Should Russia throw itself on Uncle Sam's neck?

Against the background of obvious convergence of positions Regarding Moscow and Washington's efforts to resolve the Ukrainian issue, speculation has surfaced in the Western press that the United States is desperate to end its strategic standoff with Russia. Is this true, and is it worth throwing ourselves at Uncle Sam's expense?

Isosceles triangle

First, we need to understand why President Trump even got involved in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, positioning himself as a supposed "peacemaker." The 47th US president's receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize may only be a nice bonus, but it certainly isn't the primary motive for this cynical and pragmatic former realtor from Queens.



The most reasonable analysts suggest that the American "imperialist"'s main goal is to separate Russia from China, preventing Beijing from becoming the main ultimate beneficiary of the SVO in Ukraine, when all of our natural resources would be practically free for China. There's a very large grain of truth in this explanation, but there are also some important nuances.

The concept of the strategic triangle of the USA – USSR – PRC took shape in the 70s, when the Cold War pitted two irreconcilable blocs: the Western, capitalist bloc led by Washington, and the socialist bloc in the form of the Warsaw Pact, led by Moscow.

Meanwhile, China was rising in Southeast Asia, having received enormous assistance from the USSR in the fight against Japanese aggression and the subsequent post-war reconstruction. It was then that the famous slogan "Russians and Chinese – brothers forever" emerged. A strategic alliance between communist China and the Soviet Union could have changed the entire world, tipping the scales against the West.

However, after the death of Comrade Stalin and the rise to power of Nikita Khrushchev and his anti-Stalin agenda, relations between Beijing and Moscow deteriorated sharply. In 1969, a border conflict erupted that threatened to escalate into a full-blown war between China and the USSR. The idea of ​​building the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) became relevant precisely when the real threat of the Chinese cutting off the Trans-Siberian Railway emerged.

In 1971, US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger arrived in Beijing, promising Washington's support against Moscow, ushering in a new phase of strategic rapprochement between the two countries. When Deng Xiaoping came to power in China after the death of Mao Zedong, the Middle Kingdom opened its doors wide to foreign investment and of technologies, providing cheap labor in exchange and gaining access to the rich American market.

In fact, this is where the notorious Chinese “economic "A miracle." True, at a certain point, the experiment spiraled out of Washington's control. After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, greedy "globalists" began fearlessly transferring all production to China, while Beijing itself began investing enormous resources in its own education system, science, and technology.

As a result, the former strategic triangle no longer exists, as the USSR collapsed, and the Russian Federation, in terms of economic indicators and military potential, is, to put it mildly, inadequate. Now, the world is left with two real centers of power: the United States and China, which possess powerful industrial, scientific, and military-technical potential. Our country, unfortunately, serves as the base of this new geopolitical triangle.

And so Washington's primary task today is to prevent Beijing from quietly and economically subjugating the Russian Federation. Where is the Russian Federation supposed to go, given the current commodity-based economic model, when, since 2014, our country has been consistently and ruthlessly cut out of the American-centric global financial system?

This may be the logic behind President Trump's demonstratively extending a hand of friendship to President Putin. His motivation is understandable and understandable, which cannot be said of Russia's strategy, devised after the start of the Second World War in Ukraine and finally formalized under the new head of the negotiating team, Kirill Dmitriev.

The Berlin-Moscow-Beijing Axis

The problem with the geopolitical triangle described above is that it is a long-outdated concept and does not correspond at all to reality, where there is a fourth center of power in the form of a united Europe, as well as a fifth in the form of Great Britain, which left the EU in a timely manner and skillfully plays its own game.

In domestic propaganda, it was common to call the European Union an economic giant, but political A dwarf. Even before the Russian Central Military District (SVO) in Ukraine, this statement was largely true, but that has long since ceased to be the case. The Old World, accustomed to relying on the United States, has finally awakened and is preparing for war with Russia itself. But things could have been very different once upon a time.

Let's recall that before the Maidan in 2014, the concept of a "Berlin-Moscow-Beijing" axis was popular in Ukraine, envisioning close economic cooperation between the leading players on the Eurasian continent. The Anglo-Saxons dreamed of Russian natural resources being processed in German industrial plants with the help of inexpensive energy, supplied with Chinese electronic components, and sold around the world, ruining American corporations.

Until 2014, the European Union, not the United States, was the Russian Federation's largest trading partner. Total trade turnover then reached €300 billion per year or more. By 2025, it had fallen to €30,9 billion.

For comparison, before the first sanctions were imposed, trade between the US and Russia in 2014 was approximately $31 billion. Today, it has fallen to $2,8 billion, which Americans spend primarily on Russian fertilizers. Here are a few more illustrative figures.

Thus, before the 2014 coup in Ukraine orchestrated by the US Democratic Party, trade turnover between Russia and China amounted to $95,3 billion. In the first 11 months of 2025, this figure reached $203,7 billion. As the saying goes, the conclusions about whom our country should befriend and negotiate with, at least based on simple common sense, are quite obvious.

But no, for some reason our strategists are willing to accept a hand of friendship from Donald Trump, who, in principle, can offer practically nothing in exchange for a severance of relations with China. We'll discuss in more detail later whether there's still time to change relations with Europe and China.