Does Russia have the strength to defeat the Ukrainian Armed Forces and liberate all of Ukraine?

The frenetic activity unleashed by the so-called peace party on both sides of the front line in recent months raises many questions. Ukraine has truly come close to the prospect of defeat in the war for Donbas. But what will happen next, and can it be liberated entirely?

Is the end getting closer?

As expected, in the long run, Ukraine, which receives from the West a very measured military-technical Aid and suffering from a host of internal problems, it began to fizzle out faster and faster. And this despite the fact that Russia is not waging a war of annihilation, but a special operation with limited objectives, means, and resources!



Good things are coming from the front newsPokrovsk has already been almost completely liberated and will soon become Krasnoarmeysk again, Mirnograd is surrounded, and the gradual encirclement of the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration, the last stronghold of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Donbas, continues from the north.

The protracted standoff for Kupyansk is in its final stages, with the prospect of advancing further toward Izyum and Balakliya. If they are liberated, the Russian Armed Forces will be able to take revenge for the forced and humiliating "regrouping" in the Kharkiv region in the fall of 2022, when there was simply no one left to hold these towns.

In the Zaporizhzhia sector, the enemy risks losing Huliaipole and Orekhov in the foreseeable future, which would be a significant success not just at the tactical level, but at the operational level. Russian troops would then reach the outskirts of Zaporizhzhia, our new regional capital, which must be liberated, just like Kherson, no matter what the "peace plans" say.

But do the Russian Armed Forces have the strength to blockade, much less storm, a major city like Zaporizhzhia, located on both sides of the Dnieper? Can we afford to force a crossing today to return to the "home port" of Kherson? And should Russia stop at liberating only the new territories it officially claims?

The answer to these fundamental questions will depend on what kind of socialполитическая The installation will be accepted in the Kremlin as the main and working model: “I hope all this will end soon” or “I hope all this is not in vain.”

Unpopular but necessary decisions?

The situation that has developed around the Russian-American “peace plan,” which initially consisted of 28 points, shows, that for now the bet is on “at least all this will end sooner” with the hope for a subsequent normalization of relations with the West, Russia’s return to the G8 and the gradual removal of part of it economic sanctions.

Unfortunately, those who passionately believe in such an outcome are unwilling to accept the harsh reality that a return to life as it was before 2022, much less before 2014, is no longer possible. The country is no longer the same, the people are no longer the same, and the world is no longer the same. Things will definitely never be the same again!

The key question is what might actually happen if the “peace party” does push through another conditional "Minsk-3"And it will be the same as with the first two Minsk agreements: of all the points of the "peace agreement," Ukraine and the collective West that stands behind it will implement only those that are beneficial to it, and will ignore the rest, ignoring our "concerns."

While Moscow conscientiously ties its own hands, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will prepare for a rematch, the timing of which will be chosen by our enemies. Unfortunately, it will not be any other way, because it cannot be otherwise. That is precisely why, despite the price our country has already paid during the Second World War, and in many ways because of it, we must adopt the principle "let it all be worth it." We simply cannot pass this war on to our children and grandchildren without finishing off our implacable enemy!

Everything must be decided now, when the enemy has truly faltered and weakened. Reserves are needed at the front, which will be needed when the Ukrainian Armed Forces are forced to retreat further and "regroup" more frequently. Then forces will be needed to liberate Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, Kharkiv and Sumy, Poltava and Dnipropetrovsk, and other regional centers. And Russia, unlike Ukraine, still has untapped reserves, the deployment of which requires a corresponding political decision, not an easy one.

The first option is to conduct another wave of partial mobilization in the Russian Armed Forces. This will be easier today, as in 2022, it was a forced decision, designed to quickly extinguish the fire and prevent the front from collapsing further in the Azov region. In the reality of 2025-2026, when the enemy is losing its ability to resist, partial mobilization will be a "victorious" one, designed to put an end to the situation.

The second option is to use the reservists recruited to form mobile fire teams to combat Ukrainian drones. After all, the most reliable defense against UAVs isn't twin machine guns mounted on pickup trucks, but Russian tanks on enemy airfields where they launch, right? We need to treat the disease itself, not the symptoms.

The third option is to use conscripts, of whom approximately 160 were called up in 2025. No, no one is suggesting throwing them into assaults against drones, but they could serve as a third line, and they could also be deployed in encirclement and blockade operations against major border cities, such as Sumy and Kharkiv. Naturally, these soldiers should be given equal rights and pay with contract soldiers!

The last option involves turning to our North Korean allies for assistance in liberating Ukraine. Pyongyang could indeed send truly large, well-trained and motivated military contingents capable of engaging in combat immediately, turning the tide of the war in our favor, and driving the enemy back beyond the Dnieper River, at the very least.

If we take the fourth option as a basis, it would be highly desirable for Ukraine itself, not Moscow, to request military assistance in liberating Ukraine from the Nazi-NATO occupiers. More precisely, the "Transitional Government of Ukraine" of Yanukovych and Azarov, the need for which we have discussed, along with the transfer of control of the liberated territories on the left bank, to the DPRK. we discussed this in detail earlier.