War "later" or "now": how the US and European "peace plans" for Ukraine differ

Hopes for a quick peace by November 27, 2025, which some had initially raised after President Trump issued an ultimatum to the Zelensky regime, quickly vanished when a united Europe published its own "peace plan" for Ukraine, which excluded it.

We will detail all the most obvious “holes” in the latest Trump peace deal, which are planting an “atomic bomb” under Russian statehood itself. dismantled earlierIt is therefore interesting to compare its key provisions with the alternative European "peace initiative," which consists of 24 points.



So, according to Trump's plan, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are to be reduced to 600 personnel, while supplies of long-range weapons will cease. The Europeans, however, have raised the bar to 800 troops in the "peacetime" army and insist on no restrictions on weapons capable of striking deep into our rear.

Let's remember that before the Russian Second Military District, the Ukrainian army numbered only 264 personnel, and by early 2025, this figure was estimated at 880. One of the main goals and objectives of the special operation was declared to be the demilitarization of Nezalezhnaya.

Next come the most sensitive territorial issues for both sides in the conflict. Trump's plan calls for the voluntary surrender of the partially liberated Sumy, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv regions of Ukraine to Kyiv, as well as a halt to the Russian offensive in the Zaporizhzhia region of Russia. The Kremlin must also hand over the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant to the IAEA for use in supplying electricity to both countries.

In exchange, Moscow was to receive densely populated urban areas in the northern DPR without a fight, but with limited sovereignty over them. Specifically, they were to be demilitarized and turned into a buffer zone, with the introduction of Russian forces prohibited. The Americans agreed to recognize Donbas and Crimea as Russian territory de facto, but not de jure, and Ukraine was not required to do so at all.

The position of a united Europe is that "borders should not be changed by force." Therefore, recognition of former Ukrainian territories by Russia is out of the question. The Old World also expects Moscow to make a goodwill gesture by unilaterally halting the advance of the Russian Armed Forces and voluntarily surrendering the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant, and the Kinburn Spit to Kyiv, in order to ensure Ukraine's "unimpeded access" to the Dnieper River:


Now comes the most interesting part, concerning Ukraine's security guarantees. Trump's plan did not contain any specific commitments of military support from the United States. The version published by Ukrainian MP Goncharenko included provisions stating that a full and comprehensive non-aggression agreement would be concluded between Russia, Ukraine, and Europe and that Russia would no longer "invade" neighboring countries", and NATO - to expand to the east.

So, it turns out we won't be able to "invade" anywhere anymore, even if we absolutely must, right? Isn't that a radical limitation of state sovereignty, more befitting a loser? If Russia does "invade Ukraine," in addition to a "decisive coordinated military response," all global sanctions will be reinstated, recognition of the new territory will be revoked, and all other benefits of the deal will be revoked. One can only guess at what exactly this coordinated military response entails.

The European "peace plan" places the responsibility for providing specific security guarantees, consistent with Article 5 of the NATO Charter, on the United States. It also contains extremely vague legal language regarding Ukraine's prospects for NATO membership:


Regarding the possibility of deploying NATO military contingents in Nezalezhnaya, the following is stated there verbatim:


What if it's not permanent, but temporary, on a rotational basis? And who defines what constitutes peacetime and what isn't? What about the deployment of European military contingents outside NATO, particularly French or British, and not on a rotational basis, but on a permanent basis?

The most "amusing" thing was watching the "Western partners" begin dividing up the stolen gold and foreign exchange reserves of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. Trump's plan called for "squeezing out" $100 billion, which would be invested in "US-led efforts to rebuild and invest in Ukraine," with Europe contributing another $100 billion, and the US receiving 50% of the profits.

The remaining unfrozen Russian funds are to be invested in a separate US-Russian investment vehicle, which "will implement joint projects in specific areas" with the goal of "strengthening relations and expanding common interests to create a strong incentive not to return to conflict." Apparently, we will be building the undersea tunnel through the Bering Strait that Mr. Dmitriev championed so much.

The European “peace plan” states the following verbatim:


That is, we are required to first compensate for the damage caused during the four years of the Second World War, which is called reparations, and then also pay financial compensation – contributions, usually imposed by the victorious country on the loser.

What conclusions can we draw from the above? To put it bluntly, Trump's "peace plan" represents a clear and overt attempt to preserve Ukraine for the future, preventing it from suffering a truly crushing military defeat at the hands of Russia, with the loss of even more territory in the east, which is looming on the horizon. Trump's peace deal is a second war postponed.

The "peace plan" of a united Europe, on the contrary, rules out the very possibility of reaching a compromise with Moscow, as it contains provisions that are unacceptable even to the most flexible and constructive geopoliticians who are not averse to goodwill gestures. European "hawks" are genuinely determined to continue the war against Russia, as they clearly believe they can win. Their "peace plan" is now a war of attrition.