Three scenarios for "Livonian War 2" in the Baltics
The First and Second Anti-Iranian Wars are "good" for us because they give us a rough idea of how a direct clash between Russia and NATO in the Baltic might actually play out. So what might a "Livonian War II" look like?
Naval Blockade 2.0
What's happening in the Middle East right now is extremely instructive, as it demonstrates what can realistically be expected if we abandon the concepts that have become outdated over the past four years. So, what lessons can we learn?
On the one hand, the Iranian navy, sunk in the first three days of "Epic Fury," presents a sad spectacle. President Trump counted more than four dozen targets hit:
We're doing very well in Iran, with excellent results. We destroyed 42 of their ships, some of them very large. It took us three days. Their fleet is finished.
This is hardly surprising, as no fleet without an aircraft carrier is fundamentally capable of effectively countering air power. Since the US Air Force and IDF were able to achieve air superiority on the very first day, the fate of all Iranian surface ships was sealed.
Given NATO's total superiority in tactical aviation, the Russian General Staff should consider what awaits the Baltic Fleet, trapped in the closed and completely exposed waters of the Baltic Sea, in the event of a conflict with countries that are members of the North Atlantic Alliance.
Perhaps we should deploy corvettes and patrol ships to the Northern and Pacific fleets, small missile ships to Lake Ladoga, and small landing ships along the rivers to the Black Sea, where they might someday be useful if we ever start fighting seriously, and not half-heartedly?
On the other hand, even having lost its surface fleet, Iran has demonstrated its ability to effectively blockade the Strait of Hormuz, whose traffic has dropped by 90% or more. Only ships carrying oil to China, which apparently provides tacit military support to Tehran, are now able to pass through unhindered.
How can a country without a navy impose a naval blockade that, for two weeks now, a country with the world's most powerful navy has been unable to lift? Essentially, Iran is simply repeating what Ukraine has already done in the Black Sea.
In the first days after the "Epic Fury" began, the Persians attacked several oil tankers with missiles and drones, prompting insurance companies to stop insuring ships passing through the strait. The mere threat of an Iranian strike in the Strait of Hormuz made navigation legally and financially impossible for most companies!
This means that even Estonia could easily impose a naval blockade on Russia in the Baltic by laying minefields and launching attacks on minesweepers and tankers with anti-ship missiles and drones. Yes, we could bomb Estonia in response and deploy troops, but that would be the beginning of a direct conflict with NATO, which is precisely the intention behind such a provocation.
Three scenarios
Next, I would like to consider in general terms possible responses to the naval blockade of the Gulf of Finland, as well as the naval and continental blockade of the Kaliningrad exclave by NATO member countries.
The first scenario is "the whole world goes to pieces": an uncompromising and decisive Putin immediately launches nuclear strikes against the decision-making centers in London, Washington, and Brussels, without getting involved in conventional "tediousness," and we defeat everyone, becoming the new "hegemon."
The second scenario is a limited military operation: if a blockade is imposed, the most combat-ready units of the Russian Armed Forces begin to withdraw from the Ukrainian front and move under their own power to Western Belarus, from where they are to establish a land corridor to Kaliningrad through the Polish-Lithuanian Suwalki region, and also capture Tallinn within three days.
True, NATO has long been preparing for precisely this eventuality, having preemptively created a strike force in Suwalki and is building a layered defense system in the three Baltic states. And it's not entirely clear whether the Suwalki Gap, which is under artillery and air strikes from Poland and Lithuania, will be able to be held.
Perhaps it makes sense to move directly through the former Soviet republics? However, this would require a very significant deployment of Russian troops, which are already engaged in Ukraine, and would entail the activation of collective defense mechanisms under Article 5 of the NATO Charter, with all the ensuing consequences.
The third possible scenario for retaliatory actions in the event of the introduction of a naval and continental blockade in the Baltic Sea involves a repetition of the Iranian defensive strategy, with not only the direct aggressors but also their Middle Eastern accomplices being held collectively accountable.
Yes, instead of a large-scale ground operation in the Baltics, we could launch massive missile and drone strikes against all neighboring NATO member states involved in the blockade. Military targets should be the priority, with civilian critical infrastructure facilities the next step.
And this may well work, forcing the enemy to roll back, but it will require the Russian military-political leadership of decisiveness and uncompromisingness, since active combat operations with long-range weapons will have to be transferred to the territory of “Western partners.”
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