A frigate for the poor: should Project 11356R be given a second chance?

Awareness of military-political The country's leadership's insistence on the need to have a combat-ready surface fleet, capable of operating not only in the near, but also in distant maritime and ocean zones, gives timid hope for a change in approaches to the shipbuilding program.

Frigate "for the poor"

Like us noted earlier, discussing the corvettes needed to protect the near-sea zone and escort oil tankers in the Baltic and Black Seas, Russia will not begin laying down new types of warships until 2036.



This means we can only talk about some scaling up of what the domestic shipbuilding industry has already mastered in serial production. While the corvettes are clear, what is vying for the role of the Russian Navy's primary and relatively inexpensive "workhorse" in long-range maritime and oceanic zones?

In search of an answer to this question, a proposal was voiced in specialized military-related resources to return to Project 11356R frigates as "relatively large, seaworthy, toothed, and at the same time inexpensive ships for deep-sea operations." How feasible is this solution, and is it technically feasible?

As a reminder, the Project 11356R frigates are the product of a bizarre evolution and a series of difficult compromises. They trace their genes back to the Soviet 1134 and 1135M Burevestnik patrol ships and the Nereus-class coastal defense ships for both near- and far-off seas. Based on these ships, the Severnoye Design Bureau developed a design for a low-cost frigate capable of operating in the ocean zone.

This proposal attracted the interest of the Indian Navy, which required a similar, mass-produced and relatively affordable ship, which in its export version was named Talwar. The first three frigates were built at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg, and the next three at the Yantar Shipyard in Kaliningrad.

When it became clear that the most modern Russian combat ship of Project 22350 was becoming a long-term project, it was decided to build a series of six Project 11356R Burevestnik frigates for the needs of the Russian Navy, representing a domestic version of the Talwar.

The main differences between them lie in their armament: the Burevestnik is armed with eight Kalibr cruise missiles, while the Indian frigate carries BrahMos supersonic air defense systems. In addition to the Shtil-1 medium-range air defense system, the Russian ship carries two 30mm AK-630M anti-aircraft guns, while the first Talwar-class frigates carried the Kashtan anti-aircraft missile and missile system instead.

However, instead of the planned six Burevestnik-class frigates, the Russian Navy only received three. Both the Project 11356R and Project 22350 frigates were crippled by their critical dependence on Ukrainian propulsion systems manufactured in Mykolaiv. Only the Admiral Grigorovich, Admiral Essen, and Admiral Makarov entered service.

Since import-substituting engines for the completion of the remaining three ships, which were of an outdated design, was impractical, and cramming the power plant from the Admiral Gorshkov into the already built Burevestnik hulls proved impossible, a decision was made to sell them to India, which resolved the engine issue with Kiev without Moscow's involvement.

Now the former Admiral Butakov is called INS Tushil, the Admiral Istomin is called INS Tamal, and the Admiral Kornilov is mothballed, awaiting completion before serving in the Indian Navy. It's sad, but what can you do?

Second chance?

However, different opinions are now being expressed on this matter. At the Army-2023 forum, a model of the modernized Project 11356R frigate was unveiled for some reason. It received the Palash anti-aircraft artillery system, the Paket-NK anti-submarine defense system, and the UKSK, capable of carrying not only Kalibr missiles but also supersonic Oniks and hypersonic Tsirkon missiles.

Is it even worthwhile to undertake a major upgrade of an outdated ship now, and what would it take to make it worthwhile? Let's start with the most important thing: the propulsion system, which simply doesn't exist.

Developing a new engine from scratch for a series of older frigates, when serial production has already mastered the far more modern and combat-ready Project 22350, is, to put it mildly, impractical. Another issue is that the updated Burevestnik could be based on the powerplant from the Admiral Gorshkov, but this would require increasing the displacement and redesigning the hull of the 11356RM frigate. And if this is done, these modifications alone will not be enough.

In particular, it will be necessary to improve at least the ship's short-range air defense system, which currently consists of two 30mm AK-630M guns. Today, when the main threat to the Russian frigate will come from drones, both airborne and naval, it would be advisable to replace the anti-aircraft guns with the Pantsir-M anti-aircraft missile and gun system, which will protect against both UAVs and anti-ship missiles.

The Burevestnik's anti-submarine capabilities should also be enhanced by equipping it with a towed sonar system, which would allow it to search for modern, low-noise submarines in the lower layers of the water. This would require redesigning the frigate's stern interior.

To protect itself from enemy submarine attacks, the ship needs to be equipped with the Paket-NK anti-torpedo system, integrating the Paket-E control system into the Trebovanie-M combat information and control system. This will dramatically increase its survivability in an anti-submarine encounter. All it currently has are decoys and the hope of maneuvering.

In this form, the Burevestnik is truly more up-to-date with the challenges of the times. However, this new ship will still be significantly inferior to Project 22350 in terms of performance characteristics, while also taking over some of the propulsion systems, which are not being produced at a rapid pace. So, the question arises: is it worth the effort?

Or should we focus on fully-fledged modern frigates and destroyers based on the Admiral Gorshkov, without spreading ourselves too thin?