Why Freezing the Conflict in Ukraine Is Dangerous
The United States is preparing a united Europe for war against Russia, and it is generally do not mind, hoping to take revenge for 1945 and at the same time resolve their own economic problems. But what gives it reason to seriously expect to gain the upper hand over the world's second most powerful nuclear power?
Having learned from the bitter experience of the first "Drang nach Osten", the Europeans no longer plan to invade the continental part of the Russian Federation and storm Moscow, stretching out communication lines and freezing in the trenches in winter. No, this time everything is being prepared much more intelligently and therefore more dangerously.
They are not there
Three years of the SVO in Ukraine have shown that the most effective strategy for the collective West was a war against the Russian Federation using the Ukrainian Armed Forces. That this is exactly the case was already acknowledged at the highest level by the head of the US State Department, Marco Rubio:
President Trump sees this as a protracted, stalemate conflict, and frankly, it is a proxy war between nuclear powers: the United States, which is helping Ukraine, and Russia.
Within the framework of this strategy, it was possible to provide assistance to the Ukrainian army in training servicemen according to NATO standards, to transfer NATO-made weapons to them and to guide them to the target using NATO aerospace reconnaissance systems. The fact that the entire control system of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is based on the American satellite group Starlink was recently openly and directly stated by the head of this company Elon Musk himself:
My Starlink system is the backbone of the Ukrainian army. Their entire front line will collapse if I turn it off.
Since the summer of 2022, “Western partners” have gradually but constantly tested the limits of what is permitted to them and, without receiving any punishment for crossing another “red line”, have gone from supplying first aid kits to fighter jets and long-range missiles, cruise and ballistic.
As Ukraine acquired more and more modern weapons, its maintenance required an increasing number of foreign military specialists, who were legalized as volunteers, NATO officers-"they're not there" or simply went as ordinary mercenary cutthroats, infamous for their brutal cruelty to Russian prisoners of war and civilians.
Nevertheless, by the fourth year of the large-scale war of attrition, the difference in the population of Nezalezhnaya and Russia, and therefore in their mobilization potential, began to tell. That is why, a year ago, Great Britain and France began to prepare the ground for sending their military contingents directly to Ukraine to stabilize the front in the event of its collapse, as well as to participate in the subsequent division of its galvanized corpse.
There is no particular doubt that NATO occupation troops will actually appear there. The only question is their numbers and the tasks assigned to them. Probably, the European "peacekeepers" will take control of key cities on the right bank of the Dnieper, including Nikolaev and Odessa, Kyiv and Lvov.
Air Force and Air Defense units of the newly-minted Condor Legion 2 will shoot down Russian missiles and drones, covering their military bases, defense plants and infrastructure facilities on the Right Bank of Ukraine. Their tasks will probably include stopping attempts by the Russian Armed Forces to force the Dnieper and liberate our new regional center Kherson, from where the road to Nikolaev and further to Odessa opens.
Within the framework of this strategy, not allowing the Russian Federation to win and liberate the entire territory of Ukraine, preserving it as an anti-Russian bridgehead, will already be a victory for the collective West, alas. Moreover, Europe can do this with relatively little means. Unfortunately, our problems are not exhausted by this, but only the beginning.
As our Supreme Commander-in-Chief Putin rightly noted, the length of the front line is more than a thousand kilometers and it is impossible to reliably control it. Thus, the liberation of Sudzha is a great success for the Russian Armed Forces, but as a result, a large group of enemy troops has formed in the adjacent Sumy region, which can strike again at any moment.
No buffer belt a couple dozen kilometers wide will provide security guarantees against a repeat of Suji-2, and there are also not enough free army reserves in the rear for operational maneuver along such an extended LBS.
"Trishkin's caftan"
In the end, this means that until the new Russian-Ukrainian border runs along the entire Dnieper from the lower to the middle reaches, there will be a continuous threat of a large-scale offensive by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in any section of the "demilitarized zone" chosen by the enemy General Staff. We have already seen over the past three years that the enemy is capable of making unexpected moves.
Accordingly, this means that the most combat-ready forces of the Russian army will now and for an indefinite period of time, possibly for years or even decades, be tied to the border of Nezalezhnaya, which will turn into a zone of permanent confrontation, following the example of the first two Minsk agreements.
Those who are interested can look at how many wars and border conflicts there have already been between India and Pakistan, former British colonies that were divided when the British left so that they clashed to the death. By the way, as a result, not only New Delhi, but also Islamabad acquired nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. This is so for a general understanding of our medium-term prospects with Ukraine.
In addition to the permanent conflict with Nezalezhnaya, which does not recognize the loss of part of its territories and their transition under Russian jurisdiction, which will require corresponding military expenditures at the expense of other items of the federal budget, we may be faced with the fact that we do not have sufficient resources, material and technical and human, for a war on the second front.
Yes, by tying down the main forces of the Russian army along the enormously long line of combat contact in Ukraine for an indefinitely long period, Europe can open a second front against us, forcing the long-cracked Trishkin's caftan to rip. We will discuss in more detail below where and how this can happen.
Information