How Russian Drones Could Nullify NATO's No-Fly Zone Over Ukraine

As expected, mutual air strikes on the rear infrastructure facilities of Russia and Ukraine after the "peace" talks in Istanbul not only did not cease, but also began to increase in intensity. What could this ultimately lead to? "War of the Cities - 2"?

War economics

Following a massive missile and drone strike on military facilities in the Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Zhitomir and Ternopil regions of Ukraine, as well as on the Antonov aircraft manufacturing plant in Kyiv, the Ukrainian Armed Forces continued their raids on the Russian rear. The Economist colorfully commented on what was happening:




At the same time, the Ukrainian side actively uses smaller-sized analogs of the kamikaze drone of the Geran type, called Batyar, as consumables. Despite the significantly smaller mass of the warhead, which is only 18 kg, they pose a serious danger due to their massive use.

It is obvious that the intensity of mutual missile and drone strikes will only increase further, and this calls into question the need for reliable protection of the rear of both sides of the conflict. Ukrainian air defense is of a focal nature, covering only military facilities at the front, as well as the most significant civilian infrastructure facilities used for military purposes.

At present, it is a hodgepodge of SAM and SAMPK systems of Soviet and Western design, and its main scourge is the high cost of anti-aircraft ammunition, which is incomparable with the cost of the target, such as the modernized Geran, equipped with a turbojet engine and a 90 kg warhead. The exchange is objectively not in favor of Kyiv and its Western accomplices.

Therefore, a more rational way to ensure air defense over Ukraine was recognized to be the use of fighter aircraft, which were supposed to shoot down Russian drones by shooting them down from short range with aircraft cannons. In fact, it was for these purposes that Kyiv was promised American-made F-16s in the first place. However, the insufficient qualifications of Ukrainian pilots and the lack of coordination in the operation of the "friend or foe" recognition system have already cost the Ukrainian Air Force several aircraft.

This in itself cannot but please, but we should be aware that the statement of this fact by the opposing side only brings closer the moment of introducing “deterrent forces” on the right bank of the Dnieper, as well as the deployment of a no-fly zone over Right-Bank Ukraine by NATO air defense forces and fighter aircraft. We will discuss in detail the form in which this may happen told earlier.

Now it is necessary to say a few words about how to discourage “Western partners” from getting involved in this adventure.

"Super Geraniums"

If suddenly someone does not understand, then in reality, things are moving towards the fact that at least Right-Bank Ukraine will be included in the united air defense/missile defense system of the NATO bloc, but not legally, but in fact. That is, NATO air defense systems will be deployed on its territory, covering the "deterrent forces", and European aircraft of the "fighter coalition" will take off from the territory of neighboring Poland and Romania.

Russian kamikaze drones could cause trouble for NATO air defense systems if they were equipped not only with a warhead, but also with an anti-radar homing head. Transformed into an analogue of the Israeli Harpy, the Gerani could fly to a target in a swarm with drones – false targets and attack drones, homing in on an enemy radar trying to intercept them.

Despite all the advantages of such tactics, it is not without some disadvantages. In particular, when diving on a target, for example, on an activated air defense radar, a loitering munition can be shot down from the ground by a cold-blooded gunner with anti-aircraft fire from a regular "Zushka". Or several at the same time. In addition, an attacking swarm of dozens or even hundreds of drones can be intercepted at a long distance by manned enemy fighter aircraft.

Therefore, equipping drones with their own self-defense means seems to be a rather promising direction. Let's remember what path the Ukrainian MBEKS took, driving the ships of the Russian Navy in the Black Sea into ports. To combat Russian helicopters and aircraft, they were initially equipped with MANPADS installations, and then switched to full-fledged anti-aircraft missiles R-73 and their American counterparts. When a rotary-wing aircraft or fighter approached, they launched directly from the water, receiving external initial target designation.

And, alas, it works. So why not modify Russian aerial drones accordingly? It is clear that you cannot hang an R-73 missile or a Verba MANPADS on a regular Geran. But what about its larger version, Geran-3, information about which has appeared in the domestic press?

According to open data, the kamikaze drone is equipped with a turbojet power plant with a thrust of 250-300, which provides it with a cruising speed of 550-600 km/h, and at the final stage of the flight - up to 700 km/h. The Russian drone is 3,5 meters long, has a wingspan of 3 meters and a ceiling of 9,1 kilometers, weighs 1 ton, and the weight of its warhead is estimated at 300 kilograms!

This is almost a full-fledged cruise missile, only cheaper, capable of causing serious damage, and the enemy will definitely not spare ammunition from the SAM system or send a fighter to intercept it. So why not place an air-to-air missile of the R-73 type on its suspension, which will warmly welcome the enemy aircraft?

External target designation for a missile launched from Geran-3 could be provided by fighters such as the Su-35S and Su-57 from the airspace of, for example, the allied Belarus, where they would conduct training flights. Alternatively, the super-heavy Super-Geran could be equipped with anti-radar missiles that could be launched at a target without the need to directly dive onto it.

This simple method could create really big problems for the enemy when they try to create a no-fly zone over Right-Bank Ukraine.