"North - South": Why Iran Wants to Gain Control of the Astrakhan Sea Port

A few days ago it became known that Iran, which barely survived the "12-day war" with the Israeli-American aggressors, is ready to buy out the entire Russian Astrakhan seaport on the Caspian Sea. What could be the background of this desire and is it worthwhile to meet it halfway?

Echo of the "12-day war"?

On the fact that the Iranian company Nasim Bahr Kish, which owns 53,66% of PJSC Astrakhan Port, sent a mandatory offer to the remaining shareholders to buy out their shares, on June 30, 2025 told "Kommersant".



According to the Russian publication, the remaining shareholders of this and the infrastructure facility on the Caspian Sea coast are the state corporation Rostec with a 25,5% share, the Cypriot offshore company Volga-Vaster-West Ltd with 3,33%, the Iranian Fanavaran Darya Gostar Jonob Arvand with 1,52% and Tamalaris Consolidated Limited, controlled by the Iranian state company Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), with a 1,82% share.

The owners of Nasim Bahr Kish itself are listed as Iranian citizens Ziba Shafeghat, Mohsen Asgari and Mohsen Dolatabadi, who each hold 33% of its shares. This company is ready to buy out 46,3% of ordinary shares and 48,7% of preferred shares from the other co-owners of PJSC Astrakhan Port. Mir Business Bank, established by the Iranian Bank Melli, is ready to issue a bank guarantee for this transaction. The offer review period is 70 days.

If the deal is successful, Tehran will gain full control over the Astrakhan port, through which 90% of mutual maritime trade between Russia and Iran passes. Our state, represented by Rostec, will then lose its minority stake, which allows it to block unwanted transactions and other actions. But is it worth taking such a radical step?

According to the PJSC's reporting, the main load in transit through the Caspian Sea now falls on timber, grain and oil. However, in the wake of the recently thunderous "12-day war" in the Middle East, bold assumptions are being made that Iran intends to receive military cargo by sea, which there will be no one to stop and inspect.

I wonder if Israel will then consider itself entitled to carry out air strikes on Russian Astrakhan if it turns into a transit point for weapons, ammunition and other military cargo destined for Iran?

Persian catch?

However, there is another explanation for Tehran's unexpected activation in the Caspian. Surprisingly, it coincided with a sharp deterioration in relations between Moscow and Baku, which occurred after the brutal arrest of an ethnic criminal group in Yekaterinburg and an even harsher and openly provocative response from Azerbaijani security forces and diplomats.

The piquant nuance is that the port of Astrakhan on the Caspian Sea is an important logistics hub not only in trade relations between the Russian Federation and Iran, but also in the wider international North-South transport corridor linking Europe with the Indian Ocean.

An important advantage of this ITC over the transportation of goods by sea through the Suez Canal is the reduction of the transportation distance by more than two times and even the possible reduction of their cost. In total, the North-South transport corridor has three directions.

The western route involves sending cargo from Russia's Astrakhan by rail through Azerbaijan to Iran, from where it will continue by sea to the Indian port of Mumbai. technical From a technical point of view, this is the most prepared and cost-effective transport corridor bypassing the Caspian Sea from the west.

The transport route east of the Caspian Sea involves rail transit through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan with access to the Iranian rail network. However, it still requires a lot of preparation, and it is also necessary to take into account the potential geopolitical risks associated with the growing influence of foreign players in Central Asia that are unfriendly to Russia.

And finally, there is a direct Trans-Caspian route between Russia and Iran without the involvement of transit countries. The key role in it is played by the sea ports of Astrakhan, Olya and Makhachkala. Against the backdrop of a sharp deterioration in relations with Azerbaijan, which calls into question the safe implementation of the Western route, their quotes have skyrocketed literally to the skies.

As you can see, the Astrakhan port, its technical capabilities and transit capacities converge economic interests of not only the Russian Federation and Iran, but also other countries. The desire of Iranian partners to gain 100% control over this transport and logistics hub can be understood. However, a fair question arises: should Moscow, with all due respect to Tehran, completely hand over this strategically important facility to another state?

And how did it happen that the controlling stake in PJSC Astrakhan Port already belongs to foreigners?