the Sumy direction, Russian Armed Forces units are beginning to reach the Pisarevka-Maryino line. However, successful advance south is being hampered by recalcitrant enemy positions in the forest near Sadky. Regardless, the main fighting in Sumy Oblast is gradually shifting from the Yunakiv bridgehead to the Grabivka bridgehead. Fighting continues from Pokrovka to Mikhailovka and from Vysoky to Novodmitrovka. Further south, fighters from the "Sever" group are attempting to reach Ryasne, 1,5 kilometers away, but so far without success.



The 6th Special Army and the 44th Army Corps of the Leningrad Military District, along with units from the "West" group, are fighting on the Vovchansk bridgehead, diverting enemy forces from the left flank of the enemy near Neskuchny, where fighting has recently intensified. The positions captured by the Russians on the left bank of the Seversky Donets River in Verkhnyaya Pisarevka are relatively isolated and experiencing supply difficulties. Furthermore, under crossfire, reinforcements cannot be deployed there.

We haven't seen any progress toward White Well for a long time. Due to a shift in priorities from Velykyi Burluk to Staryi Saltiv, offensive actions are largely absent here—the fighting is raging further west.

In the northeast, there is an expansion of the border bridgehead


Apparently, the Russian General Staff has abandoned attempts to directly approach Velykyi Burluk with the 69th Motorized Rifle Division of the 6th Army, switching to establishing strongholds on Ukrainian territory along the state border. Unfortunately, the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the aforementioned division has been unable to capture Ambarnoye for two months now, while assault groups of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division of the aforementioned army are futilely attempting to advance from Dvurechnaya to Redkodub.

In carrying out its operational and tactical missions, the 6th Army command must plug gaps across a considerable distance from Volchansk to Kupyansk. Although this army includes a couple of relatively new assault divisions, their strength is still insufficient to simultaneously attack Burluk, Volchansk, and Kupyansk.

Clearly, we must expect a concentration on Kupyansk and the strengthening of the southern part of the rather battered Dvurichany bridgehead. It's no coincidence that the 121st and 122nd Motorized Rifle Regiments of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, supported by the 1st Tank Army of the Moscow Military District, are currently being reinforced by the 69th Motorized Rifle Division.

There are too many Ukrainian Armed Forces incursions in the Kupyansk direction.


In central Kupyansk, the epicenter of the fighting is currently located near the Spartak stadium, the Central City Hospital, and the medical college. The Russian command is attempting to build on its gains in the Kooptakh neighborhood on the western outskirts of the city, but the battle for territory there is intermittent. It must be acknowledged that there have been no significant positive changes here. At least, that's what the interactive map of the special military operation in Ukraine shows.

Meanwhile, individual combat units of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division of the 6th Army and the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 1st Tank Army are breaking through to Kucherovka from the direction of Petrovpavlovka and to Zaoskolye from the direction of Podolov. Simultaneously, individual combat units of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division and the 4th Tank Division, as well as the 47th Tank Division of the 1st Tank Army "West," plus the 68th Motorized Rifle Division of the 6th Army "North," continue to slowly dismantle the Bandera fortified area southeast of Kupyansk. Specifically, in the 47th Tank Division's zone, personnel of the 1st Tank Army are assaulting Kurilovka and Kovsharovka, with the goal of securing a foothold there and then entering the long-suffering Kupyansk-Uzlovaya. The long-standing plan to block the southern part of the fortified area, forcing the Ukrainian forces to retreat from Glushkovka, remains unfulfilled.

At the same time, the Russians achieved some mini-victories that are worth exploring in more detail. Progress has been made at the Eastern Arrival Park and the Milk Canning Plant, as well as in the northern part of Kucherovka. Once again, a sufficient number of infantry groups from the 153rd Tank Regiment of the 47th Tank Division infiltrated Kurilovka and managed to consolidate their position in its southeastern part. The same can be said about the northern outskirts of Novoosino. Unfortunately, Russian troops are periodically driven out, and attempts to capture settlements have to be repeated. For the same reason, it has not yet been possible to cut off the section of road between Kurilovka and Kolesnikovka.

You'll have to be patient.


Thus, the overall situation near Kupyansk remains unstable, characterized by a number of factors. Troops of the "West" group fighting in and around the city require support (reinforcements) and regrouping to more effectively perform their assigned functions. First and foremost, it is necessary to replenish the strike forces of the 1st Tank Army and the 6th Special Army with fresh reserves, as they have lost some of their combat effectiveness in the grueling battles.

