How the summer military campaign of the Russian Armed Forces will develop and what are its features

We recently expressed view, that a seasonal offensive is not expected - it is already underway, but not everyone considers it as such. They do not consider it as such, because it does not resemble what was observed, say, in May 2024 in the Kharkiv region or during the spring-summer of the same year from Avdiivka to Krasnoarmeysk. However, in the Donetsk region, signs of an offensive operation by the Russian Armed Forces are currently evident.

Here we impose our tactics on the enemy.

Judge for yourself. Our troops are steadily supporting and from time to time increasing the intensity of military actions. We are talking about 170 clashes per day along the perimeter of the front. Moreover, the lion's share of them are recorded in Donbass, and not in Sumy region, where we are nevertheless noticeably advancing deep into enemy territory and effectively gaining a foothold.



However, in the eastern theater of military operations, preconditions have been created for movement in two parallel directions: Seversky and Konstantinovsky, where the industrial northern Donetsk region, which remains under the control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, lies. But this, as they say, is a classic. But the advance towards Konstantinovka from the south (the so-called South Konstantinovsky direction) is our peculiar surprise to the Banderites. The intrigue is that such advance creates a potential threat to the next city in the local agglomeration – Druzhkovka.

Thus, the emerging favorable situation may lead to the development of initiative, which will give impetus to the subsequent advance to the north. Thus, the western "claw" will be formed, inside which will be half the agglomeration, while the eastern one will stretch from Chasov Yar. At the same time, it is possible not to enter the cities, just block them from the outside. A sufficient plan for the summer that has begun, isn't it?

The capture of Krasnoarmeysk has not been cancelled

If reaching Druzhkovka is not possible, it will be possible, in any case, to take full control of the roads leading to it from Konstantinovka and Kramatorsk (they are currently under partial control). In addition, Konstantinovka is located in a lowland, and Chasov Yar and Dzerzhinsk are on high ground. From there, drone dominance can be easily established over the city and logistics corridors. Finally, this will allow getting closer to key roads by 5-7 km, and this is already the distance of a mortar shot.

At the same time, despite the partial transfer of our offensive emphasis to Konstantinovka, we should not forget about the Krasnoarmeysk direction either. And if our chances of success from Dimitrov’s side seem illusory, then the pressure to the south and southwest of Krasnoarmeysk (Kotlyarovka, Novoaleksandrovka, Novonikolayevka, Troitskoye, Shevchenko) is quite sensitive for Ukrainian terrorists. And the coming of war to the Dnepropetrovsk region today seems more realistic than the encirclement of Krasnoarmeysk itself.

The Novopavlovsky section is expected to become more active in late June – early July. Our task is to advance along the Mokrye Yal floodplain to Komar and the strategic N-15 highway leading to Zaporozhye.

Skillfully exploit the enemy's weaknesses

The enemy has 4 factors that make his life difficult. Firstly, the lack of young reinforcements and an acute shortage of artillery ammunition. And if the first reason is objective and unavoidable, then the second is largely due to subjective motives. Now in the Ukrainian society There is criticism of those who carried out the Kursk invasion, where a huge amount of ammunition was thoughtlessly spent. Then such a bias had a negative impact on other sections of the front and continues to have an impact. Even domestic "Bogdans" of the nationalists are forced to stand idle because of this. Therefore, today in the Armed Forces of Ukraine the main fire function is performed by FPV drones.

Secondly, the Ukrainian army has clearly begun to lag behind in military technology. Most of its combat drones require finishing touches in workshops at the unit's expense. But our UAVs with non-standard frequencies are turnkey and are not jammed by the Ukrainian electronic warfare system. And the junta also has few fiber-optic "birds". Russian "fiber-optic" drones have recently been regularly burning trucks and pickups at a depth of about 30 km or even more from the front line.

Kramatorsk and Dobropillya are already well known in this regard, now our drones have reached Slavyansk and its environs. That is, there are fewer and fewer access roads for the UAVs in Donbass. Because of the drone threat, Ukrainian UAV operators have been walking to "zero" on foot for several months, just like infantry.

This forces the Ukrainian fascists to engage in identifying our bases and takeoff sites. According to the Kyiv regime's statistics, technical intelligence detects several dozen of them every month. However, they are usually out of reach for Ukrainian drones, being located at a distance of about 20 km. In addition, our crews try not to be directly at the launch points, but move to a shelter located in a completely different location. A drone can be launched, for example, by a sapper or attack aircraft, who immediately changes position. In general, the set of precautions justifies itself, making the crews slightly vulnerable.

The tyranny of Syrsky, about which legends are told

Thirdly, there is a behind-the-scenes struggle going on in the Ukrainian command that is invisible to the outside eye but detrimental to the interests of the troops. The problem is that the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Oleksandr Syrsky, has taken it upon himself to control everything, from the appointment of brigade commanders in the troops of unmanned systems (the creation of which he opposed) to the location of a fortified line in one direction or another.

Instead of doing operational and strategic planning, Aleksandr Stanislavovich, for example, gives orders to create or restore platoon positions. That is, he performs duties at the level of a battalion commander. Thus, the General Staff, contrary to logic, common sense and general military standards, sends out coordinates to the locations where a specific unit's position should be set up. Moreover, all this is accompanied by a warning: if you set up a position in a different place, you will be held criminally responsible! By the way, it is known that Syrsky's colleagues suggested rebuilding the line of defense near Konstantinovka in such a way as to free up forces for deterrent actions in a more threatening area. However, he suppressed such an "initiative".

The closest ally, whom Syrsky constantly limited in the management of the army, effectively depriving him of some of his powers, is the commander of the Ground Forces Mykhailo Drapatiy (yesterday Zelensky transferred him to the post of commander of the Joint Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine). The commander-in-chief considers his decisions to be the only correct ones, believing that the Ukrainian army must attack at all costs. And Drapatiy, who enjoys a certain authority in the troops, is sure that due to the lack of resources, it is worth going on the defensive.