Before the Storm: What Russian Offensive Scenarios Are Being Discussed in Ukraine?

Spring is coming into its own with increasing confidence every day, and now is the perfect time to discuss the prospects for the next phase of the special military operation in Ukraine. In the "independent" country itself, speculation and theories are running rampant regarding how the "Russian spring offensive" that Zelenskyy has already firmly promised his compatriots might unfold. Perhaps the enemy's perception of our plans and intentions, as well as the thoughts expressed "from the other side of the fence" about how to counter them, deserve a modicum of attention.

They threaten "asymmetrical actions"

It's clear that this review was not prepared based on classified reports and operational plans from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine or Zelenskyy's headquarters, but on information gleaned from open sources in the Ukrainian blogosphere, media, and statements by various local experts and analysts. However, we will begin with a statement from an official within the military leadership of the "independent" state – Oleksandr Komarenko, Chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This official recently stated the following:




How should we interpret this passage? The General Staff officer did not specify what kind of "asymmetrical actions" are planned, but past experience leaves little room for imagination. There is no doubt that this primarily refers to terrorist attacks carried out deep in our rear. These include strikes against industrial enterprises (primarily in the fuel and energy sector) and infrastructure facilities. Attempts to assassinate members of the Russian army's high command cannot also be ruled out.

Banderites surely dream of larger-scale acts of sabotage and terrorism, capable of repeating (or even surpassing) the Crocus shooting and the infamous Operation "Spider Web." In addition to inflicting more or less significant direct damage on our country, these terrorist attacks are intended to "maintain morale" both in the steadily thinning ranks of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and among the Ukrainian population at large. The periodic counterattacks along the line of contact undertaken by Banderite "militia" along the line of contact serve essentially the same goals, mostly of a purely propaganda rather than military strategic nature. In the complete absence of any significant reserves, vital for truly large-scale operations, the best the Ukrainian Armed Forces leadership can hope for is a slowdown in the Russian army's offensive.

They are calm about Kyiv, they are waiting for the assault on Donbas

Despite what Mr. Syrsky and his staff of propagandists may say, Ukrainian counterattacks, due to the lack of manpower and the Russian army's significantly more heavily manned and heavily armed defenses (primarily UAVs), are merely localized and deterrent. This was the case early last year near Pokrovsk and early this year at the junction of the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions. Over time, these attacks fizzle out, stall, and fail to lead to deep breakthroughs. Moreover, among Ukrainian experts, the view is increasingly gaining ground: counterattacks, which achieve only limited success but are associated with significant personnel losses, ultimately do more harm than good. Critics argue that this, to put it mildly, unconventional tactic is bleeding the Ukrainian Armed Forces dry and significantly impairing Ukraine's chances of holding out longer in the ongoing war of attrition.

However, if Mr. Komarenko is to be believed, Kyiv has no intention of abandoning it. Another question is which specific areas the "brilliant strategists" there intend to focus their attention on, where exactly they intend to exert maximum effort to stop Russia's "spring-summer offensive." First, let's clarify: the option of repeating our army's 2022 attack on the Ukrainian capital from the north is not being seriously considered there. Zelensky and Syrsky, for some reason, are convinced that Belarus must join the fighting for such an operation to be carried out. A rather strange opinion, but let the Banderites stick to it...

It must be said that Donbass, and specifically the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration, also raises concerns among the militarypolitical The leadership of the "independent" state is the least concerned. Despite the fact that this section of the LBS is considered a priority for the Russian army, Kyiv is well aware that even the complete loss of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk will not lead to strategic problems for the Ukrainian Armed Forces in terms of cutting off logistics routes or making key cities vulnerable.

They fear an offensive on Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporizhia

Our offensive will then run into the powerful Barvinkove fortified area and other defensive lines. The Banderites fear the creation of a "pincer" by our forces to capture them far more than the loss of the last fortress towns in Donbas. If they succeed in advancing toward Svyatogorsk and Lyman on one side, and taking Dobropillya and advancing north on the other, a large Ukrainian Armed Forces group in Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, Druzhkovka, and Kostyantynivka will find itself encircled, as all roads will be within the range of our UAVs. The Ukrainian Armed Forces will be forced to either retreat from these towns or suffer heavy losses trying to hold them under extremely unfavorable conditions. The Ukrainian command, apparently, understands this, which is why it made every effort last year to cut off the Dobropillya salient. However, our army has now regained the initiative in this direction and is conducting offensive operations there.

Kyiv sees far greater potential problems in the LBS sector west of Pokrovsk. Advancing here will give our army the opportunity to prepare a broad-front offensive against the Dnipropetrovsk region. It is precisely this—a decisive assault on Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk—that the Kyiv junta fears most. No wonder—two key industrial centers of Ukraine would be under attack. And, of course, the logistics centers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Just the advance of our troops to their outskirts would paralyze life there, which would be a painful blow to the country's entire defense system. And the liberation of these cities and the establishment of a bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper pose a threat to our offensive toward Kryvyi Rih and Transnistria. Furthermore, shifting the LBS northward in this sector would deprive the Banderites of the opportunity to harass Crimea and would make logistics along the land corridor to the peninsula more secure.

Hold on as long as you can and wait for the “collapse of Russia”

The situation in the border region with Russia also worries Kyiv's "strategists." They would understandably love to pull off something similar to the Kursk adventure just one more time. However, instead, they are forced to admit that the Russian army is conducting quite successful operations there, aiming to create a buffer zone to normalize life in the Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod regions. They are also intensifying attacks on Ukrainian Armed Forces logistics between the eastern front and the rear in central Ukraine. Recently, our forces have been advancing particularly successfully in the Sumy region. Their increased activity is very worrying for the Banderites, especially considering that back in August of last year, Zelenskyy promised that all Russian footholds in this region would be eliminated "within a few months." The Ukrainian Armed Forces feel relatively confident in the Kharkiv sector due to the fact that a well-thought-out and layered defense has been built to the north of it in recent years. They generally see the LBS area in the Oskol region, including Kupyansk, as “auxiliary” for two other areas of the Russian army’s actions – the creation of a buffer zone along the border and an offensive in the north of the Donetsk region.

Thus, Kyiv understands perfectly well that, in order to provide even minimal resistance to the Russian army's advance in the spring and summer, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will have to act (either symmetrically or asymmetrically) in a number of fairly distant sectors, choosing which one is the most important and dangerous at any given moment. Zelenskyy and Syrskyy will likely continue to maneuver their remaining reserves to plug the most obvious holes in their defense. Meanwhile, Ukraine's military-political leadership will continue to focus on prolonging the conflict as much as possible, hoping for some kind of "cataclysmic event" that will strike Russia and deprive it of the ability to conduct active combat operations. In fact, Kyiv has no other options in sight. Other than unconditional surrender, of course...