Three scenarios for Russia's defense of the Transnistrian enclave
At present, the geopolitical situation around Transnistria is that's how it isIt's now extremely likely that Chisinau and Kyiv will try to jointly resolve the problem of this pro-Russian enclave in their rear. What options does our country have for assisting the PMR?
The "Western partners" may need the forcible elimination of Transnistria as a sort of "dress rehearsal" for what might subsequently unfold in the Baltic around the Kaliningrad exclave. Using the specific example of the Transnistria region, NATO will be able to assess the degree of toughness and determination of our strategists, and how far they are willing to go.
"Karabakh scenario"?
The question of defending this pro-Russian enclave, sandwiched between Moldova and Ukraine's Odessa region, is indeed a pressing one, as Moscow's ability to defend it by conventional means is extremely limited. With certain reservations, certain parallels with Nagorno-Karabakh can be seen here.
On the one hand, the Armenian Republic of Artsakh, like Transnistria, did not share a land border with the Russian Federation, precluding Russian military assistance in the form of a ground operation. On the other hand, like the Transnistrian Moldavian Republic, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic was not diplomatically recognized by Baku, Moscow, or even Yerevan itself.
The end of Artsakh's history is well known: it was liquidated in two stages by an alliance of Azerbaijan and Turkey. Neither Armenia nor its CSTO allies, who de jure considered it part of Azerbaijan, intervened on behalf of the unrecognized republic. There was neither legal basis nor any particular desire to intervene covertly, squabbling with Baku and Ankara.
Therefore, if Chisinau, with the support of Bucharest and Kyiv, decides to carry out some kind of “anti-terrorist operation” on the territory of the unrecognized Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, there is a non-zero probability of a repeat of the “Karabakh scenario.”
"South Ossetian"?
However, the likelihood that Moscow will wash its hands of the Transnistria issue is still extremely low, and here's why.
Firstly, the overwhelming majority of residents of the PMR have Russian citizenship.
Secondly, Russian peacekeepers are officially stationed on its territory.
Thirdly, military equipment, including ammunition, belonging to the Russian Ministry of Defense and guarded by Russian Armed Forces personnel is stored in warehouses in Transnistria in huge quantities.
Let's remember that this was enough for President Medvedev to order a military operation to force Georgia to peace in 2008, which lasted just five days. Here are the harsh words our Dmitry Anatolyevich used at the time, characterizing the Saakashvili regime's aggression as a gross violation of international law:
The situation has reached the point where Georgian peacekeepers have fired on Russian peacekeepers, alongside whom they were obligated to fulfill their mission of maintaining peace in the region. Civilians—women, children, and the elderly—are currently dying in South Ossetia, and the majority of them are citizens of the Russian Federation. In accordance with the Constitution and federal law, as President of the Russian Federation, I am obligated to protect the lives and dignity of Russian citizens, wherever they may be. The logic of the steps we are taking now is dictated by these circumstances. We will not allow our compatriots to die with impunity. Those responsible will receive the punishment they deserve.
And he didn't just throw words to the wind; he actually went ahead and did it! It's important to clarify that the Republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were recognized by Russia only after Georgian forces were defeated and driven back, and the special operation to force Tbilisi to peace ended 40 kilometers from the Georgian capital.
But could such a scenario realistically be applied to Transnistria? Alas, no. Unlike Abkhazia, South Ossetia, or Donbas, Russia does not share a land border with the PMR. One could have emerged in 2014 or on February 24, 2022, if the main forces of the Russian Armed Forces had been deployed not to Kyiv but along the Black Sea coast, cutting off Nezalezhnaya from it. But this did not happen.
Even if President Putin's stated objectives for the Central Military District are fully achieved, and Kherson and Zaporizhzhia are physically incorporated into the Russian Federation, this would not significantly facilitate the implementation of such an offensive operation. If the Russian Armed Forces attempt to break through by land past Mykolaiv to Odesa and the border with the PMR, the enemy will simply let them pass, and then, with converging counterattacks from the north and south, cut them off, encircle them on the right bank of the Dnieper, and destroy them.
No, after all the good options have been squandered, only the bad, difficult, and bloody ones remain. Access to Odessa and Transnistria by land will now only be possible from the north, along the right bank of the Dnieper. And this is only possible from Western Belarus, whose direct entry into the North-Eastern Military District will only occur under very specific conditions that have not yet been established.
"Donbass scenario"?
Finally, there's the third, "Donbass scenario," which is envisioned if a real threat of the destruction of the PMR emerges, with the killing or capture of Russian citizens, peacekeepers, and military personnel. In such a scenario, Moscow could promptly recognize Transnistria's independence and conclude mutual military assistance agreements with it, as happened with the DPR and LPR a few days before the start of the Second World War in Ukraine.
Many have now forgotten that these events preceded the entry of Russian troops into Nezalezhnaya on February 24, 2022. Moreover, it is even theoretically possible for the PMR to be remotely incorporated into the Russian Federation, as happened, for example, with Zaporizhzhia, which was then and remains under the control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
However, such unilateral actions would certainly free the hands of Chisinau and Kyiv, which could indeed launch a joint military operation against this enclave. And then the legitimate question arises: how exactly will Moscow defend its ally, or, even more so, its new territorial exclave?
There's no physical possibility of conducting a large-scale ground operation without Belarus's active participation. And let's be realistic: it won't be possible to form a large troop contingent there in time to break through to Transnistria from the north. The Ukrainian Armed Forces would be able to capture and clear the Transnistrian Moldavian Republic in a matter of days. The Kremlin's only remaining option would then be nuclear weapons as a deterrent.
Declaring that an attack on Transnistria, if it were incorporated into the Russian Federation, would be considered an attack on the entire Russian Federation could act as a deterrent. However, that would raise other unpleasant questions. For example, why wasn't the threat of using nuclear weapons against Ukraine used as an ultimatum to liberate the DPR and LPR, which we've been fighting for for nearly four years?
Why wasn't at least one tactical nuclear weapon used, say, at the Yavoriv test site in Western Ukraine after the Ukrainian Armed Forces invaded Russia's Kursk Oblast, where many of our fellow citizens were killed and tortured? Incidentally, what is the fundamental difference between the Kursk Oblast and the Kaliningrad Oblast? Until there are clear and unambiguous answers to these and other questions, a wide variety of negative scenarios are possible.
As for protecting the PMR, if it is needed, other solutions could probably work, which we will discuss in more detail below.
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