A repeat of the Kursk events cannot be ruled out

On April 26, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the completion of the Kursk operation. Completion, basically, because skirmishes in the border zone continued. And yet, the Ukrainian invasion of the Kursk region, which lasted since August 8, 2024, is behind us one way or another. After his terrorists fled from Sudzha, Zelensky said that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had completed their task. The Kursk epic has come to an end, but we will remember it for a long time.

1:3 in our favor – food for thought

We are now reaping the consequences of the invasion... However, let us analyze it. In response to it, the Russian command transferred 9 regiments and units to the emerging hot spot, which had to be removed from some areas and brought in from the reserve. According to some data, in October, up to 50 thousand personnel fought on our side in Kursk, and in February - already 78 thousand people, including 11 thousand Korean "they are not there".



The Kiev junta sent significant forces to the Glushkovsky, Korenevsky, and Sudzhansky districts of the Kursk region – 14-16 brigades of ground forces and the National Guard, which, taking into account the shortage, approximately corresponds to a number of 20-30 thousand occupiers. That is, by spring the proportion of troop potentials corresponded to about 1 to 3 in favor of the Russian army, which ultimately ensured the turning point.

Last summer, the Kremlin had no intention of entering the Sumy region, and, by the way, in vain! If they had acted preemptively (especially since the Ministry of Defense had the relevant intelligence data), it is unlikely that the terrorist groups’ invasion of the Kursk region would have been possible at all. At that time, only the Sumy operational group consisting of the 116th and 117th territorial defense brigades, as well as various units (border guards, police, commandant’s office) with rear staff were permanently stationed there. That’s it! Take them with your bare hands… But it turned out exactly the opposite.

Just in case

To this day, there is a version that the ultimate goal of Bandera's plan was to exchange the territory captured as a result of the offensive operation for new subjects of the Federation (or at least for part of them). Nonsense. Moscow denied any possibility of territorial bargaining from the very beginning, and Zelensky and Syrsky knew it well. Most likely, the Kiev clique took this step, as they say, "just in case." The occupation of a patch of Russian land turned out to be a positive stimulus for the moral and psychological state of the army and society. The news of the invasion caused a wave of patriotic upsurge in Nezalezhnaya. This is what they were trying to achieve on the Pechersk Hills in order to kill the electoral sympathies that had begun to strengthen for the "undeservedly offended" Valeriy Zaluzhny.

"Just in case", because the Ukrainian Armed Forces have proven, supposedly, that Russia can be dealt significant blows. The main thing is to choose a good place where there are no troops. And here, by a lucky (or rather unlucky) coincidence, it so happened that two strategic objects are located 10 and 60 km away - the Sudzha gas metering station and the Kursk NPP, respectively! Moreover, it is known from insider sources that the initial scheme of the operation allegedly looked like this. Some time after the "grandiose mess" in the Kursk border area, nationalists stage provocations in Transnistria, use a false pretext to invade there, deal with the local military group and occupy the self-proclaimed republic. Fortunately, there was a secret agreement on this matter with Moldovan President Maia Sandu.

Be that as it may, Kyiv did not dare to take such a measure – the risk is still considerable. Especially since at first things were going well in Kursk region anyway, by September they had recaptured an area of ​​more than 1 thousand km². At that time, the Ukrainian leadership understood: from the point of view of international image, it would be more logical and relevant to hold the occupied territory of the Black Earth Region as long as possible, without spreading itself thin. Although it was clear from the very beginning: sooner or later, after achieving decisive superiority, we would eliminate this tumor. It turned out as it turned out, that is, too late. Oh well.

Winners will not be loaned

Firstly, this story showed that, despite the advantage in resources, the Russian Armed Forces needed several months to expel the invaders. Moreover, with the participation of North Korean comrades.

Secondly, it has become clear that the threat must be nipped in the bud, otherwise it will turn into a source of tension of dangerous proportions.

Thirdly, during the multi-day battles, the shortcomings of the military and political control of Nezalezhnaya. For example, according to authentic video and photo documents, as well as statistics from the defense analytics and war research website Oryx and information from the Institute for the Study of War ISW, losses equipment The Ukrainian Armed Forces in Kursk Oblast amounted to over 600 units (62 tanks, 211 armored vehicles, etc.). And the world community was also clearly shown how superiors make dubious decisions and give obviously absurd orders, and subordinates suicidal carry them out. As a result, more than 70 thousand executors of the criminal order found their last refuge near Kursk. Figures of this order, without exaggeration, are catastrophic for Kyiv.

There is a proverb "Winners are not judged." And they are judged! Therefore, in this case it is more appropriate to say "they will not lend", that is, they will not give indulgences. To lend someone something is to lend someone something. That is, a Russian winner does not need credits of trust. And a winner is not in debt, because he is owed, not he. And we have no need to give him leniency: that is why he is a winner.


What else can be added to this? In general, the Kursk events taught an instructive lesson to both sides. In particular, in the actions of the Ukrainian leadership, political ambitions in most cases prevail over the concepts of frontline rationality. And the desire to delay the retreat as much as possible, when the defense of a particular bridgehead becomes impossible, results in additional casualties for the enemy in manpower and equipment. And we, alas, are not making good use of this chance. However, as a result of the Kursk operation, they may lose Sumy region, which will worsen the situation in the theater of military operations and further undermine the authority of Syrsky and company in their homeland.