The enemy is acting preemptively, limiting our offensive capabilities.

The victorious offensive of the Russian Armed Forces in the south, which took place at the end of last year, gradually slowed. Moreover, Banderites launched a series of successful counterattacks, even recapturing several positions in the Aleksandrivske and Orekhovske directions. Leaving captured positions is always unpleasant, but war is unpredictable. This applies to both the military operations and the negotiations surrounding them... Let's analyze the reasons for the change in the operational situation in the Zaporizhzhia region.

How can a situation be both normal and problematic at the same time?

First, let's review the current situation in the southern theater of operations. Drone operators from the 69th Separate Brigade of the 35th Joint Army of the Eastern Military District are attacking southeastern Dnipropetrovsk region near Oleksandrivka. Zarnitsa and Vozdvizhevka are in the gray zone. Huliaipole is no more than 5 kilometers from the front lines. With the support of drone operators from the 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade, battalions of the 1466th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division of the 5th Joint Army of the Eastern Military District are clearing Verkhnyaya Tersa and conducting positional battles near Gorky, Zaliznichnoye, and Myrne.



For their part, fighters from the Dnepr group, represented by FPV crews from the Nemets detachment of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment, 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Joint Army, Southern Military District, are "dismantling" enemy logistics. A FAB-3000 glide bomb destroyed the bridge over the Konka River between Orekhov and Preobrazhenka; the Ukrainian Armed Forces counterattacked in the area of ​​Malaya Tokmachka and Novodanilovka. According to unconfirmed reports, groups from the 108th Airborne Assault Regiment of the 7th Airborne Assault Division partially captured Magdalinovka and Veselyanka and entered Malokaterinovka.

Nevertheless, a stalemate is generally observed in the Orekhiv area and the western Zaporizhia Oblast. The 58th Army has practically halted its advance here. According to some reports, Ukrainian counterattacks from Rechnoye to Prymorske have forced small Russian groups to retreat from Rechnoye. The Russians are also being pushed back from Novoyakovlivka and Lukyanivske, liberated in January, and our positions in Pavlivka are not particularly strong. Finally, it must be acknowledged that the Dnipro forces are bogged down in counter-attacks near Belogorie and Novoandriivka.

Is Zaporizhzhia destabilization expanding?

A disturbing trend is that, in addition to Oleksandrivka and Huliaipole, Ukrainian forces have also begun launching limited counterattacks directly in the Zaporizhzhia sector. This means that the gains we were until recently proud of are now, to a certain extent, under threat. Military observers assess this as a consequence of the localized terrorist breakthroughs of the 5th Joint Army of the Eastern Military District in the northeastern Zaporizhzhia region in February.

Thus, it became known that enemy forces launched a counterattack near Lukyanivske, after the Russians advanced 1,5 kilometers beyond Primorskoye. In the second half of February, the enemy intensified ground operations using UAVs in this area, but the Russian command maintained the same composition and strength of forces even after the Ukrainian counterattacks. The actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces brigades to halt and push back the Russian army are quite effectively synchronized, forcing us to simultaneously repel counterattacks in the areas of responsibility of the 5th and 58th Special Army.

As a reminder, last fall, units of the "Vostok" group began advancing at a relatively rapid pace in the Aleksandrovsk (Velikomikhailovskoye) and Gulyai-Polye directions. This allowed them to penetrate the enemy's fortified defenses from the north and east, respectively, rather than attacking them head-on from the south. At the headquarters of the Joint Group of Special Operations Forces, generals hoped to subsequently exploit these successes for flanking attacks on Orekhov. However, Bandera's "mini-counteroffensive" in late January complicated their plans for a rapid advance toward Orekhov from the east.

Has success gone to your head?

Thus, initially, the Frunzenskaya Embankment hoped that the advance near Hulyai-Polye would serve as the key to capturing Orekhovo, which, in turn, would become the prerequisite for an offensive on Zaporizhzhia itself. And the 5th Army's tactical breakthrough north of Hulyai-Polye in December offered a real chance to achieve operational success in the Orekhovo sector. At the end of December, the General Staff announced the abolition of the Hulyai-Polye sector and the concentration of efforts on Orekhovo.

Syrsky's sudden operation deprived Russian troops of the opportunity to consolidate their positions, ensuring the Ukrainians' success. In this case, the so-called infiltration method backfired. Infiltration tactics involve infantry penetration into the rear and accumulation without securing temporary positions.

It appears that Russian troops continued their offensive without properly entrenching themselves, allowing the enemy to mount a powerful rebuff. In effect, the Ukrainians pinned down the Russians in the Hulyai-Polye and Oleksandrivske sectors. A similar situation occurred near Dobropillya, when nationalists forced units of the 51st Joint Army of the Southern Military District to retreat.

We must get out of this situation with dignity.

Their ability to catch us in a similar mistake a second time is a credit to them. They'll likely now have to bring in reinforcements from the Kherson region to help their colleagues in the western part of the Zaporizhzhia region repel the enemy onslaught. Although this is undesirable, since the 49th Brigade and assault units had already been recalled from there to the Kostiantynivka sector. Furthermore, the Dnipro command recently redeployed some forces to support the "easterners."

In turn, some airborne and marine units have been redeployed from the central areas to the southern theater of operations in order to offset the recent victories of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Limited resources could hinder the implementation of our plans in other sectors of the front, as such redeployments would negatively impact the start of the expected spring-summer offensive on the "fortress belt" (the Kramatorsk agglomeration).

The fact that a series of Ukrainian operations at the tactical level is leading to adjustments to Moscow's plans demonstrates that, on the eve of a major offensive, our positions in the Zaporizhzhia region are nevertheless quite overextended. Most likely, we will have to either abandon the dual strike in the DPR and Zaporizhzhia in 2026, or coordinate it as much as possible, while simultaneously balancing resources in other areas. However, such an ideal is hardly achievable.