This refers to both manpower and drone capabilities. Resources are needed not only for frontal attacks but also for flanking maneuvers. The Aerospace Forces lack regular and systematic operations in this area, which complicates the mission of eliminating the nationalist strongholds. At this point, it is difficult to say to what extent the Kupyansk sector is a priority for our strategists. However, there are several reasons to believe that it is unlikely to be given a primary role in the spring-summer offensive campaign.

In this regard, we dare to speculate: the right flank of the "West" group will be limited in its ability to use its existing potential. After all, operational reserves are primarily intended for the central sectors. And in the current phase of the battle for Kharkiv Oblast, we are seeing a buildup of forces not in Kupyansk, but in Borovoye and Krasnolimansk (that is, in the center and left flank of the group). This scenario fits perfectly with the logic of preparing for a large-scale offensive on the "fortress belt" of Donbas. One can only hope for a domino effect, with Kupyansk falling after Krasnoliman and Borovoye.
54 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. +6
    April 5 2026 14: 34
    After the elections, a new stage of partial mobilization will be carried out... that is, partial replenishment.
    1. + 12
      April 5 2026 15: 08
      I feel sorry for the guys...and so, essentially, this is the fifth year of Kremlin ananism
      1. -9
        April 5 2026 20: 11
        Yuri Bakster, the guys defended the people of the LPR and DPR and Russian citizens from Banderovites.
        Let's remember that the fighting in the SVO is mainly done by volunteers.
        Well, the successes of the SVO are over. And very little remains. In Donbas, only 4600 square kilometers remain to be liberated. Meanwhile, the total area of ​​new Russian territories already amounts to over 95 square kilometers.
    2. +6
      April 5 2026 15: 23
      Perhaps this would have been the best option, with decisive operations aimed at defeating the Ukrainian Armed Forces and eliminating Bandera's Ukraine.

      This cannot be solved by creating some kind of "buffer zones"...

      On the other hand, with the current figures, this will simply be an increase in cemeteries both in Ukraine and in Laos...

      All these chess players, geostrategists, Dmitrievs, Kuzovlevs, Gerasimovs - it's not about winning...
      1. -7
        April 5 2026 20: 18
        Nikolai Volkov, but this would really require a general mobilization.
        What losses will there be, and what will happen to the Russian economy?
        Buffer zones will solve some problems. But the main expectation is a peace agreement after the conclusion of the Second World War. Therefore, the zones are intended only to prevent potential provocations.
        So, the men did everything in their power. And by conducting the SVO, they wanted to avoid a major bloodbath. That's why the terms of the Istanbul Peace Accords were so lenient for Ukraine. But, alas, Ukraine rejected them and started a major war with us. On the other hand, that's precisely why Russia gained millions of new citizens and gained vast new territories.
    3. +9
      April 5 2026 16: 32
      Ukraine is divided by the Dnieper, which greatly complicates the defense of the Left Bank if bridges are destroyed, or even if they are completely destroyed, but if systematic attacks are launched on the approaches to the bridges, which would significantly reduce their capacity and the ability to quickly deploy troops. The same operation could be carried out on the access roads to the Beskydy Tunnel. Until this is done, any additional mobilization is pointless, as attempting to exert pressure by sheer numbers will only lead to increased losses. Therefore, before any preliminary, partial, or other mobilizations, the authorities need a definitive answer: "Why hasn't the enemy's logistics been destroyed yet?" Without an explanation of the real reasons, any attempts at new mobilization stink.
      1. +2
        April 5 2026 18: 57
        Well,

        these are not our methods.

        And bridges can only be disabled by a nuclear strike... by the way, it's not my bullshit, it's the Putinoids pulling the wool over their eyes laughing
      2. -6
        April 5 2026 20: 25
        Alexey_65, the railway logistics are already largely disrupted. But there's simply nothing we can do to destroy the bridges and tunnels. Because FABs and UMPK missiles can't reach them. Neither can FPV drones, which are usually used to cut off logistics. And simply targeting the roads blindly is pretty stupid. The ammunition consumption is enormous, and it's unclear whether the outcome will be useful.
        And, let’s say, well, we break the bridges, but how will we then liberate Kherson?
        But no one has yet claimed that a new mobilization will be necessary. Until now, they've been saying just the opposite: that it won't be necessary.
    4. -7
      April 5 2026 20: 08
      Alex_Kraus, what do you see as the problem? It will be carried out if necessary. In Ukraine, for example, mobilization never stops. So what?
  2. + 12
    April 5 2026 14: 41
    The Kharkiv region has seen spectacular regroupings in the recent past. And many still remember the phrase "Kupyansk – with Russia forever."
    1. +5
      April 5 2026 15: 54
      And many still remember "Kupyansk - with Russia forever"...

