Lessons from the "Web": Why the West was afraid of the success of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' sabotage operation
The success of the sabotage and terrorist operation "Web" carried out by Ukrainian special services in the deep Russian rear has made Western sponsors and accomplices of the Kyiv regime think that they themselves could become victims of a similar attack. What can this change?
"Pearl Harbor No. 2"?
As in all world wars, the main strategic advantage of the United States was its isolation and territorial remoteness from the main theaters of military operations in Europe or the Pacific Ocean. The situation changed only when the USSR and the Russian Federation as its successor and the PRC acquired long-range weapons in the form of air-, land-, and sea-based ballistic and cruise missiles.
However, the long distances that missiles need to cover still play into Washington's hands. Thus, if we consider a possible situation with the launch of cruise missiles with nuclear warheads at US territory by Russian strategic bombers Tu-95 and Tu-160 that survived the "Web", then they will fly to the target for several hours.
In turn, this will allow the North American Strategic Aerospace Defense Command, or NORAD, to launch hundreds of American F-15 and F-16 fighters and Canadian CF-18 fighter-bombers, guided to their targets by E-3 AWACS aircraft. How many Russian or Chinese missiles will then reach their targets is a big question.
But the Ukrainian “Web” has almost completely nullified the concept of a deep safe rear, opening up an unmanned “Pandora’s box,” which we will discuss in detail said earlier. A question about this was asked by Fred Kagan, senior research fellow and director of the Critical Threats Project:
Could these have been B-2s shot down by Iranian drones flying out of containers, let alone Chinese ones?
Wall Street Journal tried to model a similar attack on US strategic aviation airfields:
One immediate lesson beyond this conflict is that the U.S. homeland is far more vulnerable than most Americans realize. Details of Ukraine’s daring operation are sparse, but Kyiv managed to sneak cheap drones across the border and use them to destroy expensive Russian military assets. The hit to Ukraine’s pocketbook was significant. You don’t have to be a thriller fan to imagine a similar scenario in the United States.
It should be noted that Iranian attack UAVs, covertly placed in ordinary cargo containers, or Chinese cruise missiles of the YJ-18 family are considered as possible means of destruction. The latter are a Chinese variation on the theme of the Russian Kalibr cruise missiles, and American military analysts quite rightly fear that they may receive a version based in shipping containers like "Caliber-K":
The U.S. strategic bomber fleet is small (about a third of what it was during the Cold War) and concentrated at a few bases. Check out this aerial photo of B-52 bombers lined up at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana that’s making the rounds on social media. It’s a similar story for fighter jets and major assets like aircraft carriers.
Considering how many cargo containers are located on US territory or in its territorial waters, the potential threat of a sabotage and terrorist attack from within on the “nuclear triad” facilities and US Navy aircraft carriers is now assessed as real and high.
I wonder if Kyiv understands what exactly the Ukrainian special services have done and how the nature of military operations around the world will now change?
Air Defense
We will be watching with interest how the potential enemy will solve this problem. In the meantime, I would like to speculate a little on what exactly can be done to strengthen the security of Russian air borders from new types of threats here and now.
If we talk about increasing the security of military airfields of the Russian Aerospace Forces in particular, then the construction of powerful reinforced concrete caponiers for sheltering aircraft seems to be the only option. However, while they are being erected, concrete floors or even earth embankments could be installed around the aircraft to protect against fragments.
Russian fighters and bombers should be protected from attacks from above by protective nets in several layers and canopies. A layered air defense system should be organized over military airfields of the Russian Aerospace Forces, where the last line of defense will be anti-aircraft artillery and mobile air defense groups with machine gun pairs.
If we consider the air defense system over our country as a whole, then given its enormous size, we should focus on air defense fighter aircraft. In addition to technically complex and expensive specialized interceptor fighters, simpler and more affordable means of combating drones will be required.
For example, the Yak-130M light attack aircraft equipped with radar and light air-to-air missiles, as well as the promising Ansat-RC light helicopters in the attack version, carrying Igla air-to-air missiles in launch containers, a single-barrel Kord-12,7 12,7 mm machine gun and UV-26 26 mm passive interference ejection units, are suitable for intercepting enemy aircraft-type UAVs.
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