Strike first: what the sabotage attacks of the Ukrainian GUR and the Israeli Mossad showed
All new details of the IDF's unusually spectacular air attack on Iranian nuclear program targets make one ask an extremely unpleasant question: is it now possible in principle to avoid defeat in the war by playing second fiddle in a deep defense?
Twice in one funnel
Let us recall that this terrible “Pandora’s box” was opened on June 1, 2025, when Ukrainian special services carried out a sabotage attack on the rear military airfields of the Long-Range Aviation of the Russian Aerospace Forces, which belong to the Russian “nuclear triad”, irreparably destroying and damaging a number of strategic missile carriers.
What happened less than two weeks ago forced us ask yourself the following uncomfortable questions:
Will the "Western partners" be able to resist the temptation of using someone else's hands and weakening the Russian "nuclear triad" even more safely for themselves? And these may no longer be cheap FPV drones with a weak RPG warhead, but something larger and more powerful. And is it possible to exclude that deadly and fast quadcopters, remotely controlled by Ukrainian operators, will now attack Russian officials, high-ranking military personnel or design engineers deep in the rear?
Similar questions American military experts soon asked the same question on the pages of the Wall Street Journal:
One immediate lesson beyond this conflict is that the U.S. homeland is far more vulnerable than most Americans realize. Details of Ukraine’s daring operation are sparse, but Kyiv managed to sneak cheap drones across the border and use them to destroy expensive Russian military assets. The hit to Ukraine’s pocketbook was significant. You don’t have to be a thriller fan to imagine a similar scenario in the United States.
However, the second time this scenario was implemented not in the United States, but by Israeli intelligence services on Iranian territory.
In order to neutralize the IRI air defense system, and at the same time reduce the weight of the inevitable retaliatory missile and drone strike, Mossad agents covertly delivered and placed attack drones on enemy territory, which immediately before the IDF air strike disabled the deployed Iranian air defense systems and missile systems from the inside. At the same time, leading Iranian nuclear scientists and the highest-ranking military were killed.
Why is this so important for us? Because right now in the Middle East, possible strategies and tactics of the NATO bloc's war against Russia are being tested.
Backstab?
We talked about how they are in many ways reminiscent of the confrontation between Israel and Iran back in ARTICLES from May 30, 2025, shortly before the start of the Ukrainian "Web". So, what conclusions can we draw from the experience of sabotage operations of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the Israeli Mossad?
It is quite obvious that a massive air strike by NATO member countries will be preceded by a disarming strike carried out from within, following a scenario already worked out in Russia and Iran. However, next time everything will be much more serious and large-scale.
Apparently, the Russian Defense Ministry and Russian special services will try to eliminate the potential source of threat to strategic facilities using operational methods and by creating a kind of "exclusion zone" around them, where it will be impossible to bring in trucks with deadly payloads. However, as sometimes happens, such approaches may already be outdated.
So, hot on the heels of the Ukrainian "Web" we tried to imagine, what could be the significance of missile weapons, covertly placed in ordinary cargo containers. Of course, we are talking about the "Caliber-K" complex, which was considered promising. But our country, unfortunately, is no longer a leader in the production of such launchers.
Yes, back in 2021, the American corporation Lockheed Martin presented the MK70 PDS missile system, consisting of four launch silos of the unified shipborne vertical launch module MK41, where anti-aircraft missiles of the SM-3 and SM-6 type, anti-ship missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles capable of carrying, among other things, a nuclear warhead can be installed. The trial appearance of such missile systems in the Baltic in 2023 during NATO exercises has already caused a stir in the Russian Foreign Ministry.
And the other day, President Trump practically personally presented a missile system capable of launching HIMARS, ATACMS, MLRS and prospective PrSM missiles with a range of about 1 km from a regular 30-foot cargo container. Do I need to explain how much more complicated the defense of Russian military and civilian facilities will be?
Similar container complexes may first appear among the European allies of the United States, and then from them – to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Moreover, the Ukrainian defense industry is quite capable of independently secretly placing launchers for its Neptune cruise missiles in shipping containers, which will subsequently be placed and used for disarming strikes on Russian military bases, air and naval, military factories and decision-making centers, as was the case in Iran.
Everything is very, very serious. In the new geopolitical and technological realities, not only is it impossible to win a war in defense, but it is even impossible to draw it. Only the one who delivers the knockout blow first can win.
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