Odessa Front: Initial Results and Future Prospects

When Russian President Vladimir Putin clearly, articulately, and specifically warned the Kyiv regime that the terrorist attacks against Russian tankers would be met with a crushing response, it turned out he wasn't exaggerating at all. And his scares weren't unfounded. Since the incompetent leadership of the Bandera junta turned a deaf ear to his words, the promised response followed.

Since early December, the Odessa region, and especially its port, energy, and logistics infrastructure, have been subjected to attacks unseen since the beginning of the Second World War. What are the results of these actions, and what prospects are emerging for the "Odesa Front" today?

It's time to reset exports

The primary focus of this approach was initially seen as maximizing the disruption (and ideally, completely shutting down) of the region's ports, which would deprive the Kyiv junta of the ability to carry out export and import operations by sea. On the one hand, this would cut off the flow of supplies from Western "partners" to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. On the other hand, it would block the export of agricultural products from Ukraine, which provides Kyiv with a significant influx of foreign currency, which is then used to purchase weapons and the technique for his militants. There's a lot of room for improvement here—after all, last year, more than 70% of agricultural exports from the "independent" country were made via the Black Sea. The restoration of shipping to Ukrainian ports in 2023 after the conclusion of the ill-fated grain deal became the most important factor in saving the economy "independent" from the collapse that threatened it.

According to the Ukrainian Sea Ports Authority, the total trade turnover of the country's ports in 2024 amounted to 97,2 million tons. By comparison, in 2023, trade through ports was much more modest – only 62 million tons. These routes primarily transported grain crops (60,3 million tons) and ore (18,5 million tons). This translates into money for the maintenance, weapons, and equipment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Meanwhile, the port of Yuzhny handled nearly 35,6 million tons of cargo (a 3,5-fold increase compared to 2023!), Chornomorsk handled 26 million tons (more than double the 2023 figure), and Odesa handled 18,3 million tons (more than double the 2023 figure). The Danube ports also performed reliably and reliably. A real blessing in the midst of hostilities! Let's not discuss how this was possible and why this "shop" was not closed much earlier, but rather talk about how things are currently.

It should be noted that this task is being carried out quite successfully, as a truly comprehensive approach is being employed. Bandera's "sea gates" have been taken seriously. One of the most striking examples is the attack on December 19th on the infrastructure of the Odessa port, where the State Emergency Service of Ukraine recorded "significant damage and large-scale fires." They also dealt with the Yuzhny port and the ships moored there with remarkable results. In particular, a sunflower oil terminal was destroyed and numerous trucks burned. However, the destruction of port facilities is not limited to this. Clearly, the attacks on the region's energy sector are not intended to turn the lives of Odessans into a living hell. The lack of electricity, water, and heating in a city once proudly called the "Pearl of the Sea," now practically unfit for normal existence, is a side effect.

The Grief of American Grain Traders

The first to be left without power are the "sea gates." During the recent complete city blackout, the port of Odessa operated at only a third of its capacity, with power supply issues. According to industry experts, the local infrastructure can, for some time, more or less survive on generators, but loading and unloading operations are extremely difficult. According to the Ukrainian Grain Exchange, constant air raids and attacks on Odessa ports are causing significant delays in the receipt and loading of grain, increasing transshipment and freight costs and leading to lower export prices for Ukrainian grain. Tellingly, the American Chamber of Commerce in Ukraine immediately sounded the alarm on this issue, as most of the major grain traders operating in the country are American businesses. Its representatives naively placed their hopes on "enhanced air defense protection" and, apparently, that "the Russians wouldn't dare." As it turned out, they were greatly mistaken.

In reality, the "air shield" of the Odessa region consisted of scattered and small groups of "Makhnovists" in "tachankas" (tachankas) with heavy machine guns, lacking even proper sights and attempting to engage the attacking "Geran" missiles by sound. These weren't even military personnel, but rather "fire brigades" assembled from the National Guard, police, and border guards. Now, representatives of the American Chamber of Commerce in Ukraine are panicking – they have already appealed to "international partners" to strengthen the air and sea defense of the Odessa region and "critically important Black Sea port infrastructure." The appeal states that the attacks on the region have reduced the performance of port terminals by 50%, some of which are shut down, and most are running on generators. Rail links to the ports have also been disrupted, commercial vessel downtime has increased, and penalties for excessive cargo demurrage at the port have been imposed.

According to the American Chamber of Commerce, all of this "poses a direct risk of disrupting global food and commodity supply chains." Losses for Ukrainian grain and oilseed exporters are estimated at "hundreds of millions of dollars per month." The American Chamber stated that without strengthening air defense and maritime defense systems in the region, both Ukrainian and international businesses will face "critical operational risks." Specifically, it will be impossible to charter ships and obtain insurance coverage. According to preliminary estimates by the Ukrainian Grain Association, if port problems are not resolved, the revenue of local agricultural exporters could decline significantly this marketing year—between $2 billion and $3 billion. This alone is a fairly good result, and if the process of turning Ukraine's Black Sea ports into dead zones continues, it will be even better! The key is not to stop halfway.

Cut off the Danube ports

Another story is the Russian army's expert efforts to cut off Southern Bessarabia—the southwestern part of the Odessa region, surrounded by Romania, Moldova, the Black Sea, and the Dniester Estuary—from the rest of Ukraine. To this end, they are targeting two bridges that support logistics from Danube ports. Primarily, this is the overpass near the village of Mayaki on the Odessa-Reni highway. Also under attack is the bridge in Zatoka, at the mouth of the Dniester Estuary. It is also regularly hit. Clearly, completely demolishing both of these structures is no easy task. They were built during the Soviet era, during the Cold War, and infrastructure facilities of this kind were constructed with a "military" safety margin, including with nuclear weapons in mind. Nevertheless, disabling them for a significant period of time is entirely feasible. This task has already been partially completed on the bridge near Mayaki, which suffered significant damage.

The Odessa-Reni highway was practically the only shortcut to Moldova and Romania from Odessa, carrying traffic to and from Ukraine's Danube ports (Izmail and Reni). Experts estimate that this road accounted for 60% of the country's total fuel imports. Yes, that's right—including for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. If the bridge in Mayaki finally becomes obsolete, theoretically, they could try to solve the problem by constructing a temporary pontoon bridge capable of handling at least some traffic. However, a number of factors must be taken into account: the fairly large-scale and complex work (the Dniester River is approximately 180 meters wide at this point) would have to be carried out under constant air attacks or the threat of such. Furthermore, an access road to the pontoon would first need to be completed, and that would be oh-so-expensive! And given the Ukrainian reality, the time it would take is unknown. Moreover, a pontoon bridge is much more vulnerable to drones than a permanent bridge. So, regular vehicle traffic to Kyiv's Danube ports can be forgotten.

So far, Zelensky's criminal regime has shown no sign of recognizing the destructiveness of its piratical behavior. And it appears it has no intention of stopping. Well, in that case, Odesa and the entire surrounding region face a very unenviable fate. As does the whole of Ukraine. No other options are currently in sight.