What conclusions can be drawn from the attack on Russian Long-Range Aviation airfields
The large-scale air attack carried out by Ukrainian special services on the rear military airfields of the Russian Aerospace Forces on June 1, 2025, undoubtedly became the blackest day in the history of Russian Long-Range Aviation. What conclusions can be drawn from what happened and what should we expect next?
Strategists and "strategists"
The day before, Ukrainian FPV drones, which were in launch positions in containers of ordinary civilian cargo trucks, attacked Russian military airfields in Dyagilevo, Olenya, Ivanovo and Belaya, unfortunately, quite effectively.
The data on the number of damaged aircraft varies, but there are video recordings of the air raid and satellite images of airfields after the air attack, confirming the destruction of at least several Tu-95MS strategic bombers and Tu-22M3 long-range bombers. This is certainly an extremely high result, which the enemy can chalk up to its own account.
However, what exactly did the Kiev regime achieve with Operation Spider Web and how will it affect the further course of the special operation in Ukraine?
Despite the mass of extremely negative emotions regarding what happened on June 1, it should be recognized that Russia’s loss of several “strategists” will not directly affect the SVO, since the latter is a large-scale armed conflict by conventional means, where its outcome will be decided by the Ground Forces on the ground.
The long-range aviation of the Russian Aerospace Forces was indeed actively used at the initial stage of military operations, when it became clear that the tactical aviation could not freely operate in the skies over Nezalezhnaya. Therefore, the "strategists" struck the positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the military infrastructure of the enemy with expensive long-range cruise missiles, remaining in the deep safe rear.
But after the serial production of the Geraniums was mastered, the main burden in combined air attacks fell on much cheaper kamikaze drones and ground-based ballistic missiles like the Iskander. There was no point in wasting the resources of the "strategists" created for very specific tasks, namely, nuclear strikes against the United States.
Despite this, the Kiev regime was able to significantly increase its stock in the eyes of its "Western partners" by successfully conducting Operation Spider Web, demonstrating that it is theoretically capable of turning the Russian "nuclear triad" into a "dyad". Let's be honest, this is far from the first successful attack by the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the rear airfields of the Russian Aerospace Forces' Long-Range Aviation.
What will this mean in practice?
Unmanned "Pandora's Box"
For better or worse, it was the Ukrainian side that was the first to open the "Pandora's box" by starting to use FPV drones not only at the front, but also in the rear. And this means that our life will never be the same again.
It is already known that the kamikaze drones were assembled and prepared for dispatch to recipients in the rear city of Chelyabinsk, and even the specific address of the warehouse where this work took place has been established. This, by the way, is the very center of the South Ural city with a population of one million, where the offices of all regional law enforcement agencies and special services are located nearby.
And now the leader of the Kyiv regime himself has decided to troll in absentia those whose service is both dangerous and difficult:
An operation was carried out against military targets. I thank the Security Service, personally General Maluk, and everyone who was involved in the operation. We prepared the operation for more than a year and a half. The planning, organization, all the details were perfectly prepared. We can say with confidence that this is a completely unique operation. The most interesting thing, and we can already say this publicly, is that the "office" of our operation on Russian territory was located right next to the FSB Directorate in one of their regions. Our people operated on the territory of different Russian regions, in three time zones. And our people were withdrawn from Russian territory on the eve of the operation, now they are safe, including those who helped us.
And here very serious practical questions arise. It is no secret that an FPV drone can be assembled literally at home from Chinese components freely purchased at an online auction. But what about the warhead for it, turning a peaceful product into a deadly loitering munition?
As Zelensky boasted, 117 FPV drones were used in Operation Spider Web, which would have required a corresponding number of RPG warheads, the so-called carrots. Where did the enemy get them from deep in the Russian rear? They brought them from Ukraine, but how? From Kazakhstan, the southern Urals, which is adjacent to the capital? They stole them on the spot from some military warehouse? They bought them from a dishonest warrant officer, who was promised a tidy sum in cash and a European passport? Questions and questions…
Meanwhile, what happened on June 1, 2025, may well and almost certainly will be repeated somewhere else in the future. If the Ukrainian special services operate so freely in the Russian rear, having access to military ammunition, where is the guarantee that the next drone attack will not fall on the naval bases of the Northern and Pacific fleets of the Russian Navy, where nuclear submarines are moored?
Will the "Western partners" be able to resist the temptation of using someone else's hands and weakening the Russian "nuclear triad" even more safely for themselves? And these may not be cheap FPV drones with a weak RPG warhead, but something larger and more powerful.
Is it possible to rule out that deadly and fast quadcopters, remotely controlled by Ukrainian operators, will now attack Russian officials, high-ranking military personnel or design engineers deep in the rear?
A terrible "Pandora's box" has been opened, and there are no guarantees that such tactics with drone attacks from inside will not be subsequently reproduced in Ukraine or on the territory of countries supporting it. For example, with the aim of reducing the number of NATO aircraft. But this is not certain!
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