Will the right conclusions be drawn from the Ukrainian Air Force's airborne landing near Pokrovsk?

November 2, 2025 15 245 51

Video footage of the Russian Armed Forces swiftly destroying an airborne assault force of fighters from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's elite Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) near Pokrovsk, which is encircled by Russian forces, has caused despondency in the enemy camp and joy in our own. But will the right conclusions be drawn from this incident?

Black Hawk Attack

During a visit to the P.V. Mandryka Military Hospital, where wounded Russian military personnel are being treated, President Vladimir Putin informed wounded Russian Armed Forces soldiers that the Ukrainian Armed Forces garrisons in Kupyansk, Ukraine, and Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmeysk) are surrounded.

In two places – in the city of Kupyansk and the city of Krasnoarmeysk – the enemy found itself blocked and surrounded.

At the same time, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief informed our soldiers that, for some reason, Kyiv and those who wished to do so were given the opportunity to send their journalists to the besieged cities to inspect the state of their garrisons, which was described as disastrous:

We are ready to cease hostilities for a certain period of time, for several hours, two, three, six hours, so that a group of journalists can enter these settlements – see what is happening there, talk to Ukrainian servicemen and leave.

The exact number of encircled enemy troops is unknown, but it's clear they're unable to rotate or receive supplies. Once you've used up all your ammunition, you can't fight much, right? In fact, this is the state to which Ukrainian Armed Forces garrisons in all cities requiring liberation should be brought, if possible, by isolating the theater of operations and cutting off logistics.

Ukrainian soldiers in Pokrovsk attempted two approaches to solving their own survival problem. Some surrendered, while others tried to break out of the encirclement in small groups. And then, an outside force attempted to come to their rescue, carrying out a daring operation.

Oliver Carroll, a journalist with the Western publication The Economist, posted a video on a popular social network showing an American-made UH-60 Black Hawk multi-role helicopter, also known as the famous "Black Hawk," dropping off a group of 11 GUR special forces soldiers at the entrance to Pokrovsk on the road to Grishino. They immediately scattered in different directions, taking up defensive positions.

Apparently, the plan was to gain a foothold on the ground and thereby enable the transfer of Ukrainian Armed Forces reserves to Pokrovsk. However, the moment of their landing was captured by a Russian reconnaissance drone, after which the entire Ukrainian force was systematically destroyed.

It would seem like a complete failure, right?

Fight in encirclement

Yes and no. What's happening now highlights key problems in the Russian special operation, the resolution of which will mean the difference between victory and what comes after.

On the one hand, it has been clear since the fall of 2022 that the key to liberating Ukraine could only be achieved through large-scale military action capable of making deep breakthroughs and cutting the enemy's lines of communication. Thus, the rapid "regrouping" of Russian Armed Forces from the Kharkiv region three years ago was prompted precisely by the threat of encirclement of the Russian garrisons in Balakliya, Izyum, and Kupyansk.

On the other hand, in the realities of the autumn of 2025, the repeated liberation of Kupyansk turned into a major problem, since small unmanned aircraft began to dominate the battlefield, organizing a systematic hunt for technique and infantry. As a result, assault operations are only possible with small tactical groups of two or three soldiers armed with automatic weapons and shotguns. This would make the march to Kyiv or Odesa too long.

Despite the overall failure, the Ukrainian airborne assault near Pokrovsk clearly demonstrated that helicopters can easily cross the "death zone" created by the enemy using minefields and a "drone wall," and here's why.

Yes, the Black Hawk, at low altitude, was able to safely reach the encircled Pokrovsk, soon to become Krasnoarmeysk, and deploy a force of 11 elite GUR special forces soldiers. Given the reality of the fourth year of the Special Operations Command in Ukraine, that's a truly formidable force! After which, the UH-60 Black Hawk was able to depart.

The fact that the Ukrainian airborne assault force near Pokrovsk was routed rather reflects poor planning and the overall dire situation of the enemy in the encircled city, which required a high-profile media campaign from the Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) leadership. But overall, we reiterate, the Ukrainian Armed Forces' helicopter assault on the "zero line" was successful.

What if it had been preceded by preparations in the form of massive missile, drone, and air strikes? What if there had been not one, but two dozen helicopters? Or two hundred, as at Gostomel? Generally speaking, in the reality of the Central Military District, large airborne assault forces in the enemy's rear, properly prepared and subsequently supplied via airlifts, can be a weapon for breaking through enemy defenses.

