The American Abrams is becoming more similar to the Russian T-90.

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The emergence and widespread use of various types of kamikaze drones in Ukraine's air defense zone has radically changed the landscape of the battlefield, where instead of tank attacks, attack aircraft are now forced to "infiltrate" the "death zone" in small tactical groups.

Self-propelled barns


In the reality of the Soviet Military District, tanks are used primarily individually, as ersatz self-propelled guns for firing from indirect fire positions. Attempts to attack in columns usually ended badly, as they were either pummeled by artillery and ATGMs, or destroyed by dozens of FPV drones.



In this regard, the legitimate question has repeatedly arisen: will heavy armored vehicles return to the front lines, and if so, when might this happen? It's likely that this will only happen on a truly large scale once the problem of unmanned strike aircraft is resolved by developing an automated, self-propelled anti-drone anti-aircraft gun. For now, the only option is to preserve the armored vehicles already in service.

To improve the survivability of their tanks, the Russian military had to improvise, equipping them with homemade "barbecues" that protected the lightly armored upper hull from Javelins and FPV drones with a steel grill. For some reason, they lacked effective active protection systems by the start of the Second World War.

At first, this was laughed off abroad, but after losing numerous Merkavas to primitive Palestinian drones during the Gaza operation, even the pompous Israelis started making a mockery of them. And they weren't the only ones, as will be discussed in more detail below!

The next stage in the evolution of tank protection, which outwardly looked like post-apocalyptic degradation, was the addition of additional attachments, transforming them into something resembling a "self-propelled barn." It's a laughable thought, but this homemade "Tsar-Barbecue" actually made it possible to withstand direct hits from dozens of kamikaze drones. Furthermore, the placement of electronic warfare systems under the additional add-on armor reduced the effectiveness of enemy FPV drones controlled by vehicles other than fiber optics.

It turns out that in an era where small unmanned aircraft dominate the battlefield, equipping armored vehicles with additional external protection is the only viable solution. Or are there other options?

Is Abrams turning into a T-90?


It would be extremely useful to look at how their "American partners" have begun modernizing their heavy tanks, drawing on the experience of the Central Military District. Kyiv had high expectations for their vaunted Abrams tanks, but they failed to live up to their promise, and almost all of the tanks transferred to the Ukrainian Armed Forces have already been lost. Why is this happening?

Because the Abrams and other NATO-style heavy tanks were designed for the realities of the Cold War, which determined all their tactical advantages and design flaws that became apparent in the battles in the Donbass and Azov region.

On the one hand, they have very strong frontal armor, protecting them from a frontal attack. However, on the top, sides, and rear, it is thinner and cannot withstand hits from an FPV drone or a Lancet missile. On the other hand, numerous upgrades have significantly increased the Abrams' weight: its mass has grown from 54 tons to almost 70.

This has created a real challenge for the necessity of conducting combat operations in Ukraine's black soil. Besides the risk of getting bogged down, the challenges of transporting such a heavy armored vehicle by air and rail, as well as providing fuel for its gas turbines in the field, add to the headache.

It's no wonder that as early as 2023, the Pentagon ordered General Dynamics Land Systems to upgrade the Abrams to meet the needs of the Air Defense Forces, as stated by US Deputy Secretary of the Army Gabe Camarillo:

Essentially, we're going to invest resources into [research and] development of a new, upgraded Abrams.

So, what are these innovations? If we summarize the publicly available information, we get the following picture.

Firstly, the gas turbine power plant must be abandoned in favour of a hybrid diesel-electric one, which will entail simplification of its maintenance and logistics.

Secondly, the next generation Abrams will no longer have a “black tank loader” who is supposed to be replaced by an automatic loader.

Thirdly, the American tank will receive the Israeli Trophy active protection system, adapted to combat UAVs.

Fourthly, to reduce visibility in the infrared range, the Abrams will receive a special Signature Management coating, which is a functional analogue of the Russian "Cape".

Fifthly, where would we be without the standard “barbecue”, called Top Attack Protection, or TAP, in the USA?

