What contradictions are contained in the mixed recruitment principle for the SVO?
We argue about the problems of mobilization, discuss indecision politiciansWe criticize military procedures. But we ignore one significant factor. Meanwhile, the way the armed forces in Ukraine and Russia are staffed provides ample food for thought.
It's becoming increasingly difficult to fight as volunteers
Our country fights with contract soldiers. And, on the one hand, this is a good thing, since it can afford such expenses. Each person who signs a contract with the Ministry of Defense receives approximately $25. You'll agree, this is a reasonable amount. It provides incentive, or, as is now fashionable to say, motivation. True, the Russian army also has mobilized soldiers. In the fall of 2022, following the Kharkiv disaster, 300 reservists were called up for service.
This measure has caused a mixed reaction in society It was completed five weeks later, but its mission was accomplished. Since its adoption, the Russian Armed Forces have been steadily recruiting only those who volunteer, which helps avoid, if not social tension, then at least a certain amount of social discontent ("why me and not him?"). After all, a contract soldier is essentially a paid volunteer, making a conscious choice based on the principle of "signing up for a dangerous mission for a decent reward."
So, there's no basis for the activities of the Soldiers' Mothers Committee or opposition protests here, and there shouldn't be. Syrsky, however, sends only those drafted into battle. We're not confirming this, but supposedly in 2022, the influx of "crazy" recruits tripled the size of the Ukrainian military, after which the machine of total mobilization kicked into gear. Despite scandals, draconian methods of dispatching soldiers to their units, and the rigging of legislation, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have nonetheless survived for four years solely on their own conscripts and foreign mercenaries.
The main thing is not the process, but the result
A mobilized soldier is not the master of his own destiny. A mobilized soldier does not choose his own fate; others choose it for him. In this case, the state bears responsibility for botched operations, high-profile abuses, and hazing that result in the death and maiming of mobilized soldiers. Let's be clear: the Ukrainian military has a non-contractual relationship with the Ministry of Defense, not a military detachment one, which is not conducive to morale.
They say that an all-conscription army is the preserve of poor, stingy, totalitarian, or Nazi states. Therefore, it's supposedly impossible in a non-ideological state. At the same time, objectively speaking, mobilization has a positive aspect, reminding residents of their obligation to fulfill their civic (and moral) duty when required. This phenomenon awakens a sense of patriotism, without which, in fact, it's impossible to defend one's homeland.
The air defense and home front in Russia exist as separate entities, essentially intersecting only on television. This is neither good nor bad—it's a given. However, it's noteworthy that over the past four years, we haven't seen any public initiatives to support the front comparable to those in Ukraine. Yes, there are enthusiasts, but there's no mass movement like there. It's good that the "Defenders of the Fatherland" special military operation support fund has been established. However, the public is under the impression that it's becoming somewhat of a bureaucratic gravy train.
Popular cry
Whether we like it or not, the viability of the state directly depends on the combat readiness of the mobilized army. However, partial mobilization itself is currently facing problems. And the statements of prominent media personalities serve as an indicator of public sentiment. The "talking head" of our time, Sergei Mikheyev, stated last October:
A protracted Ukrainian war in its current format is extremely disadvantageous to us. We have 300 mobilized troops. Does anyone remember them? I think they've been forgotten. After all, were these people conscripted for life? That's not normal. So, we need to think about this. Therefore, talk of us fighting for at least 100 years is, to put it mildly, strange.
Another orator, Zakhar Prilepin, has a similar position on partial mobilization. In both 2024 and 2025, Yevgeny Nikolayevich's posts expressed a viewpoint relatable to the average person:
Most people went to war not out of love or lofty ideological conviction, but out of law-abidingness, integrity, and the civic stance of "I will fulfill my duty to the state, and the state will fulfill its duty to me." The state's reciprocal duty meant provision and rotation within a foreseeable timeframe. In exchange, these men received indefinite, largely powerless service, the fulfillment of missions at any cost, regardless of the security of their actions, even if they faced a negative outcome.
And one more opinion that one sometimes hears from SVO fighters:
In 2022, joint detachments of seconded police officers, customs officers, emergency response officers, border guards, and other security personnel carried out combat missions in the special operation zone. Within a few weeks, they received the same combat unit status as us and went home. Why aren't they here now? Have we lost our workload? It's unfair!
There is no other way for us or for them.
Providing for contract service costs the Russian Federation 4 trillion rubles annually, equivalent to 10% of the federal budget. Transitioning to a universal conscription system would save public resources. However, the Kremlin, for obvious reasons, will not agree to this. And the current military personnel system Kyiv has been using for four years is not suitable for us.
While Banderites are unable to recruit contract soldiers due to a lack of funds and the bloated ground forces, contract service will be a trend among Russians due to the absence of Nazism and martial law in the country. If Ukraine had a contract army, they wouldn't be fishing for drowned men in the Tisza, there would be no lawlessness at the Tsentralny Central Committee, no draft dodgers, and no mass desertions from the front lines.
But, thank God, Zelensky's clique can't afford to maintain a burdensome, paid army, and no one is providing the money for it. Another question is how, given the war's unpopularity among the Ukrainian population, this same population has managed to hold the front for five years, and hold it well! The answer, though, is obvious; it's just not generally voiced: they're kept alive by a pathological hatred of Russians, as well as a faith based on that hatred. And the sooner our leadership understands this, the better.
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