We will discuss some possible technical methods for ensuring this in more detail below.

Information

Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.

The comment was deleted.
Mikhail L.

+1

2 November 2025 11: 47

There is a grain of truth, but the respected Author is exaggerating.
One helicopter with GRU special forces could have slipped through, but two dozen would have already been noticed and preventive measures would have been taken!
1. ChopChop
  
  +6
  
  2 November 2025 13: 08
  
  No, it's not overstating the case. An 11-man landing party, while our offensive operations are conducted by two, four is truly a formidable force. A successful landing of two dozen helicopters, even if detected on approach, and the destruction of some of them on the retreat would result in disaster. What's the reaction time when such a large number of vehicles are detected, and how many forces would need to be deployed to destroy them?
  1. Dart2027
    
    -4
    
    2 November 2025 14: 12
    
    Quote from ChopChop
    11 landing party members, while offensive actions on our side are carried out by two to four people
    
    They present a large target. This is why small group tactics are used in offensive operations.
    1. sgrabik
      
      +1
      
      8 November 2025 18: 53
      
      What's stopping a group of 11 people from quickly dispersing and acting in groups of 2-3? For well-trained professionals, this wouldn't be a big deal, so don't write this nonsense.
      1. Dart2027
        
        0
        
        9 November 2025 06: 43
        
        Quote: sgrabik
        What's stopping a group of 11 people from quickly dispersing?
        
        The small group tactic is that they gradually accumulate, but how many people can fight with 11 people without the possibility of getting support?
  2. Mikhail L.
    
    -2
    
    2 November 2025 14: 14
    
    from our side there are two or four leading
    
    - and on their side... a landing of two dozen helicopters - when even 11 resulted in a disaster?
2. CEBEP
  
  +3
  
  2 November 2025 14: 26
  
  However, the moment of their landing was captured by a Russian reconnaissance drone, after which the entire Ukrainian landing force was systematically destroyed.
  
  Why couldn't they destroy the helicopters after they were discovered? Our army lacks the resources and skills to wage modern warfare. Worst of all, the generals and the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces have no idea what modern warfare is. Are there people here who understand what modern warfare and a modern army are, even at the tactical level?
  1. gxmlygw
    
    +3
    
    2 November 2025 18: 49
    
    Haven't you realized yet that almost everyone here on this site knows and understands how to fight and how not to fight?
    1. Andrey Samuylik
      
      +3
      
      3 November 2025 12: 28
      
      Indeed. People understand that using an Su-34 like an Il-2 attack aircraft to drop bombs from low altitude is a 21st-century absurdity. But for some reason, that's exactly what the Russian army did at the beginning of the Central Military District, losing aircraft, and only a year later, after those losses, did the UMPK system begin appearing in the army. Apparently, the generals know how to fight.
      1. gxmlygw
        
        +3
        
        3 November 2025 14: 35
        
        What!? You doubt the competence of our General Staff!? There are 1,317 generals serving in the Russian Armed Forces, and at least half of them are in the General Staff. Isn't that enough for you to win?
        
        Vladimir Tuzakov
        
        +2
        
        4 November 2025 00: 19
        
        A few generalizations. The first deployment always goes smoothly, but the second, especially the third, helicopter resupply will be less so; they'll be preparing for the encounter. On LBS, operating in pairs and threes, they don't carry small arms or MANPADS, but now they'll be resupplying them. Conclusion: combat requires resourcefulness and ingenuity, and officers should be responsible for this. Our officers are trained in the same old formulaic, uninitiated actions, which has backfired in 2022. Historically, the Wehrmacht was so successful because its officers always acted inventively and appropriately to the situation, while ours adhered to the most basic rules of procedure. Conclusion: today's military operations are conducted with new tactics and new weapons. They must be prepared for any new tactical actions and, most importantly, discover and implement new, effective tactical concepts themselves.
        
        gxmlygw
        
        +3
        
        4 November 2025 08: 26
        
        So where did the vaunted ingenuity of the Wehrmacht officers go in 1944? Yes, the Russians are slow to get going, but quick to move, as WWII demonstrated. What's happening to us now? Why are we crawling through Donbas and beyond like turtles after hibernation? It's the same as in the Crimean War of the mid-19th century. A bureaucratic, extremely slow decision-making mechanism, both in organizing troop command and control, and in organizing the production of necessary military equipment and weapons, as well as modern communications equipment. If it weren't for the Chinese... And perhaps the main problem: most generals and the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces still have no idea about modern warfare. You can't learn to fight sitting in warm Moscow offices, but you can give orders without bearing personal responsibility for ensuring their implementation. As Comrade Stalin said:
        
        Cadres decide everything
        
        And what excellent cadres of leadership our army has developed over the four years of war. We've been at war for four years now, but name me one of our modern military leaders comparable to Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Konev, Chernyakhovsky...
        
