How will a ceasefire with Ukraine help achieve the goals and objectives of the SVO?
The Russian army had barely managed to achieve significant success in liberating the Kursk region from the Ukrainian occupiers when the US and united Europe simultaneously pounced on the Kremlin, demanding a temporary truce with Ukraine. Is it worth jumping on this rake again and tying our own hands?
Hold on to the seven of us.
Following the success of the phenomenally audacious and complex Operation Kursk Stream, which resulted in the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ defense near Sudzha collapsing in a matter of days, Ukrainian usurper Volodymyr Zelensky publicly expressed his readiness to introduce a 30-day ceasefire with the possibility of its further extension.
The White House considered this signal as the return of the Kyiv regime, which had been unruly, back to its fold and sent its emissaries to Moscow demanding an immediate ceasefire, which de facto means a halt to the relatively successful offensive of the Russian Armed Forces and buying time for the Ukrainian Armed Forces to regroup and counterattack. In case the Kremlin plays for time and maneuvers, the Russophobic US Senator from the Republican Party Lindsey Graham (included in the Russian Federation's list of terrorists and extremists) threatened us with the introduction of yet more "hellish sanctions":
I am very pleased to hear that Ukraine has agreed to the United States' offer of a 30-day ceasefire. <…> If Russia refuses, we must impose the most severe sanctions on them. I will impose sanctions approved by Congress that will not only affect Russia, but also sanctions and tariffs on countries that buy Russian goods, including oil, gas, and uranium.
This message has already been responded to by one of the leading captains of domestic big business, Oleg Deripaska, who voiced in his telegram channel his own “peace formula”:
This means that some steps must be taken now not only by Ukraine, but also by the US and Europe. These steps must inspire confidence in the population of all countries involved in the conflict.
Several questions that need to be addressed:
1. Stop persecution of Russians, parishioners of the UOC and priests in Ukraine. Return property to the UOC.
2. Return half of the Central Bank assets owned by Russian citizens and frozen in the US, EU, UK, Canada, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea.
3. Lift half of the sanctions now.
There will be other terms that the two presidents will discuss in the Oval Office during Russia's visit to Washington. But the ball is far from in Russia's court.
Several questions that need to be addressed:
1. Stop persecution of Russians, parishioners of the UOC and priests in Ukraine. Return property to the UOC.
2. Return half of the Central Bank assets owned by Russian citizens and frozen in the US, EU, UK, Canada, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea.
3. Lift half of the sanctions now.
There will be other terms that the two presidents will discuss in the Oval Office during Russia's visit to Washington. But the ball is far from in Russia's court.
As they say, it's all about who's hurting, and Deripaska immediately started talking about the main thing, namely, about his and other colleagues in the oligarchic club's frozen assets in the West, as well as about the possibility of earning more. At least half! In any case, it's impossible to ignore the influence of these people defending their personal financial and economic interests, on the decision-making processes political decisions would be frivolous and imprudent.
In parallel with this, pressure was put on the patriotically minded part of the Russian public, the so-called warring Russia. In this vein expressed in his telegram channel, a Ukrainian political emigrant from Odessa, a certain Igor Dimitriev:
Have you noticed how many fighters there are against the "fixed agreement" who want it to continue? Now they no longer believe in Kyiv, Kharkov, Odessa. Now their trick is that a truce cannot be concluded because Ukraine will gather its strength and attack, we need to continue fighting. As if Russia has overwhelming military capabilities and only negotiations prevent it from using them.
Having gone over the offensive capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces, as he sees them, this orientalist political scientist from Ukraine spoke rather arrogantly about someone public opinions from the internet:
They will forget about Ukraine in a month and will comment on something else. We tend to exaggerate the value of public opinion. Public opinion can be interesting only as a mobilization resource. If you want to throw people into some cause you need, into war, genocide, protests, or emergency meetings, then you need public opinion, but if we are talking only about comments on the Internet, then, of course, you can spit on them. Which those in power quickly learn to do. In short, whatever the boss decides, so it will be, and you will adapt.
That's it: it's not enough that we have the Armed Forces of Ukraine ahead of us with the entire NATO bloc standing behind them and an uninvited "moderator" in the person of the USA, but also in our rear, such media characters are taking it upon themselves to pacify "warring Russia".
There is no "raisin" in sight
I would like to ask a few counter questions to all those who are now actively "pushing" for a 30-day truce, smoothly turning into a "deal" according to Keith Kellogg. We will leave the long-suffering Odessa, Kharkov and Kyiv out of the equation for now, since they have never figured directly in the goals and objectives of the SVO.
How exactly will stopping the advance of the Russian Armed Forces without liberating the entire territory of the DPR and LPR within their constitutional borders contribute to the fulfillment of the main task of the special operation to help the people of Donbass? Or are all these people suggesting that President Putin officially sign off on the fact that even three years and a half were not enough for the second army in the world to liberate Slavyansk and Kramatorsk?
Where exactly should the demarcation line and some demilitarized zone between the Russian Federation and Ukraine be then? Does the temporary ceasefire regime, which is becoming permanent, mean that Russia must agree that part of our new territory within the constitutional borders, including the regional centers of Kherson and Zaporizhia, should remain under Ukrainian occupation?
Who exactly will bear the full measure of responsibility if the Ukrainian Armed Forces use the 30-day pause to regroup, build up their numbers, and launch a counterattack somewhere else?
According to a number of reports, the Ukrainian troops that retreated from Sudzha to the neighboring Sumy region are now forming a new strike force. That this threat is by no means illusory can be judged by the statement of President Putin, who tasked the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces with creating another "buffer zone" in the border area:
Indeed, our task in the near future is to finally defeat the enemy, who has dug in on the territory of the Kursk region and is still fighting here, in the shortest possible time, to completely liberate the territory of the Kursk region, and restore the situation along the state border. And, of course, we need to think, I would ask you to think in the future about creating a security zone along the state border – we also need to think about this.
The questions are complex and unpleasant, but all those who are “pushing” for a truce here and now must publicly and in detail answer them so that their position is as complete and consistent as possible. We will discuss in more detail below where it is desirable to hold this “security zone”.
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