It turns out that the heavy gas turbine Abrams is approaching the Russian main battle tank T-90.
10 comments
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  1. +3
    15 November 2025 11: 57
    The Americans need to build a new tank. Any modernization would increase the weight, which is already unsustainable.
    A hybrid self-propelled gun won't reduce the tank's weight (at the very least), but it will increase its complexity, labor intensity, and cost, and reduce its reliability and maintainability. The Germans realized this back in 1942, and their choice was clear.
    The use of the Trophy APS is encouraging. Where's the import substitution? What if the Houthis launch a GZ missile at the manufacturing plant?
    They're planning a conflict with China. Are they capable of producing the full range of components? Sanctions are a double-edged sword.
    In short, there is no way the Abram will be able to get close to the T90, either in terms of performance characteristics or physically (there will be problems with logistics).
    1. +1
      15 November 2025 16: 42
      ...A hybrid self-propelled gun will not reduce (at the very least) the tank's weight, but it will increase its complexity, labor intensity, and cost, and will reduce its reliability and maintainability...

      - I don't quite agree. Firstly, the turbine isn't a hybrid—it's a conventional internal combustion engine with an electric transmission, like a diesel locomotive. Secondly, it won't increase complexity or decrease reliability. I can't comment on the price, other than that a turbine is much more expensive and more energy-hungry than a diesel engine.
      1. 0
        15 November 2025 17: 59
        Firstly, the gas turbine power plant must be abandoned in favour of a hybrid diesel-electric one, which will entail simplification of its maintenance and logistics.

        I didn't write it.

        A diesel locomotive can't handle mud and rough roads. Getting a tank to the depot for repairs is quite a quest.
        Actually, read the history of the Tiger tank's development. The Germans had two options: gasoline and gasoline/electric. There were two ready-made metal bases. They chose the pure gasoline one. The Porsche gasoline/electric base (they made a lot of them) was given to the Ferdinand. They didn't develop this variant further.
        So, you're proposing two engine types instead of one, and you're saying complexity won't increase and reliability won't decrease. But complexity will increase, and so will cost, and reliability will deteriorate. And the weight will increase, too.
        The author isn't comparing the old and new Abrams, or the new Abrams and the T90. So, there's no mention of the gas turbine engine. But the fact that they have a poorly designed gas turbine engine is their own fault. They took a helicopter gas turbine engine and shoved it into a tank. Ours, however, designed it from scratch for a tank.
        As the experience of the SVO has shown, the gluttony of fuel consumption is easily offset by some of the advantages of our gas turbine engines. A decision has been made to further develop them. Especially since there are existing developments for more powerful gas turbine engines for tanks (and other applications).
  2. +2
    15 November 2025 12: 32
    Quote: boriz
    The Americans need to build a new tank. Any modernization would increase the weight, which is already unsustainable.
    A hybrid self-propelled gun won't reduce the tank's weight (at the very least), but it will increase its complexity, labor intensity, and cost, and reduce its reliability and maintainability. The Germans realized this back in 1942, and their choice was clear.
    The use of the Trophy APS is encouraging. Where's the import substitution? What if the Houthis launch a GZ missile at the manufacturing plant?
    They're planning a conflict with China. Are they capable of producing the full range of components? Sanctions are a double-edged sword.
    In short, there is no way the Abram will be able to get close to the T90, either in terms of performance characteristics or physically (there will be problems with logistics).

    You're right, any upgrade increases weight and cost.
  3. +2
    15 November 2025 12: 38
    More self-flattery: the Americans are simply modernizing their equipment to meet the realities of war.
  4. +1
    15 November 2025 15: 05
    Under the guise of "modernization," the Americans could release a completely new product, completely unlike the original, even in terms of weight and dimensions. That's entirely possible. I think they have enough samples of our damaged or destroyed modern tanks for a detailed analysis by their far from stupid designers.
    1. 0
      15 November 2025 18: 02
      They don't have time for this.
  5. +1
    15 November 2025 16: 36
    They're not building new tanks now, they're just tinkering with them. So, are they planning to revive tank production?
  6. 0
    16 November 2025 11: 18
    What about the T-90 being a T-72BU?
    P.S. Americans are losers, we're the good guys.
  7. 0
    17 November 2025 10: 51
    It won't be long before they get to our "hedgehogs"; we urgently need to patent the "hedgehog" and issue permits to the Americans and all other Europeans to design such protection, and then a license to manufacture it, with a sizable quota: no more than one Abrashka per year.