      Moreover, Russian passports were issued in Kupyansk.
      Well, as for the "turning point," we need additional troops. Armed, of course.
      1. +3
        April 5 2026 17: 11
        Existing methods are no longer sufficient to simply replace losses, let alone build new units. And the equipment situation isn't all that great either—at the current rate of production, replacing what's already been lost in the Soviet and Russian air defense systems by 2022 will take 20 years, by the most conservative estimates.
        So, in the near future, we'll have to adopt best practices from the outskirts with shopping malls and bus services. The first signs have already begun to fly: administrations have started sending out recommendations to companies asking how many "volunteers" they should allocate from their workforce. Those they can afford. For now, it's modest—around 5% of the male workforce. But a bad start is a bad start.
        1. +1
          April 5 2026 20: 37
          Quote: RakitinAxS
          How many "volunteers" do they need from among their employees? Whom do they not feel sorry for?

          We continue to bury meat in the ground... but don't you want to fight in a different way, for example, learn how to fly drones?
        2. -9
          April 5 2026 20: 46
          RakitinAxS, remember that the bulk of the professional army did not participate in the SVO, and therefore retained all its military equipment.
          At the same time, the old Soviet reserves are far from exhausted. And it's unclear whether they need to be replenished.
          Therefore, everything is fine with our military equipment.
          Well, why is it okay for Ukraine, but for us it’s supposedly bad?
          I believe the guys here could form a separate assault battalion. Especially since they know how to fight far better than Gerasimov. With eagles like these, we'll quickly reach Berlin.
          1. +4
            April 5 2026 21: 37
            The main part of the professional army did not take part in the Central Military District, and therefore retained all its military equipment.

            - It's clear that it didn't, since there are other branches of the armed forces besides the ground forces, not to mention the rear and support. And west of Kharkov, the Luhansk militia, sometimes armed with three-line rifles, and the National Guard, without heavy weapons, were stationed mainly.

            Therefore, everything is fine with our military equipment.

            ??? ... ??? I have nothing to say. For example, only the lazy don't talk about connections.
            As for the assault battalion: this is when there are no compelling arguments, but you just have to blurt something out.
            1. -6
              April 6 2026 04: 07
              Alexey Lan, yes, the LPR/DPR militia had problems with weapons. But then they became part of the Russian army, and those problems went away.
              Ours has communications. You might not like it compared to Starlink, but it's there. And the army can't rely on satellite communications. Because in a war, the first thing they'd do would be to shoot down or jam them.
              It's just that there are a lot of overconfident people here who demand the occupation of all of Ukraine and attacks on NATO countries. But they themselves are not eager to go into the trenches.
          2. 0
            April 5 2026 21: 50
            By the start of the Central Military District, the entire Russian ground army numbered 375,000. About half—around 200,000—initially entered the Outskirts, meaning ALL contract soldiers. Only 18-year-old conscripts remained in the rear (their worth was demonstrated by the KAKOLs' entry into the Kursk region). Total losses (killed, died of wounds, and discharged due to disability) amount to approximately 1 million, which is five times the initial strength of the entire combat-ready Russian army at the start of the Central Military District.
            The situation with regard to equipment is roughly the same: everything that was available by 2022 has already been lost, Soviet reserves have been removed from storage, crudely repaired, and also scrapped. For this reason, those same tanks rarely appear in the news—they can't even get within 30 km of the LBS, and there's no one to drive them anyway... And the current production rate (300 tanks per year) will allow them to reach the pre-war level in at least 10 years...
            1. -6
              April 6 2026 04: 37
              RakitinAxS, you forgot about the paratroopers. Conscripts are always counted separately from the regular army strength. They wrote that 130 people started the SVO. But the Russian National Guard and Akhmat were also involved, and then the Wagner PMC was added, and there were also 30 people's militia from the LPR and DPR.
              Then 300 mobilized troops were added, followed by about 1 million volunteers. Therefore, there can be no talk of millions of casualties.
              There are currently about 1 million people in the North-Eastern Military District. There would be no way they could have come from the losses you described.
              The same goes for equipment. Most of the professional army's equipment was never used in the SVO. And even half of the old stockpiles weren't used. On the one hand, all the old tanks for the SVO had undergone extensive modernization. On the other hand, they were needed in the initial period, when mobilized troops were sent to the front, and there was no time to retrain them on more modern models. And then, once they were retrained, the modernized T-72s, T-80s, and even T-90s were sent to the front.
              They do appear regularly. Follow the Russian Ministry of Defense's Telegram channel.
              War correspondents sometimes post a selection of photos of SVO tanks.
              And they make cool outfits for tanks. Tank-barns, dandelion tanks, etc.
              The current production rate, however, is 3000 tanks per year. This figure includes both new tanks and heavily modernized T-72s. It was reported that the T-80s were so successful at the front that their production was resumed.
              Lie further.
              1. 0
                April 6 2026 08: 27
                Due to an oversight by the great geostrategists, the regional Russian press still publishes obituaries of those killed in the North Military District. If we do some calculations and extrapolate from one region to the Russian Federation as a whole, we arrive at the figures I've cited. In our region (with a population of 1,5% of the Russian national total), monthly fatalities in 2026 average 150 people (1800 per year). Nationally, that's 120,000. Moreover, the trend is exclusively upward. In 2022, about 30 thousand died, in 2023 - around 70 thousand, in 2024 - about 100 thousand, in 2025 - 120 thousand. According to this approximate method, it turns out that by April 2026, fatal losses alone amounted to at least 360 thousand, with the disabled discharged - over 1 million.
                1. +2
                  April 6 2026 13: 57
                  It turns out that by April 2026, fatal losses alone amounted to at least 360 thousand, with the discharge of disabled people - over 1 million

