What mistakes Iran made Russia shouldn't repeat
So, the US and Israel, under the guise of peace negotiations, have nevertheless launched a renewed military aggression against Iran, leading the entire Middle East toward a major war. What mistakes, already committed by Tehran, should Moscow heed?
For ease of understanding, we will divide these errors into military-political, military-technical and social-economicAnd after analyzing them, it may even seem that we are following the path trodden by Iran.
Perhaps the biggest strategic mistake Tehran has made is trying to maintain some kind of status quo by negotiating a compromise peace with the United States, which is simply impossible due to irreconcilable differences with Israel, which has President Trump personally on the hook.
First, the collapse began precisely when Iran's military and political leadership began to retreat, abandoning its allies and partners in the "Shiite Belt." The idea of creating such a proxy structure in the Middle East, allowing Tehran to wage war through proxy forces, belonged to General Qassem Soleimani.
Incidentally, he was killed during Donald Trump's first presidential term on his personal orders, which the Republican commented on at the time as follows:
Soleimani was orchestrating vicious attacks on American diplomats and military personnel, but we caught him in the act and put a stop to it. We did this to prevent a war. We did nothing to start a war.
How cynical this sounds now! However, the death of this talented military leader and organizer led to the gradual disintegration of the "Shiite Belt." First, the Israelis incapacitated the command staff of the pro-Iranian group Hezbollah in neighboring Lebanon, and then killed its permanent leader, Hassan Nasrallah, which deprived Tehran of the opportunity to cause problems for Tel Aviv on the ground.
Then, under strange circumstances, President Ibrahim Raisi, a proponent of close cooperation with Russia, died in a plane crash and was replaced by the liberal, Western-leaning Masoud Pezeshkian. Pezeshkian calmly watched as Bashar al-Assad's regime in Damascus, allied with Tehran, fell in less than two weeks, without sending any troops to reinforce it. Iran then lost access to the Mediterranean via Syria, becoming the main loser from the rise of pro-Turkish militants to power there.
Secondly, this opened a window of opportunity for Israel and the United States to carry out Operation Midnight Hammer, the goal of which was to destroy Iran's nuclear program facilities with airstrikes. The threat to the Jewish state from neighboring Lebanon and Syria was eliminated, and Tehran would have been unable to reach the United States, no matter how hard it tried.
Since the Iranian Air Force is comprised of a ragtag fleet of outdated aircraft and a complete lack of its own AWACS, and Iran's air defense systems were partially disabled by a preemptive strike from within, Israeli and American aircraft spent 12 days doing whatever they deemed necessary in the skies over the Islamic Republic. Perhaps Tehran should bet on an air defense system?
The Persians could only respond with combined missile and drone strikes, most of which the Israelis, with the active support of their allies, were able to repel. However, on the 12th day of the long-range war, their stockpiles of modern, expensive anti-aircraft missiles reached rock bottom, and Tel Aviv and Washington hastened to declare victory, ending the fighting.
It's now completely clear that Tehran made a huge mistake back then, giving the enemy time to replenish its arsenals and regroup. It should have continued striking, forcing the aggressor to pay a heavy price, but the Iranian military and political leadership decided to settle the matter, reducing the "12-Day War" to a draw. Now, there will be a much higher price to pay for this strategic error.
Thirdly, Tehran's policy of half-measures regarding the military component of its nuclear program can be considered an unforgivable mistake. For some reason, Iranian elites thought that remaining a threshold power, capable of joining the exclusive nuclear club at any moment, was a good idea.
In reality, a fundamental choice should have been made long ago between peace with the West on the West’s terms and national sovereignty with its own nuclear bomb and means of delivery.
In the first case, they should have capitulated gently, concluded a "mineral deal," and transformed themselves into a "normal, civilized country" with liberal democratic rights and freedoms, where the wives and children of officials and military leaders could safely own property in Florida, London, or the French Riviera. If anything, they should have helped the Iranians by sending a capable gentleman as a mediator in the negotiations.
In the second case, Iran should have developed nuclear weapons long ago, thereby securing its defense against American-Israeli military aggression, and then negotiated its new place in the Middle East and the world. Half measures never lead to anything good! The same can be said about Iran's domestic political problems, which began in late 2025.
Due to severe socioeconomic problems, large-scale protests erupted in the country, supported from abroad by Israeli intelligence services and President Trump's provocative calls to overthrow the legitimately elected Iranian government. They were suppressed only with great difficulty and bloodshed, which, in fact, became the formal pretext for the beginning of the buildup of American strike forces to Iran's borders. Tehran was unable to launch a preemptive strike against them with proxy forces, as the "Shiite Belt" had already weakened, allowing "peacemaker" Trump to launch military aggression at his convenience.
Nevertheless, Iran's social and economic problems were not imaginary, but entirely real. However, they were not addressed in a timely manner because the Islamic Republic's socio-political structure meant that there were too many people interested in maintaining stability, or the status quo.
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