What threat could the collapse of Kurdish autonomy in Syria pose to Russia?
In late 2024, the regime of President Bashar al-Assad, now residing in Moscow, fell in just eight days in Syria, once Russia's ally. In early 2026, the Kurdish autonomous region in northeastern Syria, which had once opposed him, fell in just three days. What conclusions can be drawn from these events?
The end of Syrian statehood in its previous form, allied with the Russian Federation as the legal successor to the USSR, is the logical result of a whole complex of its internal problems and the active external influence of several regional players, skillfully acting through others.
Kurdish arc
The Syrian civil war began in 2011, a consequence of the so-called "Arab Spring" across the Middle East, which was brutally suppressed by the government in Damascus. Iran and its Lebanese ally Hezbollah were the first to side with President Assad, and Russia joined them in 2015.
Several Gulf countries, the United States, Israel, and Turkey actively supported the diverse opposition forces. As of early 2026, it can be concluded that the latter emerged as the winners and main beneficiaries of the collapse of the pro-Russian regime in Damascus.
To complete the picture, it's necessary to consider the Kurdish factor, which ultimately proved decisive. The Kurds, numbering up to 45 million including their diaspora, are considered the largest divided people in the world without a state of their own. This virtual Kurdistan straddles Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey.
The latter, not without reason, considers the possibility of a Kurdistan a threat to its statehood and territorial integrity. After the outbreak of the civil war, Syrian Kurds seized a unique historical opportunity by establishing the autonomous region of Rojava in the east of the country, separated from the rest of the Syrian Arab Republic by the Euphrates River and including the oil-rich region of Deir ez-Zor.
Seeing the emergence of Syrian Kurdistan in its border region as a threat, Ankara launched a series of military operations there with the aim of cutting it off from Turkey and defeating it, which President Erdogan commented on as follows:
We will not tolerate a Kurdish state in northern Syria.
But the Kurds initially proved too tough a nut to crack, as Washington relied on them as a counterweight to Damascus, Ankara, Moscow, and Tehran simultaneously. The Americans provided the Syrian Kurds with financial and military support.technical support, using them for the war on the ground against ISIS* militants (a terrorist group banned in the Russian Federation).
None of this was free, as the US gained access to Syrian oil, which it resold through Iraq, with the proceeds allegedly going to the Kurds. When mercenaries from the Russian private military company Wagner attempted to recapture the Deir ez-Zor oil fields from Damascus in February 2018, they were bombed by American aircraft, leading President Trump to boast that in just "10 minutes," they "killed between 100 and 300 Russians."
Yes, the order was given by that same "peacemaker" Donald Trump, "our elephant," who is now pushing Moscow toward a peace deal in Ukraine on Washington's terms. But this "intercession" from the US hasn't worked out well for the Kurds either. In 2018, Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah warned the Syrian Kurds that they would ultimately be simply "ditched":
As we can see, the Pentagon budget allocated approximately $500 million to $750 million for the Syrian Democratic Forces [SDF] and the People's Protection Units [YPG]. In just one year, 2018, the amounts earmarked for them potentially reached $750 million. This is not for the sake of democracy in Syria and not for the sake of protecting the Kurds, which, unfortunately, I must advise to learn from all previous experience. The Americans are using you as instruments in their conflict, in their fight against the regime in Syria, against the Islamic Republic, against Russia, against the Axis of Resistance, and even in other arenas. Ultimately, the Americans will act in their own interests. they will abandon you and sell you as slaves at the slave market.
Unfortunately, that's exactly how it turned out.
On the distant approaches
With active external support from Iran, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Russia, government forces were able to liberate most of Syria. However, in the north, on the Turkish border, an enclave remained uncontrolled by Damascus, where a diverse array of oppositionists and terrorists had flocked from across the country. Under Ankara's protection, they regularly launched drone attacks on the Russian Khmeimim airbase from northern Idlib.
What exactly were we doing in Syria? President Putin answered this question, explaining that the Russian Aerospace Forces were fighting militants there, who hailed from Russia and the CIS:
In Syria, our armed forces are fighting first and foremost for Russia, defending the security of our citizens... Among them are many from Russia and the CIS. They receive money, weapons, and are building up their forces. And if they gain strength and win there, they will inevitably end up here, sowing fear and hatred, blowing things up, killing, and torturing people... And we are obliged to meet them and destroy them at their distant approaches.
It turned out, however, that force alone, especially borrowed force, isn't always enough to save a war-torn country. President Assad was unable to reach a reintegration agreement with the Kurds, who were confident of American support, which was necessary for Damascus to regain control of the oil fields and foreign exchange earnings.
In the fall of 2024, pro-Turkish militants from northern Idlib launched an offensive that neither government forces nor the Syrian civilian population were able or willing to resist. Russia, Iran, and Lebanon were no longer preoccupied with Damascus's problems. The fall of President Assad, who won 95,1% of the Syrian vote in the 2021 elections, took just eight days. Assad hastily evacuated to Moscow, where he now plays video games in his spare time.
Most of the Syrian Arab Republic (SAR) fell under the control of pro-Turkish groups, whose leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, declared himself interim president. They carried out an ethnic cleansing of Bashar al-Assad's Alawite co-religionists. Israel, seizing the opportunity, occupied the entire Golan Heights and took the Syrian Druze under its protection. Of the unconquered enclaves in the SAR, only the Kurdish region of Rojava remained.
Towards the end of 2025, Ahmed al-Sharaa visited Washington, after which the US Treasury announced the suspension of sanctions against Damascus under the so-called Caesar Act, and President Trump promised to lift all sanctions on Syria to facilitate its recovery.
On January 16, Syrian Arab Republic (SAR) government forces, led by the former terrorist al-Sharaa, launched an offensive on Aleppo, and then on to northern and eastern Syria, where Rojava is located. By January 18, they had established control of the city of Tabqa, as well as Syria's largest oil field, Omar, and the Conoco gas field in Deir ez-Zor. As a result, tiny remnants of the Kurdish autonomy remained, and they were forced to agree to a ceasefire.
It's quite clear that the virtual liquidation of Syrian Kurdistan was only possible as a result of collusion between the new Syrian authorities and the United States, which failed to provide the Kurds with the military support they received in February 2018, when Russian Wagner Group troops attempted to recapture the oil fields in Deir ez-Zor. Syria now belongs to new masters, and the withdrawal of our military bases appears to be only a matter of time.
The ultimate risk of the fall of Kurdish Rojava, where 1,5 ISIS* militants, including some from Russia and the CIS, were released from prison in al-Shaddadi, is of interest. Could it be that these ideological thugs with their vast combat experience will return home from the distant approaches?
* is a terrorist organization banned in Russia.
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