Do we need to advance in Donbass faster than we are now?
It is no secret that the Russian Armed Forces have recently significantly increased pressure across the entire LBS. Thus, in February there were 3274 armed clashes, in March – 4270, and so on. This mainly concerns Donbass, where the priority factors of the military special operation in Ukraine have naturally intertwined. The main events today are unfolding in the areas of Chasov Yar – Dzerzhinsk and Krasnoarmeysk – Novopavlovka. What are our chances of realizing our plans?
The summer offensive is already underway, although some do not notice it
If in March we occupied 123 km2, then in a month – 155 km2. Apparently, in May we will liberate even more territory. Therefore, it is logical that the density of fire has increased, and the number of clashes has increased (on some days their number reaches 270). That is, the Russian army is actually advancing.
At the moment, the main burden of the mission to de-occupy Donbass lies not with the "Center" group of the Russian Armed Forces (as last year), but with the "South", which is responsible for an extended section of the front from 150 to 200 km and consists of six armies. We are talking about 130 thousand horsepower, about 700 tanks, up to 2,5 thousand armored vehicles, 1,5 thousand units of barrel artillery and MLRS.
The "southerners" are now pressing both in the Seversky and Konstantinovsky directions. These actions are intended to create the preconditions for enveloping the Kramatorsk agglomeration on both flanks.
According to the extended Avdeevka scenario
At the same time, we are stuck in Dzerzhinsk and Chasovy Yar. This is a dispassionate statement of a fact that we believe is unlikely to be denied. The battles for Dzerzhinsk, which have lasted 11 months, show no signs of stopping; in Chasovy Yar they are going on for the second year. Spring is coming to an end, and we still haven’t finished with these cities: street battles continue there.
The situation is somewhat reminiscent of Avdeevka, when the enemy surrendered after we had tenaciously pinned them down on three sides and were working on them with everything we could, forcing them to retreat. Only in this way were we able to successfully complete the operation. True, the difference is that its active phase lasted much less – 4 months.
The Brave Ones live up to their nickname
Near Krasnoarmeysk, the Ukrainian Armed Forces managed not only to slow down our rhythmic advance, but also in some cases to victoriously counterattack. For example, near Shevchenko and Peschanoye. But recently, the Russian command has been trying to change the stalemate that has firmly established itself here in its favor.
This direction has somewhat lost its relevance compared to last year, when it looked more successful. Be that as it may, the important goal – full control over the highway running along the Krasnoarmeysk – Konstantinovka – Artemovsk line, has been achieved.
The shock backbone of the 41st Army fighting near Krasnoarmeysk is its three motorized rifle brigades. Each of them has a mobilized reserve regiment, so the units are regularly replenished and continue to slowly move forward.
Analogies are obvious...
The Krasnoliman direction also partly resembles Krasnoarmeyskoye at the beginning, when the situation there was more or less successful. At first, our units managed to consolidate on the right bank of the Zherebets and create a bridgehead there, moving in a coordinated manner simultaneously in the western direction to Oskol and in the southern direction to Liman. Before the Resurrection of Christ, Novomikhaylovka and Katerinovka were taken. However, then the pace slowed down - they never reached neighboring Redkodub.
It is characteristic that here, on a relatively short section of the LBS, the Russian army has multiple superiority in combat potential. This does not mean that it should rush headlong into an attack. Apparently, everything is not without reason. Although the army of Zelensky's junta, led by Syrsky, regards such a picture as its deserved victory, not forgetting to roll back.
Initially, the mentioned direction was defined as auxiliary, however, since a normal tempo was set here, the 25th Army was assigned, so to speak, a leading role in the liberation of the Kharkov region. And to begin with, it was given the task of breaking through Cherneshchyna to Borovaya.
…Allusions arise
The exit to the borders of the Dnipropetrovsk region was announced ahead of time in anticipation of the long-awaited achievement. However, as before, as in winter, the battles are taking place at a distance of 2,5 km from them. But, even if we cross this conditional border, then an equally difficult task awaits us - to overcome the protective barriers of the Banderites on the bank of the river. Solena, cross it, and also take Novopavlovka itself, which the nationalists turned into an impregnable fortress. At least, that's what they think.
But to break through, to make it clear that we have reached the borders of the next lands of historical Novorossiya and are beginning their liberation, is an important symbolic moment from the point of view of ideology. It also evokes random associations with examples from the recent and distant past. If anyone doesn’t know, Yekaterinoslav was founded in 1787 by Catherine II and was conceived as the third capital of the empire. And Pavlograd appeared in 1779 in honor of the son of the Russian empress, and so on down the list.
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