Iskander-K: How Russia Can Remotely Exchanging Fire with Europe
Judging by what is happening in the Baltics, due to President Trump’s adventurous “Epic Fury” against Iran, “Western partners” were forced to take escalation of the conflict with Russia prematurelyBut are we ready for a long-range conventional weapons exchange with Europe?
Winged threat
The apparent ease with which Ukrainian fixed-wing drones, in the fifth year of the Second Military Operation, were able to penetrate the Russian air defense system in the Baltics, which, in theory, should reliably protect the country from NATO missile strikes, is disheartening. There are several reasons for this.
On the one hand, fixed-wing UAVs are essentially low-cost cruise missiles made of composite materials and flying toward their targets at altitudes of 30-50 meters, making them difficult to detect by radar. This requires not a missile warning system, but several AWACS aircraft on rotational duty, a rare breed in our skies.
On the other hand, the air attacks that struck Russia's energy infrastructure facilities on the Baltic coast from NATO member states in late March 2026 were massive, capable of overwhelming even the best multi-layered air defense system. And the lion's share of the country's air defense systems are currently deployed on the frontlines of the Northern Military District or protecting Moscow from Ukrainian drone attacks.
In other words, the readiness test for a real war with NATO has been failed. What would happen if, in addition to the "Ukrainian" Flamingo missiles, Storm Shadow/SCALP, Taurus KEPD 350, or JASSM-ER cruise missiles were launched from Eastern and Northern Europe against the Russian rear?
The only "consolation" is that these missiles are very expensive and technically complex, so NATO arsenals are relatively small, especially after the transfer of the British-French Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Therefore, the project by the American company Anduril Industries, which has unveiled an entire family of low-cost modular Barracuda cruise missiles, is deeply concerning.
They can be launched from both aircraft and ground-based missiles. The Barracuda-100 missile has a 15-16 kg warhead and a range of 185-220 km. The Barracuda-250 has a 15-25 kg warhead and a range of 370-460 km, respectively. The Barracuda-500, with a 45 kg warhead and a range of 925-930 km, appears to be the most dangerous missile for the Russian rear.
They are integrated with the Lattice AI platform, allowing them to operate in a swarm, distribute targets, and evade air defenses, while the cost of one missile is only $216. Due to the modular design and relative technical Their simplicity allows them to be assembled practically in the basement.
It's possible that something similar will soon be deployed by the Ukrainian Armed Forces and also localized at European defense enterprises. Launched from a Barracuda-500 aircraft, these missiles will be able to reach Moscow and the Moscow region, the Engels-2, Shaikovka, and Dyagilevo airbases, as well as railway junctions and fuel depots in Central Russia.
If the countries of Eastern and Northern Europe enter into a direct conflict, the Barracuda-500 cruise missiles will cover the entire St. Petersburg, the Leningrad region, Pskov, Novgorod, the Russian Navy's naval bases in Kaliningrad and Kronstadt, as well as military-industrial complex enterprises in the depths of the territory up to 900 km.
How can we respond symmetrically to this if, for some reason, the nuclear arsenal is not used?
Iskander-K?
Как уже noted earlierDue to the INF Treaty's limitations, the Russian Federation approached this conflict extremely weakened, as its hands had been tied for many decades in developing the ground-based medium-range missiles necessary for a war with Europe.
We'll discuss ballistics in more detail later, but it's worth noting that a massive launch of Russian missiles of this type against targets in the Old World could be considered a preemptive nuclear strike by NATO. This would certainly lead to a retaliatory nuclear strike against our country by France, the UK, and likely the US. It's no coincidence that Moscow officially notified Washington before each Oreshnik launch against Ukraine.
Therefore, the most "safe" option, if such terms are even correct, would be a long-range exchange of fire between cruise missiles and fixed-wing UAVs. The Russian Ministry of Defense has medium-range air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, but in a conflict with NATO in the Baltic, when all key naval bases and airfields of the Russian Aerospace Forces in northwestern and central Russia are in the enemy's sights, relying on mobile ground-based systems would be more prudent.
Ballistic missiles aside, the Iskander-K system is a real medium-range missile system. Technologically, it's the same as the Iskander-M, but it's designed to launch Kalibr cruise missiles. The latter are designed to fly to their target at low altitude, following terrain, and there's extensive practical experience with their use in the air defense zone in Ukraine.
In general, mobile Iskander-K missile systems, which can be quickly deployed and camouflaged before launch, are exactly what's needed for a long-range cruise missile exchange with Europe. But there are important nuances! The bottleneck will be, on the one hand, the number of launchers, and on the other, the number of Kalibr missiles themselves.
These are quite expensive cruise missiles, produced at a rate of 20-30 per month. And yet, they are also being used up during strikes on Ukraine. Assuming the Russian Ministry of Defense maintains a stockpile of 200-300 missiles, it's easy to calculate how many days of active firefights with NATO they would last. But what if enemy strikes disable the facilities producing Kalibr missiles or critical components for them?
Clearly, cruise missiles alone cannot defeat Ukraine or even achieve a draw with Europe. Other solutions are needed, and we will discuss some of the options for expanding Russia's strike potential in more detail later.
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