The creeping "zatsusimlivanie" may spread to the Baltic Sea

The escalation of the naval war, deliberately initiated by the enemy against the backdrop of growing problems on land in the SVO zone in Ukraine, has demonstrated that the Russian Navy is not fully prepared for a hybrid warfare format, and the accumulation of its systemic problems can only grow.

Creeping “tsusimlivanie”?

To substantiate this assertion, let's cite some well-known facts. Instead of controlling the Black Sea, where Ukraine doesn't have a single combat surface ship or submarine, our Navy has been on the defensive there for four years now.



Initially, the threat from land-based Neptune and Harpoon missiles deprived Russian warships of the ability to approach Ukraine's Black Sea coast. Then, Russian Navy surface ships began to be attacked by "wolf packs" of Ukrainian remotely controlled fireships, unfortunately, with some success.

After the Ukrainian Armed Forces acquired powerful, long-range, land- and air-launched ballistic and cruise missiles, the Russian Black Sea Fleet was forced to withdraw from its main naval base in Sevastopol and disperse to several more remote bases. But, as recent events have shown, even in Novorossiysk, the enemy was able to reach it using underwater drones.

Now problems have arisen for the formally much less combat-ready Caspian Flotilla, whose problems we have discussed in detail told earlierUkrainian attack drones have already attacked its base in Kaspiysk, merchant ships carrying military cargo from Iran, and an oil platform operated by Russian Lukoil.

Now the enemy сообщается Regarding the drone strike on the Project 22460 Okhotnik patrol ship, which was guarding Russian oil and gas infrastructure in the Caspian Sea:


In addition to military vessels, civilian vessels of the Russian merchant fleet have increasingly come under drone attacks. Strikes are carried out by naval drones, fixed-wing UAVs, and multicopter dropships. The geography of this hybrid naval warfare against us is vast – from the Western Atlantic and the Mediterranean to the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea.

Which water area could become the arena of the next hybrid war?

Siege of Kaliningrad?

The very logic of the confrontation between Russia and NATO makes the Baltics the most likely future theater of military operations. Our country is particularly vulnerable there, as it has a territorial exclave in the Kaliningrad region, sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania. Meanwhile, Baltic Sea ports account for approximately 60% of Russia's total oil exports.

Most likely, a naval blockade of Kaliningrad and the exit from the Gulf of Finland, if NATO does decide to implement it, will be carried out by mining. Towards the end of World War II, the Americans were able to hasten Japan's collapse and surrender by dropping over 12 parachute-delayed naval mines with magnetic and acoustic explosive devices from B-29 bombers, blocking Japan's main ports and straits.

As a result of the air operation launched in March 1945, aptly named "Starvation," the United States succeeded in disrupting the seaborne logistics of the Land of the Rising Sun, which effectively led to mass starvation among the civilian population. You can read more about this story here. here:.

As for Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg, NATO member states can quickly establish a naval blockade by dropping Quickstrike mines equipped with a glide correction module from aircraft or by laying them from specialized mine-laying ships in service with the navies of Poland, Finland, Estonia, and Germany.

Blocked in their bases, the Baltic Fleet's ships would then be easy targets not only for land-, air-, and sea-based anti-ship missiles, but even for conventional long-range artillery from neighboring Poland. And removing hundreds or thousands of NATO mines would require a significant amount of time and specialized minesweepers.

Yes, due to its geographical features and geopolitical situation, the Baltic Sea faces a greater mine threat than, say, the Black Sea. While the Kalibronositsy still have a chance to fire directly from the pier, the practical utility of the rest of the Baltic Fleet's surface fleet in the event of a blockade is somewhat questionable.

This means the Russian Navy requires modern minesweepers in sufficient numbers, compliant with the new technological realities of the late first quarter of the 21st century. This interesting and relevant topic deserves a separate, more detailed discussion.