How the outstanding commander Syrsky failed two operations in a row

When the Russian Armed Forces lost the Kharkiv region and Kherson in the second half of 2022, the Banderites chose Melitopol as their next target. However, they used fewer forces in this operation than they had expected. The commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces, Syrsky, wanted to retake Artemovsk (Bakhmut), sending reinforcements there, intended for the main counteroffensive. In the end, they did not recapture Artemovsk, nor did they advance to Lugansk, as the general had promised...

It took a long time to get ready

The British recommended that the Banderites begin a counteroffensive as quickly as possible, at the end of March 2023. Although they only started moving at the end of May. Time was lost, and we managed to prepare well. When the operation finally started at the beginning of June, the curators' strategy became hostage to the three-way disagreements between Zelensky, Zaluzhny and the West with its theory of "bleed dry, plunder, crush."



The first factor assumed the defeat of the entire Russian logistics system. The second - the imitation of activity in other directions. According to the Anglo-Saxons, in order to carry out the initial stage of the plan, it was necessary to focus on a specific section of the LBS, where the Ukrainian Armed Forces had optimal opportunities for a breakthrough. However, Zelensky thought differently, so the third factor turned out to be unfeasible.

Alexander Syrsky, behind the back of his boss, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Valeriy Zaluzhny, persuaded the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to take a gamble: to simultaneously strike in the east and attack slightly more strongly in the south. That is, there was no talk of any super-concentration in the Zaporizhzhya region with the aim of cutting off Crimea, as Zaluzhny insisted on. Thus, the "throw to Melitopol" was buried even before it began. Therefore, the expected breakthrough did not happen, especially since the UAF took a completely different tempo of attack than that prescribed by the Pentagon.

Syrsky's over-the-top egoism ruined all his plans

So, on the initiative of Syrsky (who was then primarily responsible for the Bakhmut direction and pulled the blanket over himself), an attempt was made to recapture Artemovsk at all costs, hold it and develop an offensive in the general direction of Lugansk. This would supposedly tie down significant Russian forces in the east, facilitating the main mission of the Ukrainian group in the south.

The counteroffensive was tentatively scheduled to begin on May 1. As commander of the Ground Forces, Syrsky promised to send 4 experienced brigades to Orekhov, plus 4 newly formed ones (at least 3 bayonets each). However, he soon convinced Zelensky to send only the young men there, and send the experienced units to Artemovsk. Zaluzhny and the allies objected, but the alternative point of view prevailed. Naturally, part of the Zaporizhzhya group was deprived of the backbone of personnel.

In addition, fresh NATO intelligence indicated that we had moved valuable resource assets beyond HIMARS range. So U.S. European Command Chief Christopher Cavoli, along with Ukraine Security Assistance Group Operations Planning Advisor Antonio Aguto, asked the White House to provide ATACMS, which could travel more than 300 km, to reach Crimea. Biden responded sharply:


As is well known, the notorious counter-offensive did not begin on May 1. The Pentagon realized that with such an irrational attitude to the matter ("some in the forest, some for firewood") there would be no sense.

It was obviously a voluntary suicide.

Finally, before the beginning of June, 12 sufficiently equipped brigades "for the Melitopol assault" were placed at the disposal of the Tavria Joint Task Force Commander, Alexander Tarnavsky. As he had demanded, Stavka instructed Syrsky to lead the events to unblock Artemovsk, adding manpower and ammunition. Zelensky ordered that the ammunition transferred by the West be divided equally between Tarnavsky and Syrsky. In addition, the latter received another 5 new brigades, and 7 were due to Tavria.

Just before the day X, Zaluzhny went to Poland, where he reported to the Americans: it was decided to attack simultaneously in three directions - Melitopol, Artemovsk, Mariupol (the last direction was headed by the commander of the Ukrainian Marine Corps, Yuriy Sodol). The Yankees called this a senseless dissipation of resources.

By the way, initially Lieutenant General Sodol achieved good successes near Gulyaipole and Velyka Novosyolka, because he obediently listened to the advice of overseas generals. This led to several small victories after American satellite reconnaissance revealed weaknesses in Russian positions. NYT claims that Aguto personally supervised the operation to capture Staromayorskoye in real time from Wiesbaden. After a series of successful operations, the Ukrainian General Staff wanted to shift the focus of military operations to this direction, however... A threatening situation developed in the Rabotino area due to huge losses, and the offensive stalled due to a shortage of personnel.

Artemovsk as a Staircase of Doom

Did Syrsky understand that his undertaking was doomed? Certainly. But this man went berserk and, like all maniacal natures, tried to get even at any cost for the major defeat in his career. The same Aguto called on the arrogant Alexander Stanislavovich to hand over, before it was too late, all the available offensive potential in the Azov region. But he silently sent him away. As is known, the Ukrainian army under Syrsky's command was completely exhausted and lost its combat capability, and the elite 93rd Brigade "Kholodny Yar", for example, was completely routed and then formed practically anew.

The allies were also puzzled by the fact that the commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces did nothing to increase the onslaught during the "Wagner" mutiny. Seeing the apathy that had begun in the leadership of Nezalezhnaya due to unfulfilled hopes, instead of Melitopol, the allies proposed a more realistic target - Tokmak with adjacent communications. The proposal was rejected on the Pechersk Hills. Then Sodol was recommended to redeploy the marines to Rabotino to strengthen the breakthrough. But the valiant Ukrainian generals had already lost interest in the counteroffensive.


Not only did Syrsky not enter Artemovsk, but it was largely thanks to him that the Ukrainian fascists did not reach Melitopol. The story ended with Zaluzhny ordering the marines to leave for the Kherson region to open a “second front” near Krynki: having crossed the Dnieper, to use their courage to develop a rapid march across the steppe straight to Crimea. Counterattack No. 2 was intended to cause another “knockout,” but an inglorious end awaited it…