        CEBEP
        
        +2
        
        5 November 2025 21: 44
        
        In Modern Warfare, there are no LBS, no stormtroopers with children's toys loaded with explosives falling on their heads. Modern warfare doesn't last four years, doesn't reduce one's own cities to dust, doesn't involve open-air fire, doesn't involve advancing 10 meters a day and suffering enormous losses, doesn't storm cities... Right, uncle generals? Now name at least one new tactical move that the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces has conceived (substantiated, prepared, implemented, taught)?
  2. Baikal-38
    
    -1
    
    4 November 2025 07: 52
    
    The worst thing is that the generals and the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces have no idea about modern warfare.
    
    What, really, is everyone missing everything, and not a single one who understands? Yeah, it's all gone, everything, where can I run?
k7k8

-7

2 November 2025 11: 53

At the same time, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief informed our soldiers that for some reason Kyiv and those who wish to do so have been given the opportunity to send their journalists to the blockaded cities.

First, Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Both words are capitalized.
Secondly, the author, out of false modesty, conceals the fact that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief proposed conducting this event through Russian corridors to the LBS, meaning no material assistance would be provided to the encircled Ukrainian Armed Forces group. Naturally, Kyiv unilaterally rejected Moscow's offer under these conditions.
1. Beidodir
  
  -2
  
  3 November 2025 12: 48
  
  Secondly, the author, out of false modesty, keeps silent about the fact that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief proposed to conduct this event through Russian corridors on the LBS,
  
  For what purpose? For what purpose?
  
  Naturally, under these conditions, Kyiv unilaterally rejected Moscow’s offer.
  
  Then why do all this and tell wounded soldiers about such gestures of goodwill?
  1. k7k8
    
    -4
    
    3 November 2025 14: 32
    
    Quote: Beydodyr
    For what purpose? For what purpose?
    
    The goals of this event were also announced by the President. But you're not a reader. You're a writer.
    
    Quote: Beydodyr
    Then why do all this and tell wounded soldiers about such gestures of goodwill?
    
    Why such concern? What's the purpose? But I'll tell you: in a political game, every point counts (or doesn't).
    P.S. Have you been released from the insane asylum again?
    1. Beidodir
      
      0
      
      4 November 2025 07: 24
      
      The goals of this event were also announced by the President. But you're not a reader. You're a writer.
      
      Learn to write correctly yourself, "nose-poker".
      
      Why such concern? What's the purpose? But I'll tell you: in a political game, every point counts (or doesn't).
      
      It's because of these "Russian patriots" living in Belarus, offering their "valuable" advice and rooting for the SVO remotely, that everything will end the way it does. Including because of your "approvals."
      
      P.S. Have you been released from the insane asylum again?
      
      I see, uncle, that you are completely unteachable?
      1. k7k8
        
        -2
        
        4 November 2025 08: 07
        
        You don't even understand the difference between typos and shortcomings. What else can I talk about with you? You look, but you don't see a damn thing. And you should just be jealous. At least there are no drones flying overhead here. Not at all.
        
        Beidodir
        
        0
        
        5 November 2025 09: 43
        
        And you have to be silently envious. At least there are no drones flying overhead here. None at all.
        
        Well, you've told me everything about yourself, "Russian officer" and a great Patriot of Russia.
        
        You don't even understand the difference between typos and misspellings. What else can I talk about with you? You may be looking, but you don't see anything.
        
