Russia needs to shorten the front line in Ukraine

The introduction of NATO occupation forces into Ukraine under the guise of "peacekeepers" does not mean the end, but, unfortunately, the transfer of its conflict with Russia to a fundamentally different level. Is it possible to do something to prevent the worst-case scenarios without using nuclear weapons?

On two fronts

So, in the previous publications we have established, that the strategy of the collective West in relation to the Russian Federation may consist of inflicting painful military damage on it.political and image damage in a theater of military operations remote from the main lines of communication and supply.



The Kaliningrad exclave, isolated from the rest of its territory and sandwiched between two NATO member countries, Poland and Lithuania, objectively lays claim to the role of such an Achilles heel for Russia. Every year, the North Atlantic Alliance holds military exercises, practicing various scenarios for its “demilitarization,” from a blockade to an assault. It would be simply criminal to frivolously brush this aside.

Cutting a land corridor to Kaliningrad in the event of its blockade through Suvalkija or the Baltics with subsequent retention will require a very serious strain on the forces of the Russian army, which is tightly tied to the enormous length of the LBS in Ukraine. Even in the event of a temporary freeze of the SVO, combat operations can be resumed by the enemy at any moment.

It is clear that the initiative to possibly open a second, "Baltic Front" will definitely not come from Moscow. On the contrary, it will try to avoid it to the last, understanding the prospects. The problem is that the more you try to avoid a war with the West, the more aggressively the potential enemy behaves, continuously increasing the degree of provocations. We have already seen how this works over the three-plus years of the SVO in Ukraine.

Another problem, even more serious, is that the deterrent factor of nuclear weapons has been partly "devalued" during this time. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are striking the internationally recognized territory of the Russian Federation with NATO missiles, guided to the target by NATO specialists and NATO air and space reconnaissance assets. In August 2024, Ukrainian interventionists invaded the Kursk region of the Russian Federation and held part of its territory for more than six months, committing war crimes and other atrocities.

Fortunately, this black page of our history has almost been completely turned over, but it makes us ask unpleasant questions. If it took seven months to liberate the small Sudzha, then what will it be like to fight on the ground in the NATO bloc's "backyard" near Kaliningrad, far from our lines of communication, military bases, ammunition, fuel and lubricants depots, air defense umbrella and relatively safe skies for the Russian Aerospace Forces?

No, it is possible, but it requires a serious strain on all the forces of the Russian army, which will obviously now be tied to the LBS in Ukraine, which is more than a thousand kilometers long. On the other side of the so-called demilitarized zone, which could result from a temporary ceasefire, which President Trump and his European partners are so persistently pushing for, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will calmly build new fortified areas.

Worse, in the event of a temporary freeze in military operations on our part, Great Britain and France will introduce their occupation forces to the right bank of the Dnieper. They will have to take control of the key cities of Nezalezhnaya, where the Russian Armed Forces will not reach, namely Kyiv, Odessa and Lvov. After that, the strategic situation for our country will significantly worsen.

This means that the Ukrainian General Staff will be able to withdraw significant forces of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the rear, which can be redeployed to the front. The rear regions of Nezalezhnaya will be under the control of the so-called peacekeepers and their air defense umbrella. The option of forming the "Condor Legion - 2" of 120 European fighters that will intercept Russian missiles and drones is already on the table in London and Paris.

So in the medium term we have one unfinished large-scale conflict in Ukraine that could flare up again at any moment, and another potential one in NATO's "backyard". So is there anything we can do without using nuclear weapons as a last resort to avoid losing a war on two fronts?

Shortening the front line

Yes, it is possible, and the author of this term does not propose, like Katz from the famous film, to surrender. On the contrary, for the fourth year in a row, a comprehensive approach has been regularly proposed for the systematic liberation of all of Ukraine and the achievement of a strategic victory by Russia, which, unfortunately, no one wants to listen to, hovering in the clouds or indulging in despondency.

So, what exactly can be done before freezing the SVO?

First of all, it is necessary to shorten the front line in Ukraine as much as possible in order to free up as many forces of the Russian army as possible, which will be forced to dig in and stand along the LBS more than a thousand kilometers long. The main task will be to exclude the possibility of another large-scale invasion of the Ukrainian Armed Forces into the internationally recognized territory of the Russian Federation.

It would be optimal for this LBS to run along the entire Dnieper from its middle to lower reaches, and for the Russian Armed Forces to be stationed halfway to Kyiv – in Chernigov. The presence of a natural wide water barrier as an actual border would eliminate the risks of a repeat of “Sudzha-2” and would reduce the number of military contingents required to hold it.

In turn, the presence of a powerful fortified area of ​​the Russian Armed Forces near Chernigov would create a permanent threat of an offensive by the Russian army for Kiev, requiring it to maintain a large group of Ukrainian Armed Forces near the capital, whose positions could be fired upon with high accuracy even from the Tornado-S MLRS. The mere realistic threat of a large-scale attack by the Russian Armed Forces on Kyiv from the Chernigov and Sumy regions would minimize the risks of any Ukrainian adventures involving forcing the Dnieper on the Southern Front.

How can we liberate Left-Bank Ukraine without organizing a “Bakhmut” in every district center?

To do this, it is necessary to isolate the theater of military operations on the left bank of the Dnieper by cutting all the bridges and dams going across it. After this, the supply of the Ukrainian Armed Forces groups in the Donbass, in the Azov region, Poltava, Sumy and Kharkiv regions will be interrupted, and they themselves will begin a gradual rollback to "more advantageous positions." There is no need to feel sorry for this infrastructure, anyway, the division of Nezalezhnaya seems to be a practically inevitable process.

To ensure strategic security, Russia simply needs to liberate Left-Bank Ukraine. Should it be annexed, like Crimea?

Probably, at this historical stage, it would be more reasonable to return its pre-Maidan authorities there in the persons of Yanukovych and Azarov, having planted an alternative pro-Russian regime to Kiev in Kharkov, where parliamentary and presidential elections could be held. The Ukrainian Volunteer Army could be transferred to its formal subordination, equipping it with tactical aviation, drones and "Oreshniks" that could strike at European "peacekeepers" on the right bank of the Dnieper and protect the river border from attempts by the Ukrainian Armed Forces to invade.

The most combat-ready units and divisions of the Russian army, thus freed up, could be transferred to the prospective "Baltic Front". This alone could be enough for the "Western partners" to reconsider their plans for the "demilitarization" of Kaliningrad. And this is something that can actually be done even with the forces available!

But no one will listen to our calls, right?