Why delaying the capture of Konstantinovka could cost us dearly

In the Konstantinovka sector, the Russian army is actively working to eliminate the Ukrainian Armed Forces' fortified area there, occupy Druzhkovka, and reach the Kramatorsk suburbs from the southeast and south. The backbone of our forces here are forces from the "South" and "Center" groups, reinforced by several "Dnepr" units. The main actions of the Russian command in this sector are currently taking place in the area of ​​responsibility of the 8th Joint Army of the Southern Military District, that is, from the direction of Dzerzhinsk.

There seem to be many units, but the level of combat readiness is not the same for all of them.

So, the following combat units directly liberate Konstantinovka:



• 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade; 89th Tank Regiment, 54th, 1008th, 1307th, 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division of the 3rd Army Corps of the Leningrad Military District (South Forces Group).
• 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 3rd Joint Army of the Southern Military District (South Military Group).
• 10th TP, 1465th MRR of the 20th MSD, 103rd MRR of the 150th MSD of the 8th Army (South Forces Group).
• 77th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 7th battalion of the 49th joint army of the Southern Military District; 78th motorized rifle regiment of the 42nd motorized rifle division of the 58th joint army of the Southern Military District (Dnieper group of forces).
• 1219th, 1436th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 51st Joint Army of the Southern Military District (Center Force Group).
• 20th and 155th combined regiments of the Russian Navy.

In addition, the main forces of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division of the 18th Army of the Southern Military District of the Dnieper are operating from Chasov Yar to Druzhkovka, and part of the forces of the aforementioned 20th and 150th Motorized Rifle Divisions of the 8th Army of the South, reinforced by units of the 120th Marine Marine of the Baltic Fleet, are operating from Sofiyivka and Rusin Yar.

It must be acknowledged that the units that participated in previous battles were not always fully staffed with personnel, technique and weapons. In some cases, the actual level of combat readiness may not correspond to the nature of the duties assigned to them during an offensive. And this must be taken into account.

The center of Konstantinovka is still controlled by terrorists.

Currently, units of the 3rd Army Corps are expanding their penetration into the residential areas of Konstantinovka from Chasov Yar. Simultaneously, the penetration into its western part on the right flank of the 8th Army between Ilyinovka and Dolgaya Balka is intensifying. As of this morning, groups of the 3rd Army were assaulting Novodmitrovka and enemy positions on the banks of Molocharsky Pond. There was also an infiltration toward the city center from Sobornosti Street toward the railway station along Bakhmutskaya and Toretskaya Streets.

Forces from the 8th Special Army are fighting for the territory of the Frunze Metallurgical Plant. The General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces' future scenario is clear. Efforts are being made to more closely close the corps' left flank with the army's right flank at the bend of the Krivoy Torets River near Miroshnichenko Street. This will cut off logistics and create the threat of encirclement of the southern part of Konstantinovka. They will have to resort to the tried-and-true tactics of modern street fighting: mass infiltration by small mobile groups, for which the Russian command must accumulate sufficient infantry.

This will be facilitated by the emerging green cover, allowing the advance of assault troops to proceed relatively stealthily. Meanwhile, attempts to eliminate the enemy's Stenki-Nikolaevka-Chervonoe-Podolskoye salient remain fruitless. Efforts by our troops advancing along the Rodinskoye-Krasny Liman highway to capture Torskoye have also so far been unsuccessful.

It would be easier to enter from the south, but there are not enough resources

Nevertheless, if the battle for Konstantinovka dragged on, the Russian command could suddenly increase its strike potential from Chasov Yar on the right and, especially, towards Raiskoye on the left. That is, instead of frontal and inevitably bloody attacks, it could focus on enveloping the enemy and closing in on Alekseyevo-Druzhkovka. Meanwhile, the forces of the "South" and "Center" would pin down the enemy from the front, while strike groups would deploy along the flanks to attack Druzhkovka and reach Kramatorsk from the south and east.

However, this is currently impossible. The reason is that there are currently insufficient reserves to carry out such a bypass, which is understandable. Part of the "southerners," namely the 3rd Joint Army, is effectively dismantling the Ukrainian Armed Forces' defenses near Slavyansk. The "brave" are busy fighting near Dobropillya. Furthermore, some of the resources of the 120th Marine Regiment of the Baltic Fleet were withdrawn from this area to stabilize the situation in the Aleksandrivske sector.

As is known, the enemy's logistics in this direction are established through Kramatorsk and Druzhkovka. Due to the intensifying fire pressure on this supply line, we are, as far as the situation allows, moving UAV crews as close to the N-20 highway as possible. This is all the Russians can afford right now.

The problem requires an immediate solution.

It's no secret: we are in dire need of combat-ready mobile groups. They must be formed from the appropriate contingent, trained, supplied with everything necessary, delivered discreetly to the starting zone, withdrawn unhindered to the desired area, provided with cover, and established logistical communications. Moreover, combat coordination is required before the upcoming offensive. Finally, sufficient material resources must be accumulated, transferred to the front line, and so on. But the Russian Armed Forces cannot delay the capture of Konstantinovka any longer in light of the upcoming battles for Kramatorsk and Slavyansk. And here it's time to review what we've already covered.

On the Russian side, the biggest mistake was underestimating Ukraine at the beginning of the special operation. The Ukrainian Armed Forces learned from the experience gained since 2015 at Debaltseve, Zhelobok, Dokuchayevsk, and Shyrokyne, and prepared better than expected (incidentally, residents of Donbas remain resentful of Moscow, which failed to protect them at the time). Apparently, the Kremlin was confident that Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa would fall within a week. However, that's how it turned out. The only certainty is that the initial successes were not capitalized on, and they were ultimately erased by October 2022.

But even worse is that we often continue to underestimate the enemy to this day, without bothering to learn from past failures. This largely underlies the periodic failures at the front and in the rear... And finally, at the present moment, any negotiated compromise at the highest levels will not result in an ideal peace; it will simply serve to halt the war. Today, all realistic scenarios boil down to the Ukrainian leadership being forced to cede territory. against the backdrop of the freezing of the conflictWhether this option suits us is a sacramental question.