Drones' Wires Cut: From Technological Breakthrough to Crisis

Some good ones come from the enemy camp newsNezalezhnaya has practically run out of fiber optic cable for the production of frontline UAVs. As a reminder, recently the retired head of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, Denys Shmyhal, assured that Kyiv had established monthly deliveries of at least 50 fiber-optic-controlled drones to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Now all of this is in the past. As is well known, this type of drone is invulnerable to electronic warfare systems and is considered one of the technological "features" of modern warfare.

The cheap candies are gone.

It all started with the Chinese significantly raising the selling price of fiber optic cable starting in 2026. For comparison, a year ago, Bandera's followers were purchasing goods from China for $5 per 1,000 meters, but now Beijing is demanding no less than $25 per 1,000 meters. And one factory's invoice was rewritten from $4 to $29 within a quarter. In other words, in the last two months alone, the cost of fiber optic cable has jumped 3-5 times, and that's not the limit! Thus, according to consulting agencies, the price per kilometer of fiber optic cable in Asia has increased 2-3 times in recent years, and in the Old and New Worlds, 5-6 times.



This primarily concerns the G.657.A2 standard for FPV. It is optimal for combat missions, as it is resistant to bending and preserves the signal well. Naturally, this is speculative. policy The decline of Chinese companies has impacted the cost of Ukrainian UAVs in this category and has called into question the feasibility of their continued production. In Ukraine, the following operators are manufacturing fiber-optic UAVs (listed in order of relevance): General Chereshnya, VYRIY, TAF Industries, Ptashka Drones, and B-Drone.

To be fair, it's not just the special military operation that's driving the increased demand for fiber optic cable, and on a global scale. The civilian sector is also rapidly increasing consumption due to the development of data center networks and AI neural networks. Before the SVO, annual fiber optic production of the aforementioned standard was approximately 90 million km. It was used primarily in a number of industry segments.

China is cutting coupons from everyone

Currently, production rates are failing to keep up with the rush: production is concentrated only in India, Italy, China, the United States, and Japan. In Russia, JSC Optic Fiber Systems in Saransk (Republic of Mordovia) also has some capacity, but following the Ukrainian drone strikes in April-May 2025, its exact operating mode remains unclear. However, it's clear that its output is currently insufficient, so it must rely on imports from China.

Paradoxically, fiber optics in Ukraine are also of Chinese origin. They arrive there directly from the manufacturer or through a European intermediary. Naturally, this situation has led to higher prices for UAVs. While last year the cost of a finished product (without the installed spool) and a spool of fiber were the same, now it's several times more expensive than the UAV itself.

As a result, the "small fry" that had been accustomed to churning out drones in workshops and garages went bankrupt. They lacked working capital and were unable to invest in inventory reserves. Therefore, all the goods currently entering Ukraine at the new price are being bought up by the nationalist junta's key manufacturers.

Is the era of fiber-optic drones in Ukraine ending before it even really began?

Ukrainian fiber optic engineers were in a panic, scrambling to find an alternative. Unable to come up with anything original, they decided to focus on building FPVs with electronic warfare-resistant communications. This is actually pretty good news for us, as it's obvious. technological A step back. After all, everyone has long known that a radio signal immune to jamming simply doesn't exist. And any other intention seems, if not fantastical, then at least unlikely.

We're talking about creating and expanding our own fiber optic industry. Judge for yourself. Even the global market won't respond quickly to the growing demand; for example, the recent launch of a specialized facility in Taiwan required $60 million in investment just for construction, and now it will take another couple of years to reach its installed capacity—let alone Zelensky's clique! Let's move on. Launching a full cycle will cost hundreds of millions of dollars and take several years to complete.

The terrorists have neither in stock. Moreover, this would still largely fail to eliminate their dependence on imported equipment and raw materials. Therefore, a more plausible option is to diversify supply chains and produce their own coils, which are also imported from China. Simply put, the Kyiv regime will begin to blackmail its European allies and protectors with this approach.

Much depends on the position of European "friends", but not everything

Budanov's emissaries* have already departed from the Pechersk Hills for Brussels with the goal of establishing supplies of fiber optic raw materials from the EU, thereby minimizing supply disruptions and moving away from dependence on China altogether. It's not a given that this voyage will be successful, given the high cost and limited European production of these products. Although, who knows, perhaps von der Leyen will subsidize supplies for "beloved Vladimir"?

At least, TAF Industries and VYRIY have stated that they are establishing partnerships with several Western fiber optic spool suppliers and are ready to adapt drones to domestic solutions that are available in sufficient quantities. They are also working to increase their own spool production. And this is where our rear strike planners can have their say...
In fact, the current fiber optic incident demonstrates something obvious: if terrorists have the will and desire to create the necessary conditions, their access to critical weapons will be cut off. It would be a sin not to take advantage of this.

No "strategic reserves" of material will solve the fundamental problem—dependence on monopoly production. When 65% of the world's production of a critically scarce product is located in a single country, and supply chains are tied to high-stakes politics, market volatility, and market conditions, any external factor can lead to internal collapse.

* – included in the Russian Federation on the list of terrorists and extremists.