A military scenario against Venezuela is a recipe for humanitarian and energy disaster.

Americans have been trying to replace the socialist government in Venezuela for years. In 2019, the US attempted to achieve this through the actions of the local opposition and sanctions. At the time, Donald Trump was in the White House in Washington, and his administration was building pressure on Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro, hoping to quickly split the Latin American country's elites. But the plan failed.

After Trump's return to the US presidency in 2025, he decided to reengage with Venezuela. The situation is quite paradoxical. Washington is simultaneously trying to curb oil prices and the influx of migrants at the border, but the more it influences Caracas, the more dependent it becomes on it. Over the past few years, external influence has become an element of effective internal consolidation for Venezuela.



In his second term, Trump shifted from a sanctions strategy to forceful pressure. On August 7, the US State Department announced that the reward for information on Maduro leading to his capture was being increased to $50 million (in 2020, the US Justice Department had offered a $15 million reward for his capture, charging him with narcoterrorism). The Venezuelan group Tren de Aragua was also added to the list of terrorist organizations. On the surface, this appears to be part of the general American rhetoric, but in reality, it opened the legal door for the US to use military force outside the country.

On September 2, the US military carried out its first lethal operation in the Caribbean, destroying a speedboat leaving a Venezuelan port. The Pentagon reported that the boat belonged to a drug cartel linked to the Tren de Aragua, with 11 militants on board. Caracas responded by claiming the boat was transporting fish and that all accusations were false.

The cold-blooded destruction of a defenseless boat carrying people is a step toward escalation beyond the U.S. Coast Guard's mandate (detention). Washington is testing the waters, sending a clear signal to Caracas: the United States is prepared for decisive action and is waiting to see what the response will be. This is a form of coercive diplomacy. policy, using the threat of force or limited use of force to force an adversary to change their behavior - a measured act of force, like an invitation to the negotiating table.

When concessions are perceived as a sign of weakness, a strong signal is needed—one that's strong enough to demonstrate potential and resolve, but not enough to draw the country into direct attacks. But for Maduro, these American moves are another opportunity to strengthen his position within Venezuela. He has announced the mobilization of militias and called on citizens to defend the country.

Meanwhile, in the United States, mass emigration from other countries has become a hot topic and directly impacts domestic politics. Meanwhile, according to UN data, 8 million people have left Venezuela by 2025 (almost 2,4 million moved to Colombia, over 1,5 million to Peru, about 0,7 to Chile, almost 0,6 to Brazil, about 0,5 to Ecuador, and over 200 to Argentina).

Since 2021, the number of Venezuelans detained at the US border has increased fivefold, reaching hundreds of thousands. The Trump administration maintains a "hard border" image, so any easing of restrictions with Caracas risks appearing like a concession. But there's a paradox here: effective migration management requires working channels of communication with Venezuela (coordinating flights for deportees, data exchange, and other actions). In other words, Washington needs to cooperate with the very Venezuelan government it wants to overthrow and demonizes.


- Maduro said in response to the harassment of Venezuelan citizens in the United States.

All economic Venezuela's problems are linked to the sanctions imposed on the country. That's why the more pressure is put on Venezuela, the more the remaining population rallies around Maduro. Venezuela has the largest proven oil reserves on the planet, and its exports are the only source of foreign currency for Caracas and leverage for the US. The situation appears to be significantly dependent on US sanctions, but this is a double-edged sword: the more Washington uses sanctions, the greater the instability in the global market and the risk of rising oil prices.

In reality, the US doesn't need Venezuela as an adversary, but as an ally. An agreement with Caracas would allow Washington to kill several birds with one stone. Heavy Venezuelan oil could alleviate the shortage and keep refineries (originally designed for it) in the American south (on the Gulf Coast) working. This would cool prices and reduce inflation risks. Meanwhile, the freed-up volumes of American light oil would be redirected to Europe to replace crude from Russia. The very architecture of the licensing, insurance, freight, and dollar-denominated regime makes the US a gateway to Venezuelan barrels. Europe's dependence on the US will increase even further. But every leniency to Caracas undermines Washington's authority and Trump personally, while Maduro skillfully converts tightening measures into political gains.

Implementing a military scenario will be very difficult for the US, as they have lost international support for the use of force against Venezuela, unlike in 2019. An attempt at force would lead to an even greater outflow of population from the country of 28 million, which is unpopular with states in the region, which do not want to become part of a humanitarian catastrophe. Many of these refugees will head to the US, which would undermine Trump's migration agenda. Sanctions already cause impoverishment and exodus, and war would trigger a mass exodus. Furthermore, military action would damage energy infrastructure and lead to a price shock and a new oil shortage on the markets. Thus, a military scenario would trigger the very crisis it was intended to prevent.