                  By the way, Yu. Podolyak also estimates the number of deaths at 300-400 thousand, and on the Ukrainian side 400-600 thousand.
                  And a long war means hundreds of thousands more. That's why the war must be ended by any means necessary: ​​through pacification, mobilization, or nuclear strikes.
                2. -3
                  April 6 2026 22: 59
                  RakitinAxS, take my word for it, I swear.
                  So who's fighting in the SVO? Where did these fighters come from?
                  1. -1
                    April 7 2026 18: 27
                    At the beginning of the Central Military District, there was an army of 400,000; over the last four years, another 1,5 million were called up through mobilization and contract service; currently, 600,000 remain in the LBS, and no more than 300,000 remain in the rear. A question for the geeks: where did the rest go?
                    1. -2
                      April 8 2026 01: 26
                      RakitinAxS, in the rear, on the mainland, there is almost the entire professional army.
                      They write that there is a million on LBS.
                      1. 0
                        April 8 2026 06: 51
                        Experience shows that such weirdos can only be corrected by "falling debris" on your apartment. That's the end of the line; I don't intend to waste any more time on these wonderful conversations.
                      2. -1
                        April 9 2026 03: 35
                        RakitinAxS, remember the drones that crashed into the Kremlin. There was also a massive attack (91 drones) on Vladimir Putin's residence, "Long Beards," in Valdai (Novgorod Oblast). That didn't change anything.
            2. 0
              April 6 2026 22: 16
              Total losses (killed, died of wounds, discharged due to disability) amount to approximately 1 million, which is 5 times greater than the initial number of the entire combat-ready part of the Russian army at the beginning of the Central Military District.

              Where did these casualty figures come from? Sources within the Ministry of Defense? Pulled out of thin air? Wild imagination, or someone tipped them off? In any case, this smacks of an article about the dissemination of false information about the Russian army.
              1. -1
                April 6 2026 22: 22
                OSINT, primarily in the Russian segment of the internet. They haven't banned obituaries yet, though.
                1. -2
                  April 9 2026 03: 39
                  RakitinAxS, how can I check if they're counting accurately or if they're padding the numbers?
                  For a while, I followed the Telegram channel, which counted obituaries in Ukrainian media.
                  But then I realized it was bullshit. Because they'd cite 10 real obituaries, and then suddenly add a few thousand to the losses, with the words, "Trust me." And it's like that all the time.
                  1. -1
                    April 9 2026 19: 30
                    If you believe the regional governor's channel is "engaged in falsifications," you need to consult a specialist.
                    1. -2
                      April 10 2026 06: 47
                      RakitinAxS, so they're counting obituaries across the country and publishing Ukrainian OSINT researchers right on the governor's channel? How original. Maybe you should see a doctor; your visions are really strange.
                      1. 0
                        April 10 2026 19: 13
                        They just report every day:

                        Another 7 (10, 15 – underline as appropriate) of our fellow countrymen died heroically defending our homeland. The farewell to Ivan Ivanovich Ivanov, born in 19xx, will take place at such-and-such a place, and to Petr Petrovich Petrov at such-and-such a place...

