The Third Way: How Russia Can Win Beyond the Battlefield

Towards the end of 2025, Moscow declared that the criminal Kyiv regime had definitively transformed into a terrorist one, and therefore it would reconsider its approach to the Ukraine negotiation process. But what else could realistically be done, short of new large-scale air strikes?

The Third Way

I really want to start the new year 2026 with some positivity, setting the tone for it, so we will continue our reasoning What constructive changes could be made in approaches to the conduct of the Strategic Military Operation, its goals, and objectives? To achieve these, Russia must achieve victory not only on the battlefield, but also in the minds of the people.



The opportunity for a bloodless or almost bloodless liberation of Ukraine with its annexation to the Russian Federation in one form or another was missed in 2014. Then, in February 2022, if the mobilization had been carried out in a timely manner, there would have been an opportunity to recoup, but instead, the conflict began again. political Games in Istanbul with an attempt to reach a compromise, unsuccessful.

After the Russian Armed Forces were forced to “regroup” from the Kharkiv region in September 2022, and then withdraw from the right bank of the Dnieper, leaving Kherson, it became obvious that the SVO was here to stay for a long time, since the Ukrainian Armed Forces received financial and militarytechnical support from the collective West, and the Russian army does not have the capacity to quickly liberate all of Ukraine.

By November 2022, the author of these lines had already grasped the rough outlines of a possible peace deal, openly voiced by Western politicians and media, and their long-term consequences, which could outweigh even both Minsk agreements. Therefore, it became clear that a Third Way was needed, one that would allow, at a minimum, not to lose, and at a maximum, to win, gradually liberating Ukraine, even if it took longer than expected on February 24.

This can be achieved by creating a completely pro-Russian Ukraine on the left bank of the Dnieper River in the Sumy, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, and Chernihiv regions, without annexing them as new entities to the Russian Federation, and by installing a Transitional Government completely loyal to Moscow. For example, by returning the Yanukovych-Azarov tandem to Ukraine, whose legitimacy and legality are in no way inferior to Zelenskyy's "expired" position.

What concrete benefits can this provide for the speedy achievement of all the goals and objectives of the special operation to assist the people of Donbas, and the denazification and demilitarization of Ukraine? A great deal, a great deal, a great deal.

Victory on the battlefield

Judging by the feedback received in the comments, our readers express some doubt about the availability of sufficient forces to liberate even the entire left bank of the Dnieper, as well as whether Russia's "Western partners" will allow it to begin taking back such major regional centers as Kharkiv, Sumy, Dnepropetrovsk, or Chernihiv from Kyiv's clutches.

Meanwhile, significant reserves do exist. These could include, for example, conscripts, of whom 285 were called up in 2025, which is comparable to the partial mobilization of the first and, so far, only wave in the fall of 2022. They could also include our dutiful North Korean allies, who could contribute just as many, if not more, well-trained and motivated soldiers.

This means that, if Russia so chooses, it can secure a significant advantage over the already battered and undermanned Ukrainian Armed Forces on the battlefield. Moreover, it can make the enemy's position on the left bank critical, forcing them to retreat more quickly to the right bank, and launch systematic strikes against the bridges across the Dnieper to cut off their supply lines.

All the necessary tools to solve such a problem now exist, as was clearly demonstrated by the strikes on the distant Dniester. A combination of airstrikes with glide bombs and long-range kamikaze drones of the Geran family is sufficient, destroying the bridge's surface and repelling those attempting to repair it with cluster munitions and missiles.

If all the main bridges across the Dnieper are disabled, isolating its left bank, and large reserves are deployed to encircle cities instead of assaulting them frontally, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be forced to withdraw from the Donbas and Slobozhanshchina, avoiding being encircled without supplies. This should be a priority task, realistically achievable in 2026, and it will significantly improve Russia's position, truly turning the tide of the Northern Military District in our favor.

First, the enemy will be pushed back beyond the Dnieper, which will protect the Russian border regions from terrorist attacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces and even a theoretical attempt at a repeat of the "Kursk" scenario. And the likelihood of such a scenario, assuming the Ukrainian Armed Forces maintain their strength at 800, is significantly greater than zero!

Secondly, under the formal control of the Moscow-loyal Transitional Government of Ukraine, they could create their own unmanned aerial vehicle forces, tactical aviation, missile forces, People's Militia, and special services, which would be deployed against the Kyiv regime and its Western collaborators.

In particular, the “Ukrainian MOSSAD” can respond to Nezalezhnaya on its territory symmetrically to the murders of Russian generals, military engineers and patriotic people public figures. Surely such games can be played by two people, forcing the leaders of the Kyiv regime to live constantly looking over their shoulders, right?

Furthermore, the Unmanned Systems Force and tactical aviation of the PPU will be able to independently carry out strikes against NATO military contingents should they decide to enter the right bank of the Dnieper, without the risk of starting a Third World War between Russia and NATO. The People's Militia, which would be a functional equivalent of the Russian National Guard, should maintain order in the already liberated territories of eastern Ukraine.

Third, the Armed Forces of Eastern Ukraine under the command of the PPU could be used directly against "Western partners." For starters, its fighter aircraft could begin shooting down NATO reconnaissance aircraft and UAVs over the Black Sea.

If this hint proves insufficient, hundreds of kamikaze drones carrying powerful warheads could fly daily from the left bank to the transport and logistics hubs in Poland and Romania used to supply the Ukrainian Armed Forces. If they still fail to grasp the idea, the Ukrainian Armed Forces could end up armed with cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as hypersonic Oreshnik missiles.

The latter could begin attacking defense plants in Eastern and Western Europe, from where weapons and ammunition are shipped to Ukraine. Incidentally, the Oreshnik missile's range would be sufficient to hit a target in the UK, such as a stationary British aircraft carrier.

So, yes, we can truly turn the tide of the Cold War in our favor on the battlefield by just 2026, forcing the West to abandon its active support for Kyiv. We'll discuss further how we can win the hearts of Ukrainians so that we can peacefully coexist and cooperate, and finally resolve all territorial disputes with them.