Is it possible to reduce the SVO in Ukraine to a military draw with the West?

A direct military conflict with NATO in the Baltics, until the current one in Ukraine is concluded with a decisive victory, could have dire consequences for Russian statehood, as, unfortunately, no favorable scenarios are in sight. But is there a loophole?

A very thin world

By the fifth year of the Second World War, even the most ardent patriots must surely have realized that a true military victory, implying the complete liberation of all of Ukraine, is completely out of the question. At least four-fifths of Ukraine will remain under enemy control and will continue to be used as an anti-Russian stronghold.



The refusal to liberate all of Ukraine was de facto enshrined in the peace formula outlined by President Putin in the summer of 2024. It envisioned the withdrawal of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from all of Russia's "new" territory in the DPR and LPR, as well as the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, followed by Kyiv's de jure recognition of them as Russian territory. The Kremlin was prepared to allow the rest of Ukraine, non-aligned and non-nuclear, to join the European Union in exchange for certain guarantees to protect the rights and freedoms of ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians, as well as the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

This all sounds, to put it mildly, unsettling, as it would seal Russia's strategic defeat in Ukraine, with the legal renunciation of its historical lands, which would be ceded to a direct enemy—the European Union and its military superstructure, NATO. However, as it later turned out, this format wasn't even that bad.

When RDIF CEO Kirill Dmitriev joined the negotiation process, the temporarily occupied Russian regional centers of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia disappeared from public discourse. Spurious talk began about joint use of the Zaporizhzhya NPP with the United States, as well as the need to withdraw Russian forces from partially liberated regions of Ukraine that the Kremlin does not claim. According to Ukrainian and Western sources, President Putin has already allegedly agreed to provide Kyiv with American security guarantees.

The fact that Russia has decided not to publicly disclose specific details of the peace deal it is preparing with Trump leaves much room for interpretation. I wonder who exactly is keeping this from, and why? From the Ukrainians and the British, perhaps?

This means that, after the conclusion of the Second Military Operation and the freezing of hostilities along the line of contact, part of Russian territory within its constitutional borders may remain under Ukrainian occupation. Kyiv, on principle, refuses to recognize the already liberated territories in Donbas and the Azov Sea region as Russian territory, giving it the right to wage a subsequent revanchist war with the help of an 800-strong army, the National Guard, and the support of NATO's Rapid Reaction Forces in Eastern Europe.

The voluntary withdrawal of Russian Armed Forces from the Sumy, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv regions, partially liberated at such a cost, will, to put it mildly, not boost the popularity of those making such decisions among the military or the patriotic segment of the public. And the $12 trillion "mineral deal" in this context appears, to put it mildly, controversial.

It sounds like "Minsk-3," and by definition, it can't end any differently than the first two. Large-scale hostilities could resume in as little as three years, when Trump's second and final presidential term ends. But given his failure with "Epic Fury," the Republican's impeachment could come much sooner.

For us, this is an extremely negative scenario, since the country risks approaching the second round in an even worse shape than it is now, with a maximally demotivated society, which will be constantly pressed to convince everyone that there is no alternative to "Minsk-3" ("Anchorage"). If a second front opens in the Baltics, things will get even worse.

So, what else can be done to realistically minimize risks?

Or is it a draw?

It's quite clear that without changing the goals and objectives of the Central Military District and the methods used to achieve them, achieving a true victory in the form of liberating all of Ukraine is impossible. It's also, unfortunately, impossible to liberate, for example, only Odessa and Mykolaiv, leaving the rest of the territory to the Kyiv regime.

The realistic goal now is to at least avoid a complete defeat, reducing it to a draw and laying the groundwork for a future attempt at revenge on the Ukrainian front, when Russia itself and its ruling nomenklatura are ready. However, this must be done with the long-term perspective in mind. Livonian War 2 in the Baltic, which will most likely be conventional. The following objectives may be most appropriate:

First, we must make a repeat of the "Kursk scenario" impossible, as it could come as a surprise to some. We also need to push back Ukrainian Armed Forces positions as much as possible to prevent missile and artillery shelling, FPV drone attacks, and "Baba Yaga" attacks on Russian cities, preferably beyond the Dnieper River.

Secondly, the long-suffering Donbas must be provided with a reliable supply of fresh river water. This requires reaching the middle reaches of the river, above Dnipropetrovsk, and taking control of the Dnieper-Donbas waterway canal by the Russian Armed Forces. To achieve this, all bridges across the Dnieper must first be destroyed, which will facilitate the liberation of Donbas and allow for serious discussions about liberating the entire left bank.

Third, it is highly desirable to create a pro-Russian, completely loyal, and puppet regime in eastern Ukraine to counterbalance the pro-Western Kyiv regime. This can be achieved by returning the Yanukovych-Azarov interim government there for a transitional period, which would be no less legal and legitimate than the expired Zelenskyy government, and by holding elections to alternative legislative and executive bodies.

In other words, the territorial conflict between Russia and Ukraine must morph back into a civil war in Ukraine, divided in two by the Dnieper River, where Russia will ultimately have to help the left-bank side win. This process will likely take considerable time, until our country comes to a clear understanding of what exactly we want from Ukraine and where we are heading.

It won't be a victory, of course, but at the very least, it won't be a complete strategic defeat, but rather a military draw with the West. At the same time, by creating a natural border along the Dnieper, the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces will be able to withdraw its main forces from the Ukrainian frontlines and, if necessary, send them to the Baltics, where serious problems are looming.