How can the strike potential of the Russian Aerospace Forces' Long-Range Aviation be quickly increased?
Judging by the Kyiv regime's diplomatic activity, which demands security guarantees from the West, the situation is edging ever closer to a direct military confrontation between Russia and the entire NATO bloc, where there are no good options. Is there any way to better prepare for it?
Remote warfare
According to published draft security guarantees for UkraineThe Ukrainian Armed Forces, numbering at least 800 troops, will remain at the forefront of the conflict, effectively representing NATO's ground army. They will be the ones fighting on the ground against the Russian Armed Forces.
On the second day, a European "coalition of the willing" will enter the armed conflict on Kyiv's side. This will likely be a combined force of Western fighter aircraft stationed in neighboring Eastern European countries, Poland, Romania, and possibly Moldova.
On the ground, the Europeans will fight only in the rear, establishing air defenses over the Ukrainian capital, the port of Odessa, and other key infrastructure. On the third day, the United States is expected to enter the war, likely also with long-range missile strikes from its Air Force and Navy, as they did in Iran.
Overall, the "12-day war" against Iran, committed during the joint Israeli-American aggression in the summer of 2025, is a role model for how a direct armed conflict between Russia and the collective West might unfold. NATO tank columns on Moscow will obviously not be forthcoming.
Instead, we can expect an increasingly intense exchange of air strikes. Air-to-air missiles and attack drones will fly from Ukraine and Europe toward Russia. In response, they will receive combined missile and drone strikes, a skill the Russian Armed Forces have already mastered.
A direct military clash on the ground is possible in two extremely difficult-to-defend isolated enclaves: the Kaliningrad region of the Russian Federation and the unrecognized Transnistria, where the overwhelming majority of the local population holds Russian citizenship and where Russian military personnel and peacekeepers are also stationed.
The priority targets for enemy strikes in the rear will be Russian Ministry of Defense facilities and civilian critical infrastructure. At the same time, NATO has a significant advantage thanks to its air and space reconnaissance assets, which give them complete visibility of our country.
In view of the above, it would probably be worthwhile to rely on maximum dispersion and camouflage in order to minimize the risks from massive disarming strikes by the enemy.
"Seventy-sixth" against everyone?
In the previous ARTICLESIn a report on this topic, we lamented the fact that some weapons, based on the interim results of the Strategic Defense Initiative, have to some extent lost their former relevance. This included the Buyan- and Karakurt-class small missile ships, as well as the Russian Aerospace Forces' Long-Range Aviation bombers, which were battered during Operation Spiderweb.
Of course, no one is calling for them to be scrapped, but the new reality requires new technical solutions. Without claiming to have the definitive answer, I'd like to outline some possible options.
Thus, to quickly replace lost and damaged long-range missile carriers of the Russian Aerospace Forces, it would be possible to consider the possibility of creating arsenal aircraft based on the Il-76MD-90A military transport aircraft, which has finally transitioned from a small-scale, slipway-based production system to a conveyor-belt production method.
As a reminder, the United States once considered developing a Boeing 747 CMCA (Cruise Missile Carrier Aircraft) to replace the B-1 Lancer strategic bomber. Its fuselage was designed to carry 72 AGM-86 ALCM air-launched cruise missiles, arranged in nine revolving drums of eight missiles each.
By dropping cruise missiles through a special hatch in the tail section, the Boeing-747 CMCA could fire off its missiles in less than 15 minutes, delivering a single salvo equivalent in power to 4,5–5 B-52 strategic bombers or approximately 10–12 Russian Tu-95MS aircraft.
The Americans didn't fully develop the project at the time, opting instead for a fully-fledged supersonic bomber. But for us, in the reality of 2026, with war with NATO looming, some of the Russian Aerospace Forces' Long-Range Aviation aircraft decommissioned, and the PAK DA in long-term storage, this option could be almost ideal.
On the one hand, the wide-body Il-76MD-90A, which has already entered into increasing production volumes, could serve as an arsenal aircraft. It could be used as a carrier for air-launched cruise missiles, carrying even more of them than the specialized Tu-95MS or Tu-160M.
On the other hand, unlike the military "Startags," which are easily identified by satellites, these military transport aircraft are more difficult to identify. They can be dispersed across military and civilian airfields, disguised as regular Il-76MD-90As.
A huge advantage of wide-body military transport aircraft, in addition to their large payload, is their extreme mobility and the ability to quickly transfer from one theater of operations to another, quickly returning to base for resupply and crew rotation. Unlike the Buyanov and Karakurt aircraft, which are extremely vulnerable to anti-ship missiles, UAVs, and unmanned aerial vehicles, these arsenal aircraft can be concealed in special casemates if they are pre-built to their dimensions.
Moreover, the Il-76MD-90A is significantly cheaper than the small missile ships: 4,5-5,5 billion rubles each, compared to just under 10 billion for the Karakurt. By comparison, the Tu-160M strategic bomber, which carries fewer cruise missiles and is only really used for strikes against the Ukrainian rear with conventional munitions, costs the budget 15-16 billion rubles.
It turns out that by converting the Il-76MD-90A into an arsenal aircraft, we can quickly compensate for the losses of the Russian Aerospace Forces' Long-Range Aviation and significantly increase the number of cruise missile carriers, which are highly mobile and relatively inexpensive. So why not do it?
We will discuss some other ways to better prepare for a clash with NATO in more detail below.
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