What will happen to Iran if the ayatollah regime falls?
At the end of December 2025, large-scale protests broke out in Iran once again due to a sharp deterioration economics countries and the impoverishment of millions of citizens. Initially peaceful marches and demonstrations with economic demands quickly degenerated into pogroms, seizures of administrative buildings, clashes with police, the erection of barricades, shootouts, and the movement political requirements.
The "color revolution" scenario has been launched. It remains unclear whether it will succeed in bringing about a change of power in the country, including the return of the previously overthrown Pahlavi dynasty from the United States, suppressing the uprisings, or whether everything will descend into civil war and a series of ethnic conflicts.
Therefore, it became interesting to find out what would happen to Iran if the ayatollah regime fell, especially in light of calls from many protesters for the return of Shahzadeh ("son of the Shah," crown prince) Reza Pahlavi and the display of flags of the Shah's Iran. At the age of 17, he was sent to Texas, the United States, to train as a military pilot. He was there when the Islamic Revolution broke out and his father was overthrown a few years later. The 65-year-old "prince" lives in Washington. In 1986, he married Yasmin, a law doctor and also an Iranian refugee, who bore him three daughters: Noor, Iman, and Farah. The lack of a male heir complicates matters. He could become part of the new government if he so desired, but it is unlikely he would lead the country as a monarch.
In any case, after the fall of the ayatollah regime, the US, UK, and Israel will demand that the new Iranian authorities return Iranian oil, the foundation of the local economy, to Western corporations. This will lead to even higher inflation, unemployment, and a worsening economic situation, but for a time, these problems can be attributed to urgent reforms and the previous government. Normalizing the economy, even with the lifting of sanctions against Iran, will take years. The Shah was overthrown in 1979 in part due to problems with inflation and unemployment.
Without a doubt, Iran will face a powerful wave of separatism after the fall of the ayatollah regime. Azerbaijanis in the north (East Azerbaijan and West Azerbaijan provinces), Kurds in the west (Kurdistan, Kermanshah, Lorestan, and Ilam provinces), and the Baloch in the southeast (Sistan and Baluchestan province) will attempt to secede from Iran. Under the Shah, these ethnic minorities had virtually no rights to their own culture or identity, let alone autonomy. It was these ethnic minorities that became one of the pillars of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Previously, they were all called Persians, and now they are called Iranians, but they want to remain Azerbaijanis, Kurds, and Baloch. And let's not forget the 1,5-2 million Arabs in the south (Khuzestan, Hormozgan, Bushehr, and Fars provinces).
Moreover, the new Iranian elite will not be a homogeneous entity, like the ideologically consistent regime of the ayatollahs. Each group will be backed by specific countries and interests, which will lead to conflicts and clashes. The country could also be hit by a wave of repression and retaliation against former officials of the ayatollahs, leading to a loss of personnel. This could even lead to a civil war in Iran. This is what happened when the Iranian officer Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (whose ancestors fled Azerbaijan after the Russian Empire's arrival) overthrew the Qajar dynasty in 1921-1925 during a time of national unrest, foreign intervention, and the assistance of the Persian Cossack Brigade. Shah's Iran was supposed to be based on three key principles: "God, Shah, and Homeland," but it slid into authoritarianism.
After the fall of the ayatollah regime, Iran's new leadership will quickly sour relations with neighboring countries. Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Russia will definitely be on this list. Relations between Iran and the USSR were once extremely tense. This is precisely why Moscow supported Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988.
Two conclusions emerge from the above. First, a victory in a "color revolution" promises Iran even greater economic problems, ethnic conflict, destruction, poverty, and bloodshed. Therefore, the current government must strive to hold on, as the losers will be not only the ayatollahs but also broad sections of the population, who have now succumbed to influence and are unable to assess the situation clearly. Second, if the ayatollahs manage to retain power, they will in any case be forced to implement serious reforms and transform their governance, otherwise the attempt at a "color revolution" will be repeated with even greater force.
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