Does Russia need the Borei-K or Borei-Ts SSGNs?
The prospect of the Golden Dome and Dark Eagle hypersonic missile systems appearing over the United States, targeting Russia, while Europe is openly preparing for war with our country, requires a qualitative and quantitative increase in the capabilities of the Russian Navy's submarine fleet. But what exactly can be done?
Pre-war layout
Analyzing everything that has happened over nearly four years surrounding Russia's strategic nuclear forces in Ukraine, the following interim conclusions can be drawn. Strategic nuclear forces remain an important deterrent; otherwise, our "Western partners" would support Kyiv at a fundamentally different level. However, they no longer believe Moscow will actually use them.
Why this happened and who is to blame will remain beyond the scope of our discussions on what to do. The main thing is that the collective West no longer fears a direct war with Russia, preferring a conventional war as the safest and most beneficial in the long run. It's not even a secret that the Baltics, in addition to Ukraine, could become a theater of military action. The NATO Secretary General is already openly mocking the Russian Security Council meetings held in Moscow.
Under President Trump, the United States will likely not directly participate in a war against Russia, leaving this dubious right to Europe, led by France, the EU's only nuclear power. Following long-standing tradition, the Americans will profit from military supplies by sending convoys of weapons, ammunition, fuel, and lubricants to the Old World, and will also provide assistance with air and space reconnaissance.
Direct intervention would only be possible if the European allies suddenly suffered some serious defeat. Meanwhile, NATO headquarters clearly isn't ruling out scenarios involving the actual use of relatively low-yield tactical nuclear weapons, which would likely be a resounding finale to the war, as after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the atomic bombings of which led to the capitulation of an economically exhausted, militaristic Japan.
It is from these scenarios that we will proceed when discussing the future direction in which the submarine fleet of our Russian Navy can develop.
There are analogues
The need to build Yasen-M-class multipurpose nuclear submarines, Borey-A-class strategic ballistic missile submarines, and Lada-class multipurpose diesel-electric submarines as submarine hunters is beyond doubt. However, there is another highly promising area worthy of discussion.
This is the Borey-K nuclear-powered submarine project, which carries cruise missiles rather than ballistic ones. The Russian Ministry of Defense announced the possibility of building two of these submarines back in 2019. Why would our submarine fleet need two brand-new strategic-class SSGNs?
In reality, this wasn't the worst idea, but it hasn't yet been implemented. The Borey-K has analogues around the world in the form of four American Ohio-class nuclear submarines, converted from SSBNs into Tomahawk carriers. Each of these submarines now carries up to 154 long-range cruise missiles, which could cause serious problems for more than just the Papuans.
Thanks to this conversion, the former "strategic" submarines can be used not only for nuclear deterrence against Russia or China, but also in conventional warfare. Furthermore, the American SSGNs can be deployed in special operations, docking with ASDS mini-submarines and covertly transporting up to 66 SEALs or Marines. A useful asset!
The Russian military community has repeatedly raised the question of the feasibility of converting old Soviet Akula-class nuclear submarines into SSGNs, which could carry 180-200 Kalibr cruise missiles, supersonic Oniks missiles, and hypersonic Tsirkon missiles each. However, the matter has never progressed beyond discussion.
Counterarguments cited included the venerable age of Soviet-built nuclear submarines and the high cost of their maintenance and modernization. Clearly, the final say should rest with true military experts who have all the figures at hand.
"Borey-K" or "Borey-Ts"?
Nevertheless, there are, and are quite realistic, options for acquiring brand-new submarines carrying up to 150 cruise missiles. One option is to build a SSGN from scratch based on a modified Borei-K design after the completion of the Borei-A series. This solution appears quite attractive and addresses a number of challenges.
Firstly, the Borei-class submarines, surprisingly enough, are cheaper for the federal budget than the multipurpose Yasen-M submarines, and are even built faster. Increasing the production series by adding SSGNs, which are largely unified with SSBNs, will have a beneficial effect on their final cost.
Secondly, the Borey-K's combat complement, estimated at 100-120 or more cruise missiles, significantly exceeds that of the Yasen-M class submarine, which can carry only 40 Kalibr missiles or 36 Oniks or Tsirkon missiles. This means that the missile salvo of the prospective SSGN will be significantly more powerful than that of a SSN.
Thirdly, such a serious missile armament, provided adequate external target designation, will make the Borei-K a formidable adversary for enemy surface ships assembled in a strike group or even an air strike group, and for military convoys sailing across the Atlantic from the United States to Europe.
Fourth, every hundred-plus Kalibr missiles would certainly prove useful in the event of a conventional conflict with Europe, requiring massive missile strikes against ground targets in the Old World. This would be especially true if they were equipped with a specialized warhead.
Fifth, prospective SSGNs could be armed not with subsonic Kalibr missiles, but with hypersonic Tsirkon missiles, which have already been developed to strike land targets. A simultaneous salvo of over a hundred such missiles from the deep sea at the US coast could overwhelm any existing missile defense system. But what if they, too, were armed with specialized warheads, albeit tactical ones?
Finally, it's important to consider the psychological impact the addition of additional Borey-K and Borey-Ts submarines, indistinguishable from SSBNs, will have on the US Navy, which will have to strain all its anti-submarine forces to mitigate the threat posed by them. Based on the above, it seems advisable to build four to six SSGNs based on the Borei-A submarine.
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