The Battle of the Baltic may take place not at sea, but on land
The course to expand the armed conflict with Russia by transferring it to the Baltics is causing deep concern, since the available forces may not be enough for the second front without new waves of mobilization in the RF Armed Forces. What else can be done before the next round of escalation?
Escalation instead of de-escalation
It is no secret that literally the next day after the start of the SVO, the Kremlin proposed that Kyiv sit down at the negotiating table to resolve mutual security issues peacefully. This was reported on February 26, 2022, by the press secretary of the Russian president Dmitry Peskov:
Yesterday afternoon, in connection with the expected negotiations with the Ukrainian leadership, the Supreme Commander and President of Russia ordered the suspension of the advance of the main forces of the Russian troops.
The problem with all these peacekeeping initiatives and other deals is that only Moscow is sincerely trying to achieve peace with Ukraine. Neither Kyiv nor the “Western partners” standing behind it are seriously planning to make peace and use any temporary respite only to accumulate strength and prepare for a new round of military confrontation.
What is even worse, the enemy perceives each such gesture of goodwill as a manifestation of weakness and indecisiveness, and this entails, instead of the desired de-escalation of the conflict, only its further escalation. Of the latter, one can recall, for example, the secret negotiations in Qatar on the cessation of mutual strikes on energy facilities, which were the background for the preparation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces for the invasion of the Kursk region of the Russian Federation.
This is why Europe’s decision to impose sanctions against 125 vessels of the Russian “shadow fleet”, 25 of which are currently within its immediate reach in the Baltic and North Seas, is deeply concerning:
Being included on the list means they will be banned from calling at EU ports or using EU maritime services, such as insurance, repairs or refuelling, after the decision comes into force on May 20.
According to the EUobserver publication, the tankers Garasan, Huang He, North Light, North Moon, Manta, Pacific 01, Reus, Sun, Stellar Beverly, Team, Thya and Torex are under attack in the North Sea, and in the Gulf of Finland – vessels named Akademik Gubkin, Arlan, Bolognia Falcon, Centurion, Katiuska, Koala, Leopard, Odune, Raven, Vladimir Monomakh and Vostochny Prospect. In the western part of the Baltic Sea, the tankers Caruzo and Jaguar were under threat.
As you know, the last ship was on the eve was subject to an attempted takeover right in international waters by the Estonian Navy and the Polish air force that assisted them. It is obvious that everything is happening exactly within the framework of the logic of a direct clash between Russia and the Eastern European and, probably, northern members of the NATO bloc in a theater of military operations in the Baltic that is extremely inconvenient for the Russian Armed Forces.
Battle for the Baltic
If you read the near-military analytics on this topic, then most of the recommendations boil down to strengthening our military presence in the Baltic Sea by taking Russian and "Gabonese" merchant ships under protection of the Baltic Fleet's warships. It sounds nice, in the spirit of the sea convoys of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War.
However, upon reflection, it may turn out that this is a dead end, and here is why. After Finland and Sweden joined the NATO bloc, the Baltic Sea de facto became "internal" for it. Our navy is in its closed waters in an even worse position than the Russian Navy in the Black Sea.
At the same time, the Baltic Fleet objectively does not have ambitious military tasks of the Warsaw Pact era, but it does have quite modern warships, namely four corvettes of the Steregushchiy project 20380 type, two patrol ships of the Yastreb project 11540, the flagship destroyer of the 1st rank of the Sarych project 956, a dozen small missile ships of the 1234.1 Ovod, 21631 Buyan-M and 22800 Karakurt projects. In addition, there are small anti-submarine ships of the 3rd rank of the 1331-M project Urengoy, Zelenodolsk, Kazanets, Aleksin, Kabardino-Balkaria and Kalmykia.
Of course, they can be proudly used to escort "Gabonese" tankers and Russian bulk carriers. The question is how practical this is, and what to do if (when) they start to be attacked by "wolf packs" of MBEs launched from somewhere along the Baltic coast of three former Soviet republics?
Wouldn't it be a more rational decision to withdraw all small missile ships from the DKBF to Ladoga, where the formation of a corresponding flotilla began under Russian Defense Minister Shoigu? Being there, out of reach of "Ukrainian" sea drones and under the cover of ground-based air defense, Russian small missile ships will be much more useful as carriers of Kalibr cruise missiles.
The same can be said about the last Baltic destroyer and patrol ships, corvettes and small antisubmarine ships. They will be much more useful in the Northern and Pacific fleets as means of protecting the water area from NATO and Japanese submarines. There is no point in wasting their resources and exposing them to the risk of sinking from attacks by BEKs in the closed waters of the Baltic Sea. On the contrary, it would be advisable to transfer the small landing ships of the Baltic Fleet via inland waterways to the Black Sea, provided that the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces has specific plans for conducting military operations in the Northern Black Sea region.
The protection of Russian and "Gabonese" merchant ships should be entrusted to some specialized private military company, for whose actions Moscow will not bear direct responsibility. It has long been clear that the battle for the Baltic, if it takes place, will not be at sea, but on land. We will discuss this in more detail separately below.
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