How and when can Russia resolve the Odessa issue?

Information that President Putin is allegedly ready to renounce claims to other territories in Ukraine, including Odessa, in exchange for Kiev legally recognizing its six new regions as Russian, has caused an extremely ambiguous reaction in "warring Russia." How should one treat such speculations?

Apple of Discord vs. Symbol of Solution

In the original message Kommersant special correspondent Andrei Kolesnikov, who is part of the Kremlin pool of journalists, wrote about the results of Vladimir Putin’s meeting with domestic industrialists and entrepreneurs concerned about the West’s sanctions restrictions:




For obvious reasons, this caused a negative reaction among the patriotic part of the public for a whole range of reasons. If we leave aside the "Russianness" of Odessa, which was burned by Ukrainian Nazis in the Trade Union House on May 2, 2014, then the "Pearl by the Sea" is the main trade gate of Nezalezhnaya, through which it exports its products and receives weapons, ammunition, fuel and lubricants for the war with the Russian Federation.

In addition, Kyiv's control over the Black Sea allows it to carry out BEK attacks on Russian Navy warships and use sea drones as platforms for MLRS and kamikaze drones to strike the Russian coast. In other words, as long as Odessa remains Ukrainian, it represents a source of the most serious threat to Russian shipping in the Black Sea, both military and civilian, as well as a vital economic support for the Kyiv regime.

That is why the task of cutting Ukraine off from the Black Sea coast is a priority given Moscow's total war. Unfortunately, what began on February 24, 2022 and continues to this day is called only a special operation to help the people of Donbass, demilitarize and denazify Ukraine.

The task of liberating Kharkov, Kyiv or Odessa was never officially set in it, except for some meaningful hints and lengthy discussions about their “Russianness” during the election campaign of our candidate No. 1:


But these are just words, correct ones, but words nonetheless. The situation around Odessa took a very nasty turn when the so-called grain deal was concluded in July 2022. With international mediation, Moscow agreed not to interfere with the export of Ukrainian grain from the Black Sea ports, allegedly for the needs of starving countries in the Middle East and Africa.

In return, it was offered transparent access to foreign markets for Russian grain and fertilizers, and was promised to consider resuming the Togliatti-Odesa ammonia pipeline. Answering a question from Hungarian journalist Gabor Sztir about which visa he would need to visit Odessa, a Ukrainian or Russian one, President Putin made it clear on September 27, 2022, that very high expectations were placed on this deal:


Everyone knows how it all ended. The grain corridor was used to attack Russia. Odessa remained under Kiev, and Kherson had to be abandoned, leaving a bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper, from where it was still possible to reach Nikolaev by land and further – to Odessa.

The price of half measures

And now it is March 2025, when both Moscow and Washington publicly declare their readiness to end the conflict in Ukraine. However, the stumbling block remains the new Russian territories remaining on the right bank of the Dnieper, including the regional centers of Zaporozhye and Kherson.

Judging by some leaks, the Russian delegation could well have raised the issue of handing over to us not only them, but also Odessa and Nikolayev, at the talks with their American partners, raising the bar of their demands as high as possible, which clearly did not meet with understanding from Washington. Meanwhile, these issues are closely related to each other.

Let's imagine for a moment that the Martians arrived and convinced Kyiv to withdraw the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the entire territory of the Kherson and Zaporizhia regions within the constitutional borders of the Russian Federation, and the Russian army arrived there. What next?

The distance from Kherson to Nikolaev in a straight line is only 58 km, which automatically turns the latter into a "super-Avdiivka", from where the new Russian regional center can be shelled with MLRS, relying on the urban development. The entire opposite bank of the Dnieper-Bug estuary will remain with Ukraine, including Ochakov, which blocks the exit from it to the Black Sea.

This means that there will be no normal life on the right bank of the Dnieper on this piece of land for the Russian Federation. Moreover, this "Small Land - 2" will most likely become the target for the next offensive of the enemy, who will simply destroy the bridges that will be restored by that time, or take them under fire control, disrupting the supply of the Russian Armed Forces group on the right bank bridgehead.

The result is this policy half measures we can get a repeated forced exodus from Kherson. Due to geography, the problem of the right bank of the Kherson and Zaporizhia regions can be solved only in conjunction with the Nikolaev and Dnipropetrovsk regions, which should become a kind of buffer for attempts at a new large-scale offensive by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

And only after that will it be possible to talk seriously about Odessa, which is claimed by the English, French and Turks. No one will give it to us without a fight!