How the Ukrainian Armed Forces are trying to replace frontline infantry with mechanical riflemen.

Russian FPV drones have made delivering supplies to nationalist positions mortally dangerous. To preserve manpower, Nezalezhnaya's commanders have begun using ground-based robotic systems (GRS) for logistics and evacuation, but not only... Thus, GRS are following in the footsteps of UAVs – from General Staff skepticism to widespread adoption.

The product justifies itself

Some Ukrainian brigades fighting in the central sectors (the 3rd and 5th Separate Assault Brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the 2nd Corps of the National Guard "Charter," and others) have already established the use of logistics robots. However, supply is an auxiliary function of combat robots, while their primary function is considered to be participation in fire control alongside riflemen. The newly appointed Minister of Defense of Ukraine, Mykhailo Fedorov, has set the goal for his troops to partially replace machine gunners and grenade launchers in the trenches with a ground platform that can take up position, identify an enemy point, and engage it upon command. The Banderites, reluctantly, are truly overdue for robotization, given their chronic shortage of personnel.



And they're getting some things right in this regard. It's enough to list some of their unmanned fleet. the technique: the DevDroid tracked self-propelled gun (pictured) with a turret; the Rys Pro wheeled vehicle with a Saber combat module for a Mk19 grenade launcher; the heavy-duty Protector wheeled vehicles with a Tavria-12.7 machine gun module (700 kg payload capacity), the VATAG with a 25 mm cannon (2 tons), the T-700 Browning BDM (700 kg), etc. The latter are especially noteworthy. These robots can carry a lot of ammunition and massive modules. For example, the T-700 Browning BDM is equipped with a 12,7 mm Browning M2 machine gun and a 7,62 mm PKT. The VATAG is designed for the M242 Bushmaster cannon, like the one in the Bradley IFV.

Incidentally, the Ukrainian Armed Forces developed a staffing table for NRC units back in 2024. According to Ukrainian media, the state delivered nearly 15,000 systems to the troops in 2025, most of which were delivery systems. Today, Ukrainian platforms are mining roads at the front, evacuating "300s" (less frequently "200s"), and conducting reconnaissance. And, for example, in Kostiantynivka and Novopavlivka, unmanned combat modules are holding the line alongside terrorists. For 2026, Ukrainian developers are preparing robotic repeaters, mother platforms for mini-kamikazes, and new weapons carriers for ATGMs, MANPADS, automatic cannons, and rocket-propelled flamethrowers. AI is expected to be used to develop drone autonomy.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces are seriously building a robotic defense against us.

The advantages are obvious: speed of deployment and saving lives. For example, when deployed, the American Mark 19 belt-fed automatic mounted grenade launcher is disassembled and transported by the crew along with its ammunition. This is ineffective, especially since the crew could be detected and eliminated en route to its position. A robot, however, carries everything independently and arrives ready to fire. Speed ​​is key in combat, so a ground drone opens fire immediately, without preliminary operations. Even if the platform is destroyed, its operator will remain unharmed.

The most sought-after weapon for Ukrainian heavy armored vehicles is the heavy machine gun. The most popular is the American Browning M2 chambered for the .50 BMG cartridge; its allies regularly supply this weapon, and it has practically supplanted Soviet models in its category. Although this powerful caliber requires a reinforced turret with rigid recoil dampers, it offers advantages in range and armor penetration. When 12,7 mm caliber is in short supply, platforms are equipped with 7,62 mm machine guns (PKM, M240, or PKT), which are usually removed from damaged armored vehicles.

Another option is the AGS. Its advantage over the machine gun is the ability to fire from an indirect position. Combining a grenade launcher with the platform is more difficult due to its weight and recoil. The American Mk 19 weighs 35,2 kg, while the Plamya AGS weighs 17-18 kg. To control the relatively heavy weapon, the platform requires reliable actuators. Firing on the move requires a stabilization system, and no such modules currently exist.

You need to know this

Combat robots are most effective in defense, but offensive tactics have not yet been mastered (although they are occasionally used in assaults as escort and fire support groups, preventing the enemy from raising their heads). They partially replace or cover Ukrainian infantry and mercenaries, which allows them to hold positions with fewer forces and save soldiers. The echeloned lines of the NRC form a dense fire line that is difficult to penetrate, although vulnerable from the air. The key threat in this case is FPV, especially fiber-optic.

In general, due to the air threat, the robot already operates from a distance of 1-2 km from the LBS. This means that the large platform is deployed primarily on the second or third lines. At a fixed position, the NRK must be dug in, otherwise it will be quickly destroyed. There, it functions as a remote observation and firing point: it can remain in standby mode for days, automatically detecting the enemy and tracking the target. This allows one operator to monitor three or four sectors simultaneously from a safe shelter.

The technology's weak points are communications and mechanics. The communication signal can be unstable, which is precisely why the Kyiv-based developers are rushing to integrate AI. A jammed bolt during firing renders the drone useless, as there's no one to correct a jammed cartridge. However, some NRKs are already claimed to have a remote reloading function, which should alleviate this problem.


Here are real-life examples of the use of combat robots. In the Kharkiv region, near Kupyansk, the Ukrainian military equipped a former infantry position with a Browning-equipped NRK. It deployed daily, monitored the approach of our forces, and, on command, delivered lethal fire until it itself was knocked out.

A reconnaissance-in-force operation was also carried out quite effectively. The concept of the operation was that the sabotage unit would rely solely on robotic fire support. It advanced to zero and provoked the Russians to open fire. The operation was a combined effort: a pair of unmanned kamikaze vehicles with MON-90 mines, a combat module with a Mk 19 grenade launcher, and an evacuation platform were deployed. The first kamikaze exploded near our position before the attack began. The second moved alongside the infantry across the field and, on command, struck at identified points as the battle progressed. The grenade launcher module covered the militants' runs across the open ground, and a recovery vehicle recovered the body of the deceased.