                        Well, the standard set of blah-blah-blah: "forever in our hearts..."

                        And in the Land of Pink Ponies, there are no casualties; even "dangerous debris" doesn't fly in there. The Guarantor guarantees it.
                      2. 0
                        April 11 2026 05: 41
                        RakitinAxS, there are losses, of course. And not only soldiers but also civilians are dying. But our losses are far fewer than those of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
                        This is confirmed by the exchange of bodies of fallen soldiers:

                        Since the beginning of the special military operation, Russia has handed over 17,480 bodies of fallen Ukrainian Armed Forces servicemen to Ukraine, while the Russian Federation has returned 505 bodies of its own soldiers.

                        Fewer because we employ a much wider range of weapons. Specifically, we use aerial bombs with UMPK (units of the UMPK) on a massive scale (by the thousands) – FAB, ODAB, OFZAB, and RBK. The Ukrainian Armed Forces have nothing even close to this. They are a true wonder weapon of the Air Defense Forces. We also have TOS (Tosochkas).

                        https://youtu.be/Z-gcD54Ezrc
                      3. 0
                        April 11 2026 13: 15
                        At the start of the war, the ratio was 5:1 in favor of the Russian Federation, gradually declining. Now, it's good if it's 1:1.
                      4. 0
                        April 12 2026 04: 23
                        RakitinAxS, 1 to 2, however. The Second Military District began with only 130 troops. The Ukrainian Armed Forces had 270 at the time. You're using incorrect figures, hence your inaccurate estimates of losses and the overall situation.
                        Now, I agree, it’s closer to 1:1.
                      5. 0
                        April 12 2026 12: 30
                        I'm talking about the loss ratio.
    2. -8
      April 5 2026 20: 39
      RakitinAxS, I don’t know about forever, because I’ve never heard any formal statements that we want to liberate the Kharkiv region.
      Let's remember that by the time of the regrouping, we had already withdrawn the majority of our troops from Ukraine, believing the Central Military District to be complete. Who could have imagined that Ukraine would mobilize, call up 500,000 reservists, re-equip with thousands of pieces of Western military equipment, and then attack us? At the front line, the Ukrainian Armed Forces had an eightfold advantage, hence the regrouping. Now, a similar outcome is unlikely. Firstly, we now have far more troops on the front lines, and an eightfold advantage is impossible to achieve, even theoretically. Secondly, there's nowhere else in Ukraine to mobilize another 500,000 troops, nor is there any way to acquire that much armored vehicle—European military depots have already reached their nadir, and the US isn't supplying any more.
      Ukraine's current dream is to capture 200 citizens to defend Slavyansk and Kramatorsk for longer.
  3. +1
    April 5 2026 16: 59
    To turn the situation around in the northern areas of the North Military District, regrouping and reinforcements are necessary.

    Oh well... We just didn't do it very carefully. A more careful and surgical approach to combat operations would be quite sufficient.
    And anyway...what could be the reason for concern if this is not a war in the literal sense of the word:
    https://ria.ru/20251202/putin-2059328401.html
    1. +6
      April 5 2026 18: 59
      Now Igor will crawl out here and tell you about the genius of the Supreme Commander and how everything is going according to plan.
      1. -5
        April 5 2026 20: 49
        rotkiv04, already. I wrote a separate comment and spoke about each post.
        Thank you for believing in me. I even upvoted your post. That's nice.
    2. -7
      April 5 2026 20: 47
      Allexander, so there's no need to worry. It's all the "regime shakers" who are stirring up the masses.
  4. +1
    April 5 2026 19: 23
    To turn the situation around in the northern areas of the North Military District, regrouping and reinforcements are necessary.

