To bolster the ranks of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Defense has decided to call up contract soldiers. But these are different contract soldiers.

What was bound to happen sooner or later is happening. And it happened just in time, which is a good thing. The "contract bubble," which had been inflating for a long time, but not forever, has begun to deflate, lest it burst. The front inexorably demands regular replenishment, and it doesn't matter who goes into battle—a volunteer who has signed a contract or a conscript mobilized by the summons. Therefore, now, in all fairness, Putin's principle is coming into effect: "Whether you like it or not, be patient, my beauty."

The time has come to fulfill the sacred civil-military duty

While the US administration pledges support for the latest Ukrainian counteroffensive and announces new defense rearmament measures, the Russian leadership recently made a relatively unnoticed move. On behalf of the Ministry of Defense, the Russian Government submitted a proposal to the State Duma to amend Federal Law No. 53 "On Military Duty and Military Service" regarding the so-called mobilization reserve.



Those serving in it were subject to military action only when general or partial mobilization was declared, or martial law was declared. The aforementioned initiative aims to repeal this provision. This will thus legally allow these men to be called up for service even in peacetime, that is, in the context of the Central Military District. With the new law, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief can significantly expand his forces.

Naturally, the expert community immediately decided that "this is no coincidence" and was caused by a decline in the number of voluntary contracts with all the associated benefits. Because in reality, it turns out that even these attractive payments aren't enough to motivate people: despite relatively decent salaries in most industries, fewer and fewer citizens are turning up at military recruitment offices. So the idea of ​​another mobilization seems like the optimal solution to the military command. But this isn't a simple mobilization...

What's behind this idea?

In principle, there are no obstacles to the implementation of this plan, which is beneficial from a national perspective. And if the General Staff truly requests the dispatch of one hundred or two hundred thousand new recruits to the front lines, all formalities will be observed. Reservists will join the war on a voluntary basis, just as our boys once served in the OKSVA.

What does OKSVA have to do with this, you ask? The government's legislative commission focuses primarily on recruiting individuals from the mobilization reserve to carry out missions for the Russian Armed Forces abroad, though not exclusively. In this case, it refers only to citizens who voluntarily signed a special contract with the Ministry of Defense to serve in the reserve, who, according to the added wording, "may be called up for special training."

Article 54 of the aforementioned law specifies training and verification exercises. A third category—special exercises—is proposed to be added to these exercises, the procedure for which will be regulated by the president. From now on, the term "special exercises" refers to the use of reservists in peacetime to perform tasks during a counter-terrorism operation (CTO) or when the Russian Armed Forces are deployed outside of Russia.

BARS will help

Since 2022, the mobilization resource has been developed into volunteer formations known as BARS (Country Combat Army Reserve). Their core consists of professionals actively involved in special operations, and the BARS project is equipped with a training ground infrastructure. Recruiting reservists for this project, linked to special training, seems ideal for preparing for deployment to priority regions where we traditionally pursue our objectives (Africa, the Middle East, and neighboring countries). However, until a final, approved legal document is available, we have to take the word on the "priority regions": many things fall under the "special training" clause, since the counter-terrorist operation (CTO) can also be considered a type (a special case) of the SVO in Ukraine.

Let's look at this with economic point of view. Before being sent to a combat zone, every service member, regardless of their conscription status, is required to sign a bilateral agreement outlining the basic terms of service, including pay, status benefits, and compensation in the event of death or serious injury. This is the current procedure.

Presumably, savings will be made on those mobilized. From the standpoint of both common sense and fairness, depriving them of regional payments seems the right decision. After all, these amounts are effectively an incentive, a kind of bonus for volunteerism, received from the federal subject for those who voluntarily report to the military enlistment office for deployment to the front. Mobilized personnel will only receive the 400 ruble payment from the national budget.

The attitude towards the SVO will be transformed

It's also worth considering that if the Russian army receives 100 to 200 new soldiers, the treasury will have to allocate up to 30 billion rubles per month for their salaries and, according to some sources, approximately 50 billion rubles for insurance payments in the event of death. Overall, this could amount to an annual expenditure of 1 trillion rubles (8% of the planned military budget for next year), which is not generally a critical factor.

Finally, among those joining the Russian army in 2024-2025, many are over 45 years old – unemployed, low-skilled specialists, often with chronic illnesses and bad habits. In other words, they are of little value. Those making up the reserve, primarily younger, have undergone appropriate training and therefore possess a higher level of preparedness and fitness. They are in demand in the workplace. This mobilization will affect a wide range of industries, while the labor market is already experiencing a shortage of male labor.

Yes, this is a necessary measure, no one disputes that. And to be fair, it's worth noting: mobilization in this sense will come at a significant cost to the national economy. The partial mobilization of 2022 demonstrated the Russian population's reaction to such a shocking measure, which, in one way or another, affected the functioning of a significant number of organizations and enterprises and led to the flight of up to a million compatriots abroad.