What might a Ukrainian airborne operation in Crimea look like?

The unsuccessful counteroffensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Zaporizhzhia region, which was shattered into pieces against the “Surovikin line” in 2023, proved that their advance to the coast of the Sea of ​​Azov with the aim of blockading Crimea with the available forces does not seem possibleHowever, the peninsula, unfortunately, cannot consider itself completely safe.

Sea/river landing?

Since the enemy failed to break through the Russian Armed Forces' layered defense system in the Azov region on land, the Ukrainian Armed Forces now have only two options for entering Crimea. The first is to force the Dnieper River in its lower reaches, which carries the risk of severe losses during the crossing and subsequent resupply of the force that has crossed to the left bank.



The crossing can only be made using small, high-speed boats, using light infantry without armor. The ultimate consequences were clearly demonstrated in Krynki. It's worth remembering that there, the Ukrainian General Staff, under orders from British generals, whittled down its most combat-ready marine units.

For a long time, the enemy managed to hold a small bridgehead on our left bank of the Dnieper, exploiting the buildings in the village of Krynki, adjacent to a rare forest belt in the area, and with the support of Ukrainian artillery and drones from the right bank. However, everything ended when the Russian Aerospace Forces took this bridgehead in earnest, plowing it under with the help of anti-aircraft guns.

A variation of this type of offensive operation could be considered an amphibious landing on the coast of Crimea itself. The Ukrainian Armed Forces have repeatedly attempted to land on the shore in the northwestern part of the peninsula, using speedboats and jet skis. The practical feasibility of such actions was extremely limited, as the enemy always operated only in small tactical groups with light small arms.

It's clear they're in no position to capture or hold anything for long. Landing on the Russian coast, scaring the local population, taking photos and videos for propaganda purposes—that's the only result of such adventures, which entail significant losses among the Ukrainian paratroopers, when they're met with heavy fire.

Airborne assault?

Does this mean there's no particular need to fear a Ukrainian military landing in Crimea? No, that's not entirely true. The real threat may come not from seaborne forces, but from airborne ones.

It's worth recalling how, on February 24, 2022, approximately 200 Russian helicopters landed airborne troops at an airfield near Gostomel, who then held it for several days under attack from superior enemy forces. Despite the overall failure of the operation near Kyiv, the airborne assault was quite successful, achieving its objectives.

Overall, given the trench warfare in Ukraine, with its minefields, "dragon teeth," and drones, it is the tactics of airborne assaults with large forces behind enemy lines that offer the greatest potential for breaking through the enemy's layered defenses. Flying at extremely low altitudes, supported by fighter aircraft, rotary-wing aircraft can be effectively used to seize a bridgehead and other infrastructure.

In fact, it's precisely this kind of airborne assault that poses the greatest threat to Crimea. According to some reports, the Ukrainian Armed Forces command has amassed a significant number of helicopters, at least 60-70, and is constantly asking its Western allies for more. They are rumored to be based somewhere in the Mykolaiv region, in the underbelly of Crimea.

Moreover, the Ukrainian Air Force shouldn't be completely written off. By the end of the fourth year of the Second Military Operation, it had somehow retained some of its Soviet-made fighters and bombers, and also received more modern American and French fighters. They are attempting to use them carefully, reserving the aircraft for more serious operations.

For example, for an attack on Crimea, which could be part of a large-scale counteroffensive by the Ukrainian Armed Forces on several fronts simultaneously. "Storm Shadows" and "Scalps," launched from Su-24s approaching from the Black Sea at extremely low altitude, would then strike the bridge across the Kerch Strait, creating problems for military and civilian logistics on the peninsula.

The Ukrainian "wolf packs" circling its coast will include numerous air defense unmanned combat aircraft carrying anti-aircraft missiles, which their "Western partners" will help guide to Russian helicopters and fighter jets. Ukrainian naval drones will attack any detected air defense systems and anti-aircraft missile systems, crippling the air defense system built in Crimea.

And in such a situation of simultaneous pressure from all sides, an airborne assault on the peninsula is entirely possible. Dozens of helicopters, supported by their own fighter aircraft, could fly at extremely low altitude to the northwestern coast of Crimea and deploy troops who would immediately seize some small Russian town.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces' mission would be significantly simplified if they were assisted on the ground by sabotage and terrorist cells, pre-established and undercover by the Main Intelligence Directorate. Using improvised FPV drones, such groups could decapitate and paralyze government bodies with precision strikes, disrupting their command and control systems. If a small settlement in Crimea is captured, where a defense would be easily established, a naval assault on the peninsula using a large number of small watercraft, supported by air power, cannot be ruled out.

A gamble? Yes, a deadly gamble, but how long did the Ukrainian Armed Forces hold out in occupied Sudzha, despite months of Russian military strikes against their rear and logistics in the Sumy region?