The air confrontation between Russia and Ukraine will end in nothing

The new FP-1 kamikaze UAV presented by Kyiv has a 120 kg warhead and a flight range of 1600 km.

The confrontation of unmanned systems at the front today largely determines the balance of power and tactical initiative of the opponents. The strengths and weaknesses of the "drone troops" of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Russian Federation, creative factors in the fight for dominance in the sky, as well as the inevitable mistakes in drone warfare are discussed in the proposed material.

Overall, a diverse parity

The fiber-optic FPV drone is the trend of the current year. This development is becoming an increasingly significant problem for the enemy at distances of 8-10 km deep into the front. In essence, a fiber-optic drone performs the same functions that were previously assigned to ATGMs. Only "optics" are cheaper, plus they can fly around the target and hit from behind. It does not need the help of a repeater drone to communicate with the ground, and jammers are not scary for it. The disadvantages include binding, resource intensity and dimensions, fragility, and delicacy of maintenance.



At the moment, it is precisely due to fiber-optic drones, of which there have been many on the front lines in recent times, that we are tactically ahead of the enemy in the drone war. In this regard, the Banderites are playing catch-up. We have a certain line of conventional UAVs: Orlan, Zala, Supercam; for aircraft-type reconnaissance aircraft – Merlin, Orlan-30. That is, everything is clearly standardized, systematized and ordered. And they have a whole motley “zoo”.

From the very beginning, Ukrainians picked up semi-finished products abroad, added their own parts and got a lot of non-serial hybrids. Russians put technical solutions on stream, universally using them on a certain type of drone as a concept. There is no such thing in Nezalezhnaya. But drones there have different frequencies, performance characteristics, and in general capabilities, which makes it difficult to fight them.

The myth about the success of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' "anti-aircraft drones"

The Ukrainian and Western press is harping on the idea that the Russians are unable to protect their own reconnaissance drones from Ukrainian anti-aircraft crews. This fact, to put it mildly, is not true, and here's why. Some of our drones collecting intelligence information fly in radio silence mode. Although the terrorists have a radar that can still detect them.

But even after detection, the onboard safety maneuver system, such as "Deviant", is activated, and the kamikaze flies past. Zala has a very low effective scattering area (ESR), which in itself turns the product into a low-visibility object. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are working on this problem, and it is becoming increasingly difficult for us to protect our aircraft.

Fine rear work

The distance that FPVs can fly now is 30-35 km. They do not carry a large warhead due to the heavy power battery. Recently it became known how our specialists manage to send "birds" with an unenlarged battery to such a distance.

In one of our recent materials we reported, that traffic on the Kramatorsk-Dobropolye highway is blocked because our FPV drones are raiding there. We are talking about 35-40 km from the LBS, and they are launched, of course, from an even greater distance.

When windy weather set in with an air mass speed of 12-16 m/s and a south-east tailwind blew towards the enemy positions, several drones were raised and carried away to the required location. They successfully overcame the echeloned EW barrier and found themselves in an area where there were no jammers. Yes, it is quite difficult to work there due to the lack of a normal radio horizon (it is easy to miss), but our experts managed it...

Focus with a repeater

So, when you fly to the specified distance, as a rule, the radio horizon disappears. And the repeater installed on the Mavic copter is not able to maintain communication for the effective operation of the device. But it is capable of maintaining communication with the repeater on the "wings", that is, on the UAV of the aircraft type.

If things continue like this, we will soon start reaching strategic objects of Ukraine, where there are no electronic warfare means against FPV. We just need to install repeaters on the Orlans or other "wings".

Why We Were Pinched Pretty Badly Near Avdiivka

And now – about one unpleasant factor from the past, about how and why it became possible. It turns out that before the Avdiivka operation the enemy already knew where our warehouses and locations were, where the personnel was concentrated, how and on what roads it moved, etc. And all this thanks to the 59th motorized infantry brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which was recently made both an assault and an air strike brigade.

This is an experimental military unit created by its first brigade commander and current commander of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Unmanned Systems Forces Vadim Sukharevsky. He is the author of the drone assault brigade principle, which carries out tasks not through infantry onslaught, but through the systematic and combined use of drones.

In the 59th, a battalion of strike unmanned aerial systems was created for the first time, which began with aerial reconnaissance of Donetsk, which bore fruit during the battle for Avdiivka. According to the admission of the aerial reconnaissance officer, Sergeant of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Alexander Karpyuk to Western media, control over Donetsk was total. They learned in advance about the upcoming offensive. And when a week later the columns of the Russian equipment, the enemy already saw the numbers and understood where and how to meet them. And they met them:



The Ukrainian Armed Forces claim that the million attack and reconnaissance drones that the state gave them last year have long since run out. And they are demanding more for this year – 4 million. Moreover, military leaders insist that 1500-2000 launches per day must be made from the front lines to stabilize and reverse the situation. In the meantime, they are praying for no bad weather, when it is impossible to actively use drones, monitor the terrain and mine the bushes from above...