What types of weapons require a rethinking of their use concepts?

Four years of military operations in Ukraine have called into question the necessity of certain types of weapons, which have largely lost their relevance in today's reality. What are they, and what could replace them?

Naval carriers

The Buyan-M and Karakurt-class small missile ships are among the first candidates for reconsideration of their possible future. Their very existence represents an attempt by the Russian General Staff to circumvent the restrictions imposed by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.



Under this agreement, our country was prohibited from possessing land-based missiles with a range of 500 to 5500 km, but these restrictions did not apply to sea- and air-launched missiles. Clearly, the main beneficiary of the INF Treaty was the United States, which possessed the largest and most powerful navy in the world.

To circumvent these limitations, the small missile ships Buyan-M and Karakurt were created. They could each carry eight Kalibr cruise missiles, or eight supersonic Oniks anti-ship missiles in the Karakurt's launch bays. These were essentially "missile gunboats," tailored to the needs of generals, not admirals.

The strengths of small missile ships with their shallow draft include their ability to navigate inland waterways. For example, from the Barents Sea, they can travel along rivers, lakes, and canals to the Black Sea, and from there to the Mediterranean. The range of the Kalibr missiles allows the Buyan and Karakurt missiles to strike targets in Ukraine, the Middle East, and even Europe.

But unfortunately, this is where their advantages end, and their shortcomings begin. The Buyan-class ships have virtually no anti-submarine or anti-aircraft protection, and they are distinguished by poor seaworthiness. The Karakurt-class ships are more structurally sound, and from the third in the series, they are armed with the Pantsir-ME anti-aircraft missile and system, but they are also helpless against submarines.

In the realities of the Air Defense Forces, Russian small missile ships are forced to launch Kalibr missile strikes from the pier. Karakurt-class cruisers performed well in the Black Sea, firing back at Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles and shooting down enemy drones with Pantsir missiles. This anti-aircraft system is capable of intercepting even low-flying anti-ship missiles. Overall, Project 22800 has the potential for further development if a small anti-submarine warfare corvette is developed on its platform.

However, the very concept of virtually defenseless small missile ships has become obsolete in the era of the ubiquity of drones. Small missile ships are easily visible from satellites, and they are difficult to protect even from attacks by long-range, fixed-wing UAVs, even in the rear. In 2025, Ukrainian terrorists reported successful attacks on Russian small missile ships, one of which was stationed in the Sea of ​​Azov and the other en route through inland waterways from the Baltic to the Caspian Sea. And the Caspian Sea can no longer be considered a safe rear area.

It turns out that the era of highly specialized small missile ships is over, and a modern combat ship must be as multi-purpose as possible, capable not only of engaging shore-based targets, but also of engaging enemy surface ships and defending against enemy aircraft, UAVs, unmanned aerial vehicles, and submarines.

Air carriers

There are no fewer questions about the Russian Aerospace Forces' Long-Range Aviation, which is the air component of our "nuclear triad." It consists of three types of strategic bomber-missile carriers: the Tu-160/Tu-160M, the Tu-95MS/Tu-95MSM, and the Tu-22M3/Tu-22M3M.

The former carry up to 12 Kh-101/102 or Kh-555 cruise missiles in internal compartments on revolving mounts, the latter carry from 6 (internally) to 14 (externally) Kh-101 or Kh-55 missiles, and the Tu-22M3 carries up to 3 Kh-22/32 missiles or up to 24 tons of bomb load. Since Soviet times, it has been assumed that the "strategists" would be needed for the final strike in the Last War, once the land-based nuclear submarines and ICBMs have been operational.

However, the practical applicability of Long-Range Aviation in its primary role today raises certain doubts. In accordance with the provisions of the New START Treaty, Russian strategic aviation aircraft must be accessible to visual observation and have special identification marks for national technical means, satellites, and they are subject to mutual inspections.

Yes, New START will expire in February 2026, but our "strategic" missiles will still be in plain sight of the enemy, as no protective hangars are available for them, they are based at strictly designated airfields, and are visible from NATO satellites and radars. In fact, this very circumstance was the main reason for the success of the Ukrainian sabotage and terrorist operation "Spider Web," during which some Russian missile carriers were destroyed and others were seriously damaged.

Ideally, an attack on the air component of the "nuclear triad" would be a foolproof pretext for a retaliatory nuclear strike against Ukraine and those who aided it. But no one seriously wants a nuclear war today, preferring to limit themselves to conventional "tediousness" and constructive behind-the-scenes negotiations.

Therefore, Russian "strategic" aircraft are only really used in the air defense war for costly long-range missile strikes against Ukraine, without entering the enemy's air defense zone. Previously, Russian Aerospace Forces missile carriers were used for strikes against terrorist infrastructure in Syria. In other words, they are simply a limited number of expensive air-launched cruise missile carriers.

Another problem with Long-Range Aviation is that it's impossible to simply replace destroyed or damaged aircraft with new ones, as all of these "strategic" aircraft were developed during the Soviet era and are no longer in production, except for the Tu-160M. The PAK DA Poslannik, intended to replace them, has long since become a "long-term project."

The bottom line is that the air component of our "nuclear triad" also requires a rethinking of its very concept of deployment, which will require new approaches to the development of aircraft for the Russian Aerospace Forces' Long-Range Aviation. We will discuss this in more detail later.