        I personally see right through you. And it’s disgusting to communicate with you, but sometimes you have to.
      2. The comment was deleted.
  2. Baikal-38
    
    0
    
    4 November 2025 07: 54
    
    The plan was that they would refuse. Isn't it clear?
2. gxmlygw
  
  0
  
  3 November 2025 14: 38
  
  Learn to spell correctly. According to Article 87 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation: Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin.
  1. k7k8
    
    -1
    
    3 November 2025 23: 17
    
    Actually, I was the one rubbing the author's nose in it. Redirect your heartfelt cry to him. Maybe he'll hear you from his Olympus heights.
    And, yes, it is written exactly like that in the Constitution of the Russian Federation - Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin?
    1. gxmlygw
      
      +1
      
      4 November 2025 08: 16
      
      Haven't you realized yet that this is a light irony directed at your servility?
      1. k7k8
        
        -1
        
        4 November 2025 08: 21
        
        Dear Sir, feel the difference. This resource positions itself as a media outlet. Accordingly, it must adhere to at least some boundaries of decency. Secondly, the author of the article considers himself a Russian patriot and immediately insults the President of Russia. And you, in fact, are the one fawning, tacking your full name onto the title of a constitutionally mandated position.
        
        Beidodir
        
        +1
        
        5 November 2025 09: 42
        
        Accordingly, some boundaries of decency must be observed. Secondly, the author of the article considers himself a Russian patriot and immediately insults the President of Russia.
        
        And what exactly was the insult, oh "Russian patriot" sitting in Belarus? That one word was written in lowercase?
        This isn't servility anymore, it's sycophancy in its purest form. Which fits in perfectly with the overall picture.
        
        k7k8
        
        0
        
        5 November 2025 13: 06
        
        As always, you're magnificent in your rudeness! Hats off to you. Without people like you, it would truly be boring here.
Dart2027

+3

2 November 2025 12: 26

In general, in the reality of the air defense system, large airborne assault forces in the enemy's rear, appropriately prepared and subsequently supplied via air bridges, can become a weapon for breaking through enemy defenses.

I've heard this somewhere before... Definitely, in history class. True, the results of such landings weren't very good.
1. Beidodir
  
  -1
  
  4 November 2025 07: 25
  
  I've heard this somewhere before... Definitely, in history class. True, the results of such landings weren't very good.
  
  Back then, no one was dropped off by helicopter. They could be used for resupply and evacuation if necessary.
  1. Dart2027
    
    0
    
    4 November 2025 09: 48
    
    Quote: Beydodyr
    Back then, no one was dropped off by helicopter.
    
    They didn't land. They dropped them by parachute. But the result was exactly the same. And there will be no supply or evacuation—if the possibility of a landing still exists, then once it happens, the entire area will be under the strictest surveillance, making a second breakout impossible.
Alexey Lan

+3

2 November 2025 12: 45

Yes, the Black Hawk, at low altitude, was able to safely reach the encircled Pokrovsk, soon to become Krasnoarmeysk, and deploy a force of 11 elite GUR special forces soldiers. Given the reality of the fourth year of the Special Operations Command in Ukraine, that's a truly formidable force! After which, the UH-60 Black Hawk was able to depart.

A video broadcast of a flyover by two helicopters, not just one, was already published a day or two ago in the Military District. This means there were about two dozen special forces personnel present.
The flight of a Black Hawk with GUR special forces was detected by Russian Armed Forces "waiting" drones.
According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, the attempted attack by Ukrainian special forces was successfully repelled, and the enemy suffered significant losses.
However, the helicopters delivered the special forces to the LBS line (not to our rear) without losses. That's already an achievement. Well, after that, our soldiers had to work harder. I wouldn't call the operation reckless. What if there had been 4-8 helicopters?
And most importantly, it's a question of tactics: So this is possible. The Russian Armed Forces can do this too. And where is the military thinking in the headquarters and the Ministry of Defense?
A few months ago, there was a debate about the need for airborne forces, for which I received downvotes as a proponent of airlifting troops closer to the LBS. The Ukrainian GUR proved that this was a viable option.
LozmanPozman

+3

2 November 2025 12: 57

But if we had AWACS aircraft on duty in the skies, then helicopters would be a tasty morsel for air defense, but someone doesn’t want that...
Ivan1978

+4

2 November 2025 14: 43

Military News has already reported on the landing of a second group of helicopters. It's simply astonishing: where are the objective control systems, where is the reconnaissance, where is the air defense? The enemy is dragging special forces to the LBS in helicopters in broad daylight, while our aviation doesn't even show its face there...
Serj Iff

