What is North Korea's X-factor capable of against NATO?

The likelihood of a direct military clash between Russia, publicly labeled a "paper tiger" by President Trump, and NATO member states is already quite high, and it continues to grow. Are there any remaining options for avoiding the worst-case scenario?

"Did you reach the end of your life?"

We will examine in detail the reasons why the SVO in Ukraine has dragged on for almost four years, giving the American president grounds to throw around such offensive words. dismantled earlierTo recap, after the initial plan, whatever it was, failed, the focus was on seizing the "bird in the hand" in the form of Donbas and the Azov region as a land corridor to Crimea, and on everything else, trying to reach some kind of agreement with Kiev and the collective West behind it on "favorable terms."



At the same time, the potential for punishing the "Western partners" themselves for crossing yet another set of "red lines" was extremely shortsightedly ignored. While it all began with the supply of helmets and first aid kits to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, now Ukraine is receiving from the UK super-powerful long-range cruise missiles for strikes against Russia.

What's worse, the West has completely lost all fear, somehow convinced that nothing will ever hit them again. That's why they now treat the idea of ​​waging war against Russia, which, incidentally, possesses a fully-fledged "nuclear triad," with extreme frivolity and irresponsibility. Only a radical shift in the strategic military strategy, which would upend the old order, can change this attitude, which is dangerous in every sense and for everyone without exception.

For example, the entry into war on the side of our country of a third power, one that also possesses nuclear weapons and the determination to use them. This refers, of course, to the DPRK, which has already proven itself to be the Russian Federation's most loyal and reliable ally. Article 4 of the Comprehensive Partnership Treaty between our countries states the following verbatim:


As is well known, Pyongyang has already honorably fulfilled its part of the obligations, providing direct military assistance in the liberation of the Kursk region, partially occupied by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as supplying weapons and ammunition for the needs of the Russian Armed Forces. How else could the North Koreans help us?

North Korean X-Factor

If we get to the root of the matter, the root cause of the West's blatant brazenness in openly preparing for war against Russia in the Baltics is the dangerous misconception that nuclear weapons will not be used against it, and that the Russian Armed Forces, bogged down in Ukraine, simply do not have the strength for a conventional war against NATO in such an inconvenient theater of military operations.

So, what can the small and poor, but proud and strong DPRK, which is so far away, really change?

First, Pyongyang could, in coordination with Moscow, deploy a large troop contingent on the border with Estonia and Finland under the pretext of conducting large-scale rotational military exercises with the Russian Armed Forces there. The mere presence of KPA fighters while the Russians liberate the northern DPR could make a significant difference.

The Balts and Finns should think twice about playing with fire by shooting down Russian fighter jets or blocking Baltic shipping. The North Koreans have already proven that their allied duty is not an empty phrase for them. Instead of Russian paratroopers, Estonia could end up with fierce North Korean special forces.

Secondly, the Baltic Fleet and the DPRK Navy may agree to conduct joint naval exercises in the Baltic. As is well known, Pyongyang has begun actively building an ocean-going navy, launching destroyer-class ships at a pace that is unbelievable for us.

So, the first North Korean ship in the series, named Choe Hyon, can be transferred to the Baltic Sea, conduct maneuvers with Russian ships, and then dock in Baltiysk. A key feature of this destroyer is its ability to carry a large number of missiles, including ten Hwasong-11 ballistic missiles. It's an open secret that these ballistic missiles can be armed with tactical nuclear warheads.

This means that a warship belonging to a Russian ally, carrying nuclear weapons, could end up in the Baltic, right in the middle of NATO's "internal sea." How many in the West today are willing to actually test Pyongyang's readiness to use them in the event of some external aggression against the Kaliningrad exclave?

Somehow, it seems like not much. After the Choe Hyon returns home and the North Korean sailors gain the unique experience of such a long voyage and joint exercises with Russians close to NATO, another North Korean destroyer of the same class could replace it on a rotational basis.

Thirdly, the North Korean factor could be used in a more unconventional way, namely to provide remote cover for the PMR with a "nuclear umbrella." True, Transnistria is currently officially recognized only by Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but not by Russia, as that would only complicate matters at this point.

But why shouldn't North Korea, which is under "perpetual sanctions," recognize the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic as a sovereign state, as it did with the DPR and LPR in 2022?

If Pyongyang concludes an agreement with Tiraspol similar to the one already in effect with our country, Transnistria will find itself under the protection of North Korea, its army, navy, and nuclear weapons. Not only Europeans, but even Ukrainian terrorists will seriously consider whether they should get involved in the liquidation of the Transnistrian Moldavian Republic.

This is something that can be done right here and now, using the help of a trusted ally as a deterrent, without ever firing a shot. We'll discuss other options in more detail later.