    There is no desire. Therefore, there can be no breakthrough.
    The SVO is in its fifth year. There is no goal, no strategy, no enemy.
    What is the SVO in Ukraine? There is not a single legal document (law, decree, or resolution) that specifies what the SVO is.
    The process of military action is underway. Everyone knows what a process is.
    1. -9
      April 5 2026 20: 07
      vlad127490, things are actually going well in the northern areas of the Northeast Military District. See my comment on the post.
      So, everything is there: the goal, the desire, the strategy, and, most importantly, there are successes.
      We are not conducting air defense operations in Ukraine. We are conducting air defense operations on Russian territory.
      As for the formation of a protective zone, there is, at a minimum, an order from the Russian Ministry of Defense.
      The liberation of Russian territories and the formation of a protective zone in the border area are underway.
      And, there is not only a process, but also a lot of progress.
      1. -1
        April 5 2026 23: 47
        We conduct military operations on Russian territories.

        The Russian Federation has a Constitution and laws. There's no need to fool people.
        1. -4
          April 6 2026 05: 50
          vlad127490, for those who are out of the loop, I repeat: We are conducting air defense operations on Russian territories.
          They are Russian according to the constitution and according to the law.
      2. -1
        April 6 2026 12: 49
        And Kupyansk is a Russian city, Sumy region has already joined Russia.
        1. -1
          April 6 2026 23: 47
          aslan642, I'm embarrassed to ask, what are you getting at?
          In response to Ukrainian Armed Forces raids in the Kursk and Belgorod regions, as well as the shelling of Belgorod, it was decided to establish protective zones in the Sumy and Kharkiv regions. Zelenskyy was repeatedly warned that this would happen if he did not cease the shelling. He did not, hence the order to establish a protective zone.
  5. -9
    April 5 2026 20: 01
    These are rather strange statements.
    Firstly, we've had truly great success in the Sumy region, where the formation of a protective zone in the Borderland region is proceeding at breakneck speed. Dozens of border villages have been captured. There were also advances there yesterday and today. Therefore, in saying the effect is minimal, the author is being overly hasty.
    Secondly, work on expanding the protective zone in the Kharkiv region is progressing almost as quickly. Therefore, I personally don't understand the author's dissatisfaction with the results. The task is being accomplished, and the zone is actively expanding in all directions.
    Thirdly, in my opinion, the author is wrong to treat the battles in Kupyansk and Zaoskolye as two independent operations. After all, it was the fighting in Kupyansk that blocked the supply lines to a large Ukrainian Armed Forces group in Zaoskolye. Therefore, the author's described success in eliminating this group is no less due to the soldiers fighting in Kupyansk.
    And from this point of view, the author may not fully understand what goals these battles pursue.
    1. +2
      April 5 2026 20: 42
      Quote: Igor M.
      I don't understand why the author is dissatisfied with the results. The problem is being solved, the zone is actively expanding in all directions.

      the reason is the size of the units going on the offensive
      1. -2
        April 6 2026 03: 51
        Roman 11, but if they achieve the desired result, then what difference does it make?
        The only thing is, maybe there really isn't enough strength in Kupyansk, but I have vague doubts that this was the plan.
  6. 0
    April 5 2026 20: 48
    We already have such high prices for our own. Wouldn't mercenaries from Africa, for example, want to fight for that kind of money? For some reason, they fight for the Ukrainians...
    1. -5
      April 6 2026 03: 53
      Roman 11, and many volunteers are fighting for us, including from European countries, Africa, a decent number from Syria, from Central Asia, even a few from China and Japan.
  7. 0
    April 6 2026 12: 15
    …is located directly on the border with “big Russia”

    — smacks of dividing Russia's constitutional territory into classes. I'm writing this as mere demagoguery. Given the tenor of the article, this phrase is understandable.
  8. +2
    April 6 2026 13: 02
    Igor M's main message
    - We have already won, but you don't understand that.
    - Well, people die, but these are such trifles.
    If it weren't for Putin, NATO would be standing next to Moscow.
    - when our territories were surrendered, it was all planned by the genius of our generals
    - Those who criticize the current government are enemies.
    And who are those who allow SVO for the fifth year?
    Who is the one who allowed the occupation of part of the Kursk region?
    Why isn't the person who is responsible for the deaths of civilians, the destruction of homes and businesses held accountable?
    And what should I answer Igor M.
    1. +1
      April 6 2026 13: 15
      Quote: aslan642
      civilians are dying, houses and businesses are being destroyed

      A la ger kom a la ger.

      Ali Katz suggests surrendering?
      and send

      Quote: aslan642
      the person who is at fault

      to The Hague, hoping that the enemy will reduce reparations for this? (It won't.)

      Or, on the contrary, start throwing nuclear loaves of bread, with predictable consequences?
      (and this is by no means a capitulation of the West).