-1

2 November 2025 15: 04

It's possible to complete the enemy encirclement with a tactical airborne assault. But relieving a surrounded group of several thousand men with a platoon landing is nonsense. More likely, there was an attempt to evacuate VIPs, though that's also a gamble. It worked in Mariupol, but only because helicopters were deployed from the sea. In general, the use of tactical airborne assaults is possible, for example, to seize the Chernihiv region. It can be entered by land from two sides, followed by a tactical airborne assault. Concerning combat operations in small groups (2-3 people), this is due to the lack of firepower, especially in terms of range, of the enemy's UAV control centers. The UAV's most vulnerable point is its operator. Although we've now pinpointed this weakness. The firepower of strongpoints has increased, and then small infantry groups can enter them.
Tan San

0

2 November 2025 18: 53

Quote: Serj Iff
It's possible to complete the enemy encirclement with a tactical airborne assault. But relieving a surrounded group of several thousand men with a platoon landing is nonsense. More likely, there was an attempt to evacuate VIPs, though that's also a gamble. It worked in Mariupol, but only because helicopters were deployed from the sea. In general, the use of tactical airborne assaults is possible, for example, to seize the Chernihiv region. It can be entered by land from two sides, followed by a tactical airborne assault. Concerning combat operations in small groups (2-3 people), this is due to the lack of firepower, especially in terms of range, of the enemy's UAV control centers. The UAV's most vulnerable point is its operator. Although we've now pinpointed this weakness. The firepower of strongpoints has increased, and then small infantry groups can enter them.

Unblocking the area with a force of about a company's worth of specialists isn't unreasonable, as the density of assaults in the buildings is low. That is, the likely objective is to clear the buildings.
Alexey Vladimirov

+4

2 November 2025 18: 57

In my humble opinion, a helicopter landing is entirely feasible with large forces. They fly low, and air defenses cannot see them. If you plan the operation properly to distract the enemy on another section of the front, you could easily land a dozen helicopters with troops.
1. Andrey Samuylik
  
  +1
  
  3 November 2025 12: 20
  
  Anything is better than forcing soldiers to climb into a pipe. Next time, the hohol will release gas, and it will be a mass grave.
2. Alexey Lan
  
  0
  
  3 November 2025 17: 31
  
  helicopter landing is quite feasible with large forces,
  
  Of course it is possible, along with taking into account weather conditions, terrain, anti-drone, anti-radar operations, ground support - in short, everything in a complex.
vlad127490

+2

2 November 2025 19: 26

Will the right conclusions be drawn from the Ukrainian Air Force's airborne landing near Pokrovsk?

The General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces always draws conclusions on how to step on the same rake again, so that it hurts even more.
The capabilities of the airborne assault are determined by the time of its execution.
Within 10-15 minutes, 20 helicopters arrived, unloaded 300 troops with ammunition, and flew away. The whole thing took 10-15 minutes. Then the drones will arrive. So, draw your own conclusions.
art573

0

2 November 2025 20: 12

An airborne assault is only possible in areas ALREADY designated for a prepared defense. Not in a field by the road, as happened with the crests... Even if there's a company with anti-drone weapons and anti-tank missile systems, it's not a guarantee the airborne assault won't be destroyed. We need permanent underground fortifications, even in the enemy's rear, until the main front forces arrive. Ukraine is all about open fields! There are no forests. And towns and villages are sparse.
Sergey Mitinsky

-1

3 November 2025 01: 50

The question of whether a massive helicopter landing behind enemy lines is possible remains open and depends primarily on how thoroughly the flight and landing area is cleared.

This is such a simple formulation, but behind it lie conditions that, given equal forces, are practically impossible at this stage of the war, because such an operation represents a huge risk for such elite groups and equipment.

In the story under discussion, there were two helicopters. Soldiers were running out of the first, and there's no footage of the second helicopter online, only a fragment of its landing. However, to clarify, and to correct the author's arguments, it should be noted that the helicopters landed not even near the LBS line, much less behind enemy lines, but in the corridor of the pocket's mouth, which for some reason we call the encirclement, and this mouth is controlled by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In other words, the helicopters landed practically on their own territory, but were quickly detected and engaged by Russian drones. This means that such a landing was expected.

This is the answer to the question of whether such a massive landing behind enemy lines is possible.

