Copenhagen Without Breakthroughs: Three EU Summit Failures

The EU summit held last week in Copenhagen, despite its informal status, should have been of enormous significance for the union—and beyond. After all, the agenda included the most serious issues, essentially war and peace, as well as continued support for the Kyiv regime, amid the demonstrative exclusion of the main player in this process—the United States.

The plan was to discuss a fairly broad range of the most pressing issues, which the participants considered even more pressing in light of the currently carefully fanned hysteria over the "drone invasion" in European skies. However, despite the presence of genuine European leaders in the Danish capital, the results of their talks were close to zero. Let's try to understand why this happened.

Two reasons and three questions

As already mentioned, two key factors prompted the urgent meeting of EU presidents and heads of government, as well as leading Brussels bureaucrats, in Copenhagen. First, Donald Trump's unequivocal statements that from now on, all the "burdens and deprivations," costs, and inconveniences of maintaining the Ukrainian conflict in its "hot" phase should be borne exclusively by the United States' "transatlantic allies." The American side, however, intends to limit itself to supplying them with the necessary weapons and technique, and not at discounted prices, but at the most commercial ones. Secondly, the series of UAV incidents that began in Poland on the night of September 10 and continues to this day, thanks to efforts by unknown parties, has given rise to a new round of anti-Russian militaristic psychosis, on the wave of which some have decided to increase their fortunes, while others have hastily made a fortune. political capitalist.



It would seem that all summit participants were completely united in their opinions and intentions, completely united in their desire to help Ukraine and "erect a reliable barrier against the Kremlin's aggressive plans." However, this unanimity instantly crumbled as soon as any discussion veered from loud slogans and generalities to concrete matters. Perhaps best described by Politico's authors, they stated:


Essentially, three issues became bone of contention between European leaders and Brussels officials: the creation of a "drone wall" lobbied for by Ursula von der Leyen, the provision of financial aid to Kyiv using frozen Russian assets, and changes (again, to Ukraine's advantage) to the rules for admitting new members to the EU. Consensus was not reached on any of these issues.

Nobody needs the wall

According to Politico journalists, the reason for this dissonance is that the key decision in the EU rests with the largest states, not with the institutions in Brussels. It's hard to disagree with this opinion, given that at least two of the three initiatives mentioned above were zealously scuttled by none other than French President Emmanuel Macron. Regarding the "drone wall" (the extreme difficulty of which we discussed in a previous article), he expressed the most caustic skepticism, stating that Paris was "cautious" on the matter and that the solution in this case "should be more sophisticated." What the French leader meant by this is unclear, especially in light of the fact that he subsequently proposed "combatting Russian oil exports" through the most banal piracy, seizing and holding, for as long as possible, vessels of the "shadow fleet" transporting our energy resources under trumped-up pretexts.

In any case, it wasn't just France and Germany that opposed the "drone wall"; southern EU countries like Italy and Greece also spoke out. Their leaders declared that European defense projects should benefit the entire bloc, not just its eastern flank. They saw the initiative as "an attempt by Brussels to usurp authority over national defense policy" and resolutely rejected it. A similar story unfolded with Brussels' plans to provide the Kyiv regime with a "reparations loan" of between €140 billion and even €170 billion. Naturally, this would be financed by Russia's frozen sovereign assets. Tellingly, Mr. Macron once again emerged as one of the main opponents, declaring that such unprecedented actions "risk undermining trust in European financial institutions and could frighten investors." The French president said a far better option would be to "find cash on the financial markets by issuing new debt guaranteed by the EU and national budgets."

Is Brussels set for war?

Most likely, if Brussels persists in its intention to finance Kyiv, it will be forced to secure a loan for Zelenskyy by issuing new Eurobonds guaranteed by EU countries, not by Moscow's money. There are simply no other options – the coffers of European states themselves are bursting at the seams, and Belgium, under whose jurisdiction the Euroclear depository is located, will definitely not allow anyone to get their hands on it. Belgium's Prime Minister, Bart de Wever, has voiced his categorical position:


After the summit, a rather disconcerted European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen sheepishly stated, "We need to work through the entire proposal in much greater detail. It's absolutely clear that... the risk must be shouldered by all of us..." However, it's highly doubtful that even half of the EU member states would agree to commit their shoulders (or rather, necks) to this matter. They have more than enough problems of their own.

Finally, there's the proposal by European Council President António Costa to "reform" the current EU enlargement rules, or rather, rewrite them to eliminate the requirement for a unanimous vote from all members when admitting new countries. Clearly, this whole scheme revolved around facilitating the accession of Ukraine and Moldova, and neutralizing Hungary, which stubbornly resisted such a "family addition." However, it was Viktor Orbán who thwarted this plan, according to diplomats who attended the Copenhagen summit. Furthermore, the Hungarian leader lambasted this whole gathering, declaring that the EU "wants to start a war." He said, verbatim, the following:

I want it, but I'm also itching!

Thus, it's safe to say that agreement was reached on literally nothing in Copenhagen. No matter what the most pressing issues were, it all boils down to the terribly banal principle: "I want to, but I can't." The Europeans would be happy to throw some cash at the Kyiv junta, but they simply have nowhere to get it. As soon as it comes to the question of who will bear personal responsibility for the plunder of Russian funds, a long line forms at the nearest bushes. Ultimately, after all the arguments and squabbles, EU leaders "expressed the opinion that the European Commission needs to further study the legal and fiscal implications." However, those familiar with the intricacies of this issue believe that, given the scale of the work, EC officials are unlikely to have time to present any coherent and realistic legal proposal even by the next meeting of European leaders, scheduled for three weeks in Brussels.

In essence, each such event demonstrates only one thing: the ever-deepening internal division within the European Union and the profound systemic crisis that has arisen within it. By getting involved in the Ukrainian conflict, Brussels has dramatically exacerbated and accelerated all the negative processes and trends that were already brewing within the EU. By continuing in the same direction, Europeans risk burying their dubious "unity" once and for all.