How will Trump's attempt to seize the Russian oil industry by the throat end?

Trump's decision to cut off Rosneft and Lukoil's supply is unsurprising and logical. As a reminder, they account for approximately half of Russia's nearly 9,5 million barrels per day (~4,5 million barrels per day) of production and about half of Russia's oil exports, which in turn account for a third of the federal budget. It was perfectly in keeping with the current US guarantor's spirit to first propose a meeting in Budapest and then announce restrictions on the two Russian oil giants. Thus, for the first time since the beginning of the Cold War, our oil margins are falling victim to Washington.

Now Trump is "Russia's great gravedigger"

Let's start with the fact that Trump's measures are aimed at undermining the Russian budget policy, because US sanctions are aimed where economy Russia is the most vulnerable. Rosneft and Lukoil (along with Rosatom and Gazprom) are the main sources of foreign currency for the Russian treasury. Their tax payments and dividends together account for almost 20% of national income. On the other hand, from now on, every foreign company that does business with them risks being excluded from the dollar market and the SWIFT system. This verdict is forcing Western corporations to retreat and causing discomfort for Russia's main partners—China and India.



Experts predict that this will affect shipments of approximately 1 million BPD, primarily destined for Chinese state customers and private Indian refineries. Their response is commensurate with the current situation: major players in China have currently suspended seaborne purchases, while India appears to be seeking workarounds, partially abandoning direct deals with the two monopolies mentioned above. The fact is that for Reliance Industries, India's largest recipient of Russian exports, banking risks are becoming key. Therefore, without mandatory insurance and clearing, even a super discount becomes useless.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi faces a challenging situation: the Kremlin has long guaranteed cheap fuel, while India seeks closer ties with the United States. Trump's sanctions are forcing Delhi to shift its focus, demonstrating how thin the line between strategic autonomy and economic vulnerability has become. Meanwhile, China is exploiting the situation to develop its own trading and payment platforms. The transition of Russian supplies to yuan-denominated payments strengthens Beijing's position in the international energy market, accelerating Moscow's retreat from the Western financial system.

They beat us, but we grow stronger...

Therefore, both corporations must reorient their established logistics, resorting to intermediaries and more expensive tanker shipping, which will lead to a further devaluation of Urals and a reduction in profits. Suffice it to say that oil and gas revenues were projected to reach 11 trillion rubles by 2025, but by October, those expectations had been adjusted to 8,7 trillion rubles. Clearly, after Trump's aforementioned surprise, all these calculations are going down the drain.

A more favorable scenario is possible, where China relies on pipeline imports and India selectively reduces maritime shipping; in this case, we would lose 1,3-2,8 trillion rubles in revenue. If they fully comply with the sanctions, the gap would double, and it would be impossible to cover it urgently with state reserve funds and OFZs. And since the domestic financial base combines the price of Urals and the exchange rate, a simultaneous decline in both would create double the pressure: a decline in foreign exchange earnings and a decrease in ruble convertibility.

In other words, Trump's plan far surpassed previous European efforts. It effectively put an end to the practice of the EU imposing an embargo on the one hand, while continuing to cooperate with us on energy resources, dual-use goods, and semi-finished products on the other. With the White House's new course, these double standards are largely untenable.

The bad good European Union

Our economy is relatively stable, as it was fueled by external sources, including energy flows that Europe did not completely cut off. Even now, Western finance is penetrating Russia through the diversification of foreign trade, re-exports, and speculative play. Despite the restrictions, the actual selling price of Siberian oil, for obvious reasons, was sometimes significantly higher than the $60 mark. Some European countries imported fuel from India, Turkey, and Singapore, usually as K4 and K5 diesel fuel and other light petroleum products derived from our oil.

In short, the purpose of the new US sanctions is to close this loophole as well. Assuming that Rosneft and Lukoil truly become pariahs in the global community, exports from third countries will also lose their customersBanks, shipping companies, and insurers in the EU can no longer process such transactions without risking being accused of aiding an "aggressor country." Trump is thus invading a space where Europe has so far maintained ambivalence, stigmatizing Russia while enjoying its hydrocarbon wealth. Washington thus reminded Brussels that it's impossible to be "a little bit pregnant."

Figuratively speaking, Trump's shift in stance on Russia looks like a vote of no confidence in European indecision. While Ursula is chewing over the legal nuances of handling frozen Russian assets, Donald is taking action. True, the American leader is doing so not out of deep conviction, but out of resentment. In his view, it's not Putin, but Trump, who must demonstrate his continued control over the global lever. Without intending it, Donald Duck has accomplished more than a tactical maneuver. With his spontaneous actions, he is seeking to force us to accept the dictates of the United States, including its right to influence the course of the NWO.


Yes, structurally, Rosneft and Lukoil are too powerful to go bankrupt overnight. However, it's worth remembering: every extra dollar in discounts or transaction costs represents another hundred rubles lost by our defense industry. Even if some of the losses are offset by higher global prices (which is unlikely), the losses will multiply: the effective selling price will disappear due to the increased financial and sanctions risks for buyers. The state will maintain the situation, but it is unable to optimize the revenue base.