It's possible, but to do so, it would be necessary to carve out a corridor for such a landing force, destroying everything that could hinder it, and such an operation would only be used during a massive offensive. In this case, we're talking about a sabotage operation against a firmly entrenched enemy with all the means to control, detect, and destroy such landings. Therefore, such operations are extremely risky with little chance of success, which is precisely what happened to the Ukrainian landing force.

Today, clearing the enemy's defenses so that it would be possible to deploy entire tank armies into a breakthrough, as was once the case, is only 100% feasible if this corridor is cut through with nothing less than tactical nuclear weapons, or if the enemy is no stronger than the rebel army. Almost the same conditions are necessary for a massive helicopter assault.
1. Sergey Mitinsky
  
  0
  
  3 November 2025 02: 26
  
  I would like to add a quote regarding the author’s statements:
  
  On the one hand, it has been clear since the fall of 2022 that the key to liberating Ukraine can only be achieved through the use of large forces capable of making deep breakthroughs and cutting off the enemy's lines of communication.
  
  This is true, attacking with large forces is faster and more reliable, but losses should be expected to be many times greater, and if we take into account the greatly increased vulnerability of equipment due to the dominance of drones in the skies, then today such attacks do not guarantee success and can end in epic defeat.
  
  The point is that this war today is radically different from what it was yesterday.
  
  Drones have changed everything
Valera75

0

3 November 2025 06: 56

RPG-7s shot down more helicopters in Vietnam and Afghanistan than IGLs and Stingers. Why write about air defense and AWACS aircraft here if they can be shot down with IGLs and RPG-7s? A Ukrainian helicopter safely reached its landing point, dropped off troops, and returned to base, and they say there were two such trips. Did anything at least land at the helicopter's return point?
1. k7k8
  
  0
  
  3 November 2025 11: 57
  
  It hit so hard that not a single one of the people in the ear was left alive.
assault 2019

+3

3 November 2025 07: 07

A typical civilian operation, as practiced in Chechnya, involves foreign special forces disguised as journalists and escorting out "high-value individuals" who are the subject of concern in London.
1. k7k8
  
  -3
  
  3 November 2025 11: 56
  
  Did you listen carefully to the Russian President? And did you even listen to his proposal?
trampoline instructor

0

3 November 2025 10: 47

As usual, there are some fabrications and fantasies mixed in here, like

So it will take too long to get to Kyiv or Odessa.

I've read elsewhere that the helicopter was flying at an altitude of about 10 meters, where it's undetectable. The mission was to retrieve high-ranking NATO troops who had been surrounded. The entire landing force was quickly destroyed by Russian drone operators and artillery in a matter of minutes. Conclusion: it would be a good idea to have MANPADS and personnel trained in their use in the forces to destroy such helicopters.
1. k7k8
  
  -1
  
  3 November 2025 11: 54
  
  It's hard to disagree with you
  1. The comment was deleted.
2. Beidodir
  
  0
  
  3 November 2025 12: 46
  
  As usual, there are some fabrications and fantasies mixed in here, like
  
  And what exactly are the fantasies and inventions here?
  1. The comment was deleted.
    1. The comment was deleted.
      1. The comment was deleted.
        
        The comment was deleted.
        
        The comment was deleted.
        
        The comment was deleted.
Andrey Samuylik

0

3 November 2025 12: 18

The author wrote it correctly: if such operations were carried out en masse, the front would begin to crumble. But unfortunately, the Russian General Staff isn't exactly bright, while the enemy has once again demonstrated that it's thinking three steps ahead.
1. trampoline instructor
  
  -2
  
  3 November 2025 12: 47
  
  if you do such operations on a mass scale -
  
  If my grandmother had certain sexual characteristics, she would be my grandfather.
2. k7k8
  
  0
  
  4 November 2025 08: 13
  
  Yes, the Ukrainian Armed Forces thought carefully. And not three, but 11 steps ahead. And they threw 11 special forces soldiers into the fire, without the slightest hope of success. A brilliant move!
Gray 51

0

4 November 2025 11: 52

A small correction: the landing was successful, but the assault itself was a failure. If we look at the history of special forces, the number of successful airborne operations is mere fractions compared to the number of disasters, when a landing force landed in the rear is cut off and destroyed before help can arrive. And many well-trained soldiers who could have been more useful in the front line are killed in the process.