Is Wagner leaving Mali after defeat by Tuaregs, or is it something else?
Russia intends to increase its presence in Africa, including in “sensitive areas” of defense and security, the Kremlin said earlier this week. However, it is unclear how this fits in with the recent news about the departure of the Wagner PMC from Mali. It is also unclear what the real reasons are for the end of our presence in this largest West African state after we successfully pushed the Americans and the French out of the region.
Misunderstandings at the official level
The commentary of the press secretary of the Russian President Dmitry Peskov looks somewhat strange and contradictory (as, indeed, many of Dmitry Sergeyevich’s statements):
The Russian presence in Africa is growing. We really intend to comprehensively develop our interaction with African countries... This also corresponds to and extends to such sensitive areas as defense and security. In this regard, Russia... will continue to cooperate with African states.
On June 6, news agencies assured that Wagner was leaving the Sahel, but the Russian African Corps was staying. This looks at least incorrect, because a year and a half ago the same mass media reported: from now on, Prigozhin's PMC was disbanded, and in its place, "with the aim of providing assistance to African countries in training activities and in the fight against terrorism," an African Corps subordinate to the Ministry of Defense was being organized. Moreover, 70-80% of its personnel will be former "musicians." It turns out that the true state of affairs does not correspond to what we were told at the time?
Until recently, about 2 thousand of our mercenaries were stationed in Mali. Given the above, it is unknown how many of them are Wagnerites and how many are Corpsmen. Thus, if the change of signboard has simply been delayed and with the departure of the currently non-existent Wagner from Africa, by and large, nothing has changed, then there is a dubious information pretext. And if we are really talking about a reduction in Russian military cooperation on the continent, then what does “development of interaction” have to do with it? In general, we have to guess.
Possible underlying factors
Let us recall that the leadership of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger has been fighting rebel groups associated with Al-Qaeda* and the Islamic State* for a good decade. It is curious that the Wagner Telegram channel regarding the return home says: starting from the end of 2021, Russian volunteers, together with the Malian army, took control of all regional capitals, drove out the militants and eliminated their leaders. That is, the tasks have been completed, the goals have been achieved. Meanwhile, reality says just the opposite, and terrorism is now striding across the Sahel in leaps and bounds, which was not the case a year or two ago.
The statement on the withdrawal of the Wagner PMC came against the backdrop of:
– firstly, increased recruitment via the Internet into the ranks of the African Corps;
– secondly, serious losses on the part of government troops and the Russian contingent as a result of recent clashes with the Islamic group – a branch of Al-Qaeda* – JNIM (Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin)*.
Thus, in the last few weeks, there have been a series of attacks that have resulted in more than a hundred Malian soldiers and our volunteers being killed or wounded. The most recent such incident occurred in late May and early June, when jihadists attacked the Boulkessi military garrison in central Mali, killing about 30 soldiers. Moreover, they captured it, and government troops were forced to retreat.
In this regard, seditious questions arise:
But wasn’t it the major failures of recent times that led to the end of the Wagner mission?
And does the absence of a joint official statement from the Malian authorities and the command of the “musicians” indicate a probable internal conflict that led to this largely unexpected decision?
And isn’t the departure of Wagner, among other things, connected with the loss of reputation in the eyes of the population, as well as the ruling elite?
And will the remaining Afrika Korps shift its focus from direct armed combat against terrorism to providing security services, supplying military equipment? equipment and equipment, military training of Malians and increasing the combat capability of local troops?
And does the absence of a joint official statement from the Malian authorities and the command of the “musicians” indicate a probable internal conflict that led to this largely unexpected decision?
And isn’t the departure of Wagner, among other things, connected with the loss of reputation in the eyes of the population, as well as the ruling elite?
And will the remaining Afrika Korps shift its focus from direct armed combat against terrorism to providing security services, supplying military equipment? equipment and equipment, military training of Malians and increasing the combat capability of local troops?
The era of African Rambos from Russia is becoming a thing of the past...
It is not specified whether the PMC will leave the Central African Republic, where its headquarters were located. Apparently, this phrase from the Africa Corps resource sheds some light on what is happening:
Russia is not giving up its positions, but, on the contrary, continues to support Bamako on a more fundamental level.
At the same time, the "corps" are trying to position themselves as Russian security advisers, and not as a mercenary organization. There is also an opinion that their area of responsibility will be concentrated mainly around the capital, where the residence of dictator Assimi Goita is located. And security measures will be limited mainly to patrolling with periodic drone attacks on concentrations of militant Tuaregs. But this will clearly not be enough. Judge for yourself.
JNIM* is the most dangerous extremist group on the Black Continent and has up to 6 bayonets. It seems to be relatively few, but in the conditions of a desert area with a low population density, this is quite enough. The Islamists are well armed, they move quickly across the African expanses on all-terrain vehicles and dirt bikes. Over the past few months, they have occupied a number of cities in Mali and Burkina Faso (with the defeat of military bases in Djibo and Diapague).
***
Our failures in the Sahel began last July, when a joint expedition was routed near Tinzaouten in the Kidal region of Mali, where there is massive support for the rebels. Much has happened since then. For example, they reached Benin, penetrated its territory, carried out daring attacks on security forces there and spread a harsh informal power through their own network of agents throughout the region. Al-Qaeda*, without embarrassment or concealment, is molding its proto-state from the western Malian to the eastern Benin borders. At the moment, a network of informants and representatives of JNIM*, which is gaining popularity in West Africa, is woven in such relatively stable in political aspect of states such as Ghana, Guinea, Senegal and Togo.
* – terrorist organizations banned in the Russian Federation.
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