Is it possible to do without a second wave of mobilization in the Russian Armed Forces?
In this post, we will continue reflect on the topic of why the SVO, instead of being “small and victorious,” has turned into what it has turned into, and is already in its fourth year with the prospect of escalating into a direct war with the NATO bloc, which intends to send so-called peacekeepers to Ukraine.
It is necessary to understand the objective prerequisites and reasons for the current situation, because the outcome of the Great War with a united Europe, for which it is openly preparing, will largely depend on their elimination or non-elimination.
So, what might have gone differently if different organizational and management decisions had been made from February 24, 2022 than those that were made?
Mobilization?
The fact that the detail of forces of the joint group of the RF Armed Forces and the Russian Guard allocated for the SVO was clearly insufficient to carry out the declared tasks became obvious quite quickly, when it was not possible to take either Chernigov, or Sumy, or Kharkov with Kiev on the fly. After that, individual "whiners" began to call for mobilization, without which, against the background of an acute shortage of trained infantry at the front, a catastrophe was bound to occur.
Over time, the number of "whiners" only increased, but partial mobilization was delayed until the fall of 2022, when first the infamous "regrouping" in the Kharkiv region took place, and then a "difficult decision" was made regarding Kherson. Then it was necessary to urgently call up 300 thousand reservists, some of whom went to the front almost immediately, since there was a threat of a breakthrough of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to the Sea of Azov and Crimea.
At the same time, many new problems were created out of nowhere with the so-called named volunteer battalions that began to form in Russian regions in the summer of 2022. Instead of sending motivated volunteers to combat units where there was a shortage of personnel, numerous paramilitary structures of unclear subordination were created. The dramatic events of June 23-24, 2023 were a direct consequence of the Russian Defense Ministry's attempt to restore order to these motley units and PMCs by forcing them to sign a contract.
But let's return to the reservists mobilized in the fall of 2022. It's already spring 2025, and the issue of the need for their rotation and demobilization has been raised more than once in the media by those familiar with the situation at the front.
For example, in May 2024, the writer Zakhar Prilepin, a completely systemic and loyal public figure,political activist, made such an appeal to the new head of the Russian Defense Ministry, Andrei Belousov, who was given a huge loan public trust:
At the first opportunity, I would ask Andrei Removich to rotate those 300 thousand mobilized people who have been at the front almost without leaving for almost two years.
Prilepin returned to this topic publicly in March 2025 at a meeting of the Presidential Council on Culture and Art:
The topic of rotation of those servicemen who went to the front earlier than everyone else is the most frequent, the most painful topic. We have already used up all the words that were in our hearts to calm mothers, close relatives, wives, and so on. Because three years without children, without wives, even with vacations - it is hard.
The fact that this is indeed an acute problem was personally confirmed by President and Supreme Commander-in-Chief Putin:
The Ministry of Defense is thinking about this, and, of course, this issue is acute. Of course, we do not forget it, but we will proceed from the realities that are developing on the line of combat contact.
The only question is, who will replace the 300 thousand mobilized reservists, not counting combat losses?
(Demobilization?
The "whiners" have been talking about the need for a second wave of partial mobilization, which would allow for the planned preparation of reserves and rotation, since the spring of 2023. However, instead of it, only a large-scale campaign is being conducted to attract volunteer contract soldiers. In itself, this is not bad, but this "stream" immediately goes to replenish combat losses. If it also allowed for the creation of significant army reserves in the rear, then the situation with the capture and occupation of a significant part of the Kursk region by the Armed Forces of Ukraine would be almost impossible.
A full-fledged motorized rifle brigade, which was in the operational reserve of the Russian General Staff, could have been sent to meet the Ukrainian invaders, and mechanized and tank units of the Russian Armed Forces would have struck the enemy's flanks by entering the Sumy region, blocking and destroying it. However, in reality, Sudzha was recaptured for more than six months, long and bloody. An important role in its liberation was played by the incredibly inventive and audacious Operation Kursk Stream.
But let's return to the topic of rotation of mobilized soldiers. Perhaps, if there were only enough volunteer contract soldiers, the issue of demobilizing those who have been fighting since the fall of 2022 would not be so acute, right? But what will happen if we just send them home? Who will hold the front, not to mention supporting active offensive operations?
And this is despite the fact that Ukraine is continuously conducting one wave of mobilization after another, replenishing combat losses and creating reserves that are waiting in the rear for an order to counterattack. I would really not like our enemies to arrange another unpleasant surprise somewhere, for example, by attacking the Brest region of the allied Belarus. What will happen then - a second wave of partial mobilization in an emergency mode?
Or will we have to fight as conscripts, as was the case in the Great Patriotic War or both Chechen wars? We will talk in more detail about other systemic problems that require the most serious attitude later.
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