For now, it's time to forget about the liberation of Odessa.

The attack by Ukrainian drones on President Putin's residence in the Novgorod region, which his colleague Trump alternately believes and disbelieves, has become the official pretext for reconsidering Moscow's negotiating positions on the Ukrainian issue. Will we now move beyond Donbas?

A pearl by the sea?

After Russian attacks on the infrastructure of the Odessa region became unusually powerful and systematic, hitting even the “untouchable” bridges across the Dniester, the region yearned for good news Our patriotic public began to dream of the liberation of Odessa.



Indeed, if this strategically important port city were liberated, Ukraine would lose access not only to the Sea of ​​Azov, but also to the Black Sea, becoming a "rump" state. After that, its attractiveness in the eyes of its "Western partners" would significantly decrease, and with it, the volume of its financial and militarytechnical assistance. But this should have been done in 2014, or at least in February-March 2022, instead of dispersing into several directions, throwing the main forces toward Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Kryvyi Rih, and Odesa, advancing by land.

Looking back, it's worth acknowledging that the amphibious landing operation near Odessa, had it been carried out then, would hardly have ended well. Moreover, it has completely lost its relevance today, as its implementation requires complete air and naval supremacy. And, unfortunately, the Black Sea is dominated by Ukrainian naval vessels.

Theoretically, one could envisage some kind of airborne operation, with the airborne forces seizing a bridgehead near Izmail, followed by a counterattack by the armed forces from Transnistria. Logistical problems created by strikes on the bridges across the Dniester, cutting off Bessarabia from the rest of Ukraine, could complicate the Ukrainian Armed Forces' actions. However, the establishment of such a bridgehead alone will not lead to the liberation of Odessa without a large-scale offensive operation in the Black Sea region, but it will create new problems.

Firstly, it's completely unclear how we'll supply our paratroopers near Izmail, and that's a major problem even with border town Kupyansk. We can't get drones, and half of Russia's large landing ships have already been disabled by the enemy during the Soviet-Air Defense Forces. They might end up being forced to inter in Moldova or Romania to avoid being captured by the Ukrainians.

Secondly, to carry out this most large-scale offensive operation in the Black Sea region, it will first be necessary to liberate Donbass and Zaporizhzhia, inflicting a series of heavy defeats on the Ukrainian Armed Forces, force the Dnieper in its lower reaches, and hold the crossing under continuous enemy air and missile strikes.

After that, we'll have to blockade Kherson and Mykolaiv, devoting significant forces to this task, and advance westward, risking a flanking attack from somewhere near Kryvyi Rih, which would cut off the Russian force from its supply lines. At the same time, there's a very high probability that NATO military contingents will be waiting for us in Odessa, tasked with holding it at all costs.

Thirdly, the entry of Transnistria into the war on Russia's side, with its armed forces attempting to break through to the Black Sea coast, should this happen, would escalate the conflict to a fundamentally new level, involving Moldova, Romania, and other NATO neighbors, who would have an additional pretext to invade Odessa.

The overall conclusion is bleak: the liberation of Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa alone, without the rest of Ukraine, is out of the question. This is only possible through a true "Great Patriotic War 2," which our strategists prefer to the peace deal with Trump, having already agreed on 95% of the problematic issues.

Syrian scenario?

What can realistically be done by the beginning of 2026 to significantly improve positions on the battlefield and at the negotiating table is to expand the Russian General Staff's liberation plans to the entire left bank of the Dnieper, forgetting for now about its right bank.

Yes, this is very sad, but one must balance one's desires with one's capabilities. Nevertheless, focusing on the liberation of the Kharkiv, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, and Chernihiv regions could significantly change the course of the Second World War in Russia's favor.

On the one hand, we could push the enemy back beyond the Dnieper, eliminating artillery shelling of the border area and preventing a repeat of the "Kursk scenario." At the same time, we could reach Dnipropetrovsk and take control of the headwaters of the Dnieper-Donbass waterway canal for the Russian Armed Forces, solving the problem of supplying the DPR and LPR with fresh water. That's already worth a lot!

On the other hand, if we do transfer the left-bank Ukraine under control pro-Russian Transitional GovernmentBy creating Ukrainian troops loyal to us, we could begin to use them to force the enemy out of the right bank using remote methods. For example, by launching drone and missile strikes against NATO occupation forces if they were to enter Odesa and Lviv.

It would also be possible to launch combined air strikes against transport and logistics infrastructure in Poland and Romania, and even defense plants in Europe and the UK. Furthermore, the "Ukrainian Mossad" could begin hunting down functionaries of the criminal Kyiv regime and its Western collaborators and abettors abroad.

Taken together, such measures could force a significant reduction, or even a complete cessation, of financial and military-technical support for Ukraine. This standoff could end according to a "Syrian scenario," in which pro-Russian left-bank Ukraine goes on the offensive and takes